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FROM PIRATES TO PARTNERS:
PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN CHINA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
*

PETER K. YU

Ultimately, we, as the inhabitants of the earth, have to realize that
with the development of modern technology, international
boundaries are fast shrinking and our interest are largely common.
Environmental damage in one part of the world has adverse effects
in countries thousands of miles away. The destruction of rain
forests of the Amazon can bring about famine in distant Africa and
oil slicks in the Gulf region can have serious adverse effects on
marine life as far as the Bay of Bengal. A detonation of atomic
weapons on a lonely atoll in distant Pacific might bring about
disastrous climatic changes in countries of Asia and an epidemic
originating in Central West Africa can seriously threaten the health
and life of people even in advanced countries of the Western
World. It must be realized that the world is really on cross roads. If
we want to progress on the right road, we have to shrink our
differences and to move together to advance the interests of
humankind.
The other way lies in universal disaster and
destruction.
1

— Chief Justice of India Madhukar Hiralal Kania


*

Copyright © 2001 Peter K. Yu. All rights reserved. Executive Director,
Intellectual Property Law Program & Deputy Director, Howard M. Squadron
Program in Law, Media & Society, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva
University; Research Associate, Programme in Comparative Media Law & Policy,
Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford. The Author would like to thank
Barton Beebe, Peter Feng, Marci Hamilton, John McGinnis, and Lyn Wu for their
helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. Madhukar Hiralal Kania, Advancing the Interests of Mankind by the Rule of Law,
in THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 6 (Subrata Roy Chowdhury
et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT].
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INTRODUCTION
Since the Second World War, information and high-technology
goods have become a very important sector of the American
2
economy. These goods have become even more important with the
emergence of the Internet and the transformation of the global
3
economy. To protect its economic interests, the United States has
been very aggressive in pushing for a universal intellectual property
regime, which offers information and high-technology goods uniform
4
protection throughout the world.
Intellectual property has,
therefore, moved from a meager bilateral issue to the forefront of the
5
international trade debate. To increase its leverage, the U.S.

2. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA 9 (Alan S. Gutterman & Robert
Brown eds., 1997) (noting that the share of intellectual property-based exports in the
United States has doubled since the Second World War); R. Michael Gadbaw &
Rosemary E. Gwynn, Intellectual Property Rights in the New GATT Round, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 38, 45 (R.
Michael Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards eds., 1988) [hereinafter GLOBAL CONSENSUS,
GLOBAL CONFLICT?] (“The new reality is that the U.S. economy is increasingly
dependent for its competitiveness on its ability to protect the value inherent in
intellectual property. United States exports are increasingly weighted toward goods
with a high intellectual property content.”); Bruce A. Lehman, Speech Given at the
Inaugural Engelberg Conference on Culture and Economics of Participation in an
International Intellectual Property Regime, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 211, 211 (1997)
(“Many Americans have begun to derive their livelihoods from products of their
minds, as opposed to products of manual labor, and much of [its] gross domestic
product is attributable to new information and entertainment-based industries which
have an interest in protecting their valuable products through intellectual property
rights.”).
3. See ECONOMICS & STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
DIGITAL ECONOMY 2000 (2000), available at http://www.esa.doc.gov/De2000rev.pdf
(discussing the increasing importance of information goods in the New Economy).
4. See Donald E. deKieffer, U.S. Trade Policy Regarding Intellectual Property Matters,
in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE SEARCH FOR A BALANCED
SYSTEM 97 (George R. Stewart et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY] (recounting the development of the U.S. intellectual
property policy).
5. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]; JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE & SPLEENS:
LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF INFORMATION SOCIETY 2 (1996) (“[T]he protection of
information ‘value-added’ in products is one of the key elements in the foreign
policy of the developed world. Intellectual property—which stretches beyond
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government has threatened to impose trade sanctions on countries
that fail to provide adequate intellectual property protection to
6
American products.
During the last decade, the United States repeatedly threatened
China with a series of economic sanctions, trade wars, non-renewal of
Most Favored Nation (“MFN”) status, and opposition to entry into
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”). Such threats eventually led
to compromises by the Chinese government and the signing of
7
intellectual property agreements in 1992, 1995, and 1996. Despite
these agreements, intellectual property piracy remains rampant in
China. Every year, the United States loses over $2 billion of revenues
8
due to intellectual property piracy in China.
Although China initially had serious concerns about the United
States’s threats of trade sanctions, the constant use of such threats by
the U.S. government has led China to change its reaction and
approach. By 1996, it had become obvious that the existing
American foreign intellectual property policy was ineffective,
misguided, and self-deluding. The United States not only lost its
9
credibility, but its constant use of trade threats helped China

‘information’ conventionally defined—has become a major area of international
concern.”); Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Combating Piracy of Intellectual Property in
International Markets: A Proposed Modification of the Special 301 Action, 24 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 505, 506 (1991) (“The increasing importance of intellectual property
rights in world markets has pushed the issue of their proper legal treatment to the
forefront of domestic and international debate.”); R. Michael Gadbaw, Intellectual
Property and International Trade: Merger or Marriage of Convenience, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 223, 225 (1989) (examining “the interaction between trade and
intellectual property rights policies through key developments in United States law,
the General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade (GATT), and the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO)”); Congressman Robert W. Kastenmeier & David
Beier, International Trade and Intellectual Property: Promise, Risks, and Reality, 22 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 285, 286-87 (1989) (recounting how the issue of intellectual
property came to be included in the Uruguay Round).
6. See infra Part I (discussing the various threats made by the U.S. government to
China in the late 1980s and early 1990s).
7. See Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual
Property, Jan. 17, 1992, P.R.C.-U.S., T.I.A.S. No. 12036 (1995) [hereinafter 1992
MOU]; Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, Feb. 26, 1995, P.R.C.-U.S.,
34 I.L.M. 881 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Agreement]; China Implementation of the
1995 Intellectual Property Rights Agreement, June 17, 1996, P.R.C.-U.S., available at
http://www.mac.doc.gov/TCC/DATA/index.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2000)
[hereinafter 1996 Accord].
8. See Seth Faison, China Turns Blind Eye to Pirated Disks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,
1998, at D1 [hereinafter Faison, China Turns Blind Eye].
9. As Greg Mastel explained:
The stakes in this dispute, however, go far beyond just the dollar value of
Chinese piracy. American credibility is on the line. Less than one year ago,
U.S. and Chinese negotiators reached the second agreement in three years
to end piracy of intellectual property, but that agreement appears to have
had little, if any, effect. China also appears to have failed to comply with
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10

improve its ability to resist American demands. Such threats and
11
bullying also created hostility among the Chinese people, making
the government more reluctant to adopt Western intellectual
property law reforms.
Even worse, the ill-advised bilateral policy had created a pattern of
ineffectiveness and futility, based on which an observer can forecast
the outcome of the future intellectual property negotiations between
China and the United States. Under this pattern, the United States
begins by threatening China with trade sanctions. China then
retaliates with countersanctions of a similar amount. After several
months of bickering and posturing, both countries come to a lastminute compromise by signing a new intellectual property
agreement. Although intellectual property protection improves
during the first few months immediately after the signing of the

every major trade agreement it has struck with the United States in recent
years. The United States has threatened China with trade sanctions for its
many trade sins a half-dozen times in recent years without making good on
its threats. In the eyes of the Chinese, continued empty U.S. threats have
little credibility.
Greg Mastel, Piracy in China: No Mickey Mouse Issue, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1996, at
A27; see also JAMES MANN, ABOUT FACE:
A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S CURIOUS
RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA, FROM NIXON TO CLINTON 311 (2000) (“Clinton’s retreat
on human rights made matters worse than if he had never imposed his MFN
conditions. . . . [I]t had shown that American would back down from the threats it
made about human rights and democracy in cases where its commercial and strategic
interests were jeopardized.”); James Lilley, Trade and the Waking Giant—China, Asia,
and American Engagement, in BEYOND MFN: TRADE WITH CHINA AND AMERICAN
INTERESTS 36, 53 (James R. Lilley & Wendell L. Willkie II eds., 1994) [hereinafter
BEYOND MFN] (arguing that President Clinton was not credible to foreign leaders
because he failed to carry out threats made to China); James D. Morrow, The Strategic
Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics, in
STRATEGIC CHOICE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 77 (David A. Lake & Robert Powell
eds., 1999) (emphasizing the importance of credibility in international relations).
10. See RICHARD BERNSTEIN & ROSS H. MUNRO, THE COMING CONFLICT WITH CHINA
82-129 (Vintage Books 1998). As Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro pointed out,
China successfully inverted the American coercive approach:
The method used in the past by the United States was to threaten Beijing
with high import duties on its products sold in America—resulting from a
withdrawal of China’s Most-Favored-Nation status—unless the regime
stopped jailing its political dissenters. That initiative, little more than a
clumsy and ultimately transparent bluff, failed abysmally. China in its way
inverted the American approach. Beijing threatened to impose the
equivalent of economic sanctions against the United States—an effective
boycott on the purchase of high-technology products and curbs on American
investments in China—unless it dropped its policy of pressure and threats.
The difference is that China’s bluff was taken seriously, and its strategy has
been remarkably successful.
Id. at 83.
11. See Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Predjudice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use Shakespeare
to Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1 (2001)
(arguing that the coercive U.S. intellectual property policy toward China had created
resentment among the Chinese people).
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agreement, the piracy problem revives once international attention is
diverted and the foreign push dissipates. Within a short period of
time, American businesses again complain to the U.S. government,
12
and the cycle repeats itself.
In light of this frustrating pattern, scholars, policymakers, and
commentators have called for a critical assessment and reformulation
of the existing U.S.-China intellectual property policy. Such
reformulation was made possible when Chinese President Jiang
Zemin met with U.S. President Bill Clinton at the U.S.-China Summit
13
in October 1997. After the Summit, the two leaders issued the Joint
14
U.S.-China Statement (“Joint Statement”), proclaiming their
15
intention to build a “constructive strategic partnership.” This Joint
Statement not only presents a new model upon which the two
countries are to build their diplomatic relations, but also provides a
conceptual framework under which a new bilateral intellectual
16
property policy is to be developed.
This Article traces the existing ineffective American foreign
intellectual property policy and examines how a constructive strategic
partnership provides a new conceptual framework under which
policymakers can reformulate such a policy. Part I of this Article
traces the breakdown of the American intellectual property policy
toward China. This Part argues that U.S. trade threats have become
increasingly unsuccessful in eliciting responses and concessions from
the Chinese government with respect to intellectual property
protection. Part II examines the 1997 U.S.-China Summit and the
constructive strategic partnership pronounced in the Joint Statement
issued after the Summit. This Part explains how this partnership
model paves the way for a new bilateral intellectual property policy.
To help policymakers formulate such a policy, Part III develops a
twelve-step action plan using the constructive strategic partnership
model. Targeting the shortcomings of the existing ineffective

12. See Gregory S. Feder, Note, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China:
You Can Lead a Horse to Water, But You Can’t Make It Drink, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 223, 25051 (1996) (describing a similar cycle); see also Editorial, Surprise! A Deal with China,
WALL ST. J., June 18, 1996, at A22 [hereinafter Surprise! A Deal with China] (“One of
the Clinton Administration’s specialties is threatening a trade war and then striking a
deal at the 11th hour.”).
13. See John M. Broder, Summit in Washington: The Overview; U.S. and China Reach
Trade Pacts but Clash on Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1997, at A1 (reporting on the 1997
U.S.-China Summit).
14. Joint United States-China Statement, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1680, 1683
(Oct. 29, 1997) [hereinafter Joint Statement].
15. See id. at 1681.
16. See id. (providing a conceptual framework for developing bilateral relations
between China and the United States).
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American foreign intellectual property policy, this action plan aims to
cultivate a more stable and harmonious relationship of the two
countries, to foster better mutual understanding between each other,
and to promote a self-sustainable intellectual property regime in
China.
I.

CHINA’S RESPONSES TO AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY POLICY

The Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of
17
America and the People’s Republic of China of 1979 (“1979
Agreement”) marked the beginning of Western intellectual property
protection in post-Mao China. This Agreement provided that “each
Party shall seek, under its laws and with due regard to international
practice, to ensure to legal or natural persons of the other Party
protection of patents and trademarks equivalent to the patent and
18
trademark protection correspondingly accorded by the other Party.”
The Agreement also provided that “each Party shall take appropriate
measures, under its laws and regulations and with due regard to
international practice, to ensure to legal or natural persons of the
other Party protection of copyrights equivalent to the copyright
19
protection correspondingly accorded by the other Party.” Pursuant
to this Agreement, China became a member of the World Intellectual
Property Organization (“WIPO”) in 1980 and of the Paris Convention
20
for the Protection of Industrial Property in 1984. China also
21
22
promulgated a new trademark law in 1982 and a new patent statute
in 1984 (“1984 Patent Law”).
Even though the new trademark and patent laws granted
individuals rights over their creations and inventions, these laws were
designed mainly to promote “socialist legality with Chinese
23
characteristics.” Uneasy about the introduction of private property

17. Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and
the People’s Republic of China of 1979, July 7, 1979, P.R.C.-U.S., 31 U.S.T. 4652
[hereinafter 1979 Agreement].
18. Id. art. VI (3), 31 U.S.T. at 4658.
19. Id. art. VI (5), 31 U.S.T. at 4658.
20. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as
last revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828
U.N.T.S. 305.
21. Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China, translated in THE LAW OF
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1979-1982, at 305 (1987).
22. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, translated in THE LAWS OF THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1983-1986, at 65 (1987) [hereinafter 1984 Patent Law].
23. See WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 70 (1995). As noted in the
White Paper released by the State Council in 1994, intellectual property laws aim “to
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and the potential conflict between intellectual property laws and the
24
national interest, the Chinese government placed substantial limits
on the rights granted under the new statutes. Consider, for example,
25
Article 6 of the 1984 Patent Law.
While this provision granted
patent protection to “job-related invention-creation,” it limited
ownership to the work unit (danwei), the enterprise, or the joint
26
venture. The implementing regulations further defined the term
“job-related invention-creations” broadly to encompass virtually
anything made on or in relation to one’s job, using materials or data
27
from one’s unit, or within a year of leaving one’s unit. Given the
28
importance of a work unit in a socialist economy and the difficulty
in securing sophisticated equipment or sizable capital at the time the
29
statute was promulgated, the statute had effectively frustrated
individuals from holding job-related patents in their own names.
In the beginning, the United States was willing to compromise its
intellectual property rights, because the country was eager to lure
30
China into the “family of nations.” By the mid-1980s, the United

rapidly develop social productive forces, promote overall social progress, meet the
needs of developing a socialist market economy and expedite China’s entry into the
world economy.” INFORMATION OFFICE, STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN CHINA (1994), translated in BBC
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, June 20, 1994, available at LEXIS, News Library,
BBCSWB File.
24. See ALFORD, supra note 23, at 70.
25. 1984 Patent Law, supra note 22, art. 6. Article 6 of the 1984 Patent Law
provided, in pertinent part:
For a job-related invention-creation made by any person in execution of
the tasks of the unit to which he belongs or by primarily using the material
resources of the unit, the right to apply for a patent shall belong to the unit.
For an invention-creation that is not job-related, the right to apply for a
patent shall belong to the inventor or designer. After an application is
approved, if it was filed by a unit owned by the whole people, the patent
right shall be held by such unit; if it was filed by a collectively owned unit or
an individual, the patent right shall be owned by such unit or individual.
For a job-related invention-creation made by any staff member or worker
of a foreign-owned enterprise or a Chinese-foreign equity joint venture
within the territory of China, the right to apply for a patent shall belong to
the enterprise or joint venture. For an invention-creation that is not jobrelated, the right to apply for a patent shall belong to the inventor or
designer. After the application is approved, the patent right shall be owned
by the enterprise, joint venture or individual that applied for it.
Id.
26. Id.
27. ALFORD, supra note 23, at 71 (citing Rule 10 of the Implementing Regulations
for the 1984 Patent Law).
28. A unit typically provides industrial workers in a socialist economy with
housing, welfare benefits, social context, and employment. Id.
29. Id.
30. As Professor Alford explained:
The United States was willing to accept such broad language from a nation
then lacking patent and copyright laws and with relatively little in the way of
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31

Impatient with the lack of
States’s attitude had changed.
improvement in intellectual property protection in China, the
American government started to look for pro-active solutions seeking
to solve the Chinese piracy problem. Among the various solutions
32
was Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (“Section 301”), which has
33
been referred to as “the H-bomb of trade policy.” This “H-bomb”
was developed in response to Congress’s dissatisfaction with the
34
outdated General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the
35
agreement’s inability to protect American economic interests.

trademark protection because of its eagerness to “normalize” relations with
the PRC and its attempts to generate support in the American business
community for its China policy by suggesting a more favorable climate for
doing business than existed. In this and a range of comparable steps
designed to enlist support for normalization, however, the Carter
administration raised undue expectations on the part of the business
community, the American public more broadly, and the Chinese themselves
as to the suitability of Chinese conditions for international business.
[Despite this agreement, t]he two sides have disagreed as to whether
Article VI of the 1979 trade agreement actually committed the PRC to
protect American intellectual property or merely to aspire toward such
protection. For years, PRC commentators dismissed the notion that Article
VI created an obligation to provide any specific protection. Interestingly,
with the promulgation of the PRC’s Copyright Law in 1990, some Chinese
commentators argue that in fact Article VI constitutes a bilateral copyright
agreement for purposes of that law, thereby enabling citizens of one nation
to secure rights in the other, regardless of which works are first published.
Id. at 152-53 nn.67-68.
31. “At a 1985 meeting to the U.S. China Joint Committee on Commerce and
Trade (JCCT), the U.S. for the first time expressed concerns about weak Chinese IPR
standards. In 1987, the U.S. put IPR protection on the agenda for U.S.-China market
access talks.” Warren H. Maruyama, U.S.-China IPR Negotiations: Trade, Intellectual
Property, and the Rule of Law in a Global Economy, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW AND PRACTICE 165, 186 (Mark A. Cohen et al. eds., 1999).
32. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (1994).
33. Judith Hippler Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act: A
Legislative History of the Amendments to Section 301, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM:
AMERICA’S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 49, 52 (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990) [hereinafter AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM]
(quoting Comparing Major Trade Bills: Hearings on S. 490, S. 636, and H.R. 3 Before the
Senate Comm. on Fin., 100th Cong., pt. 1, at 19 (1987) (statement of USTR Clayton
Yeutter)).
34. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3 (pts. 5 &
6), 55 U.N.T.S. 188.
35. The legislative history of Section 301 states:
[T]he President ought to be able to act or threaten to act under Section 301,
whether or not such action would be entirely consistent with the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Many GATT articles . . . are either
inappropriate in today’s economic world or are being observed more often
in the breach, to the detriment of the United States. . . . The Committee is
not urging that the United States undertake wanton or reckless retaliatory
action under Section 301 in total disdain of applicable international
agreements. However, the Committee felt it was necessary to make it clear
that the President could act to protect U.S. economic interests whether or
not such action was consistent with the articles of an outmoded international
agreement initiated by the Executive 25 years ago and never approved by

YUPPREPAGED6501USETHISONE.DOC

2000]

FROM PIRATES TO PARTNERS

8/15/2001 11:34 AM

139

Aiming to eliminate unfair trade practices and to open foreign
36
markets, Section 301 permits the U.S. President to investigate and
impose sanctions on countries engaging in unfair trade practices that
37
threaten the United States’ economic interests.
In 1988, Congress introduced the Omnibus Trade and
38
Competitiveness Act, which amended Section 301 by including two
39
new provisions—Super 301 and Special 301. Super 301 required the
United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) to review U.S. trade
expansion priorities and identify priority foreign country practices
40
that pose major barriers to U.S. exports. Unlike Super 301, Special

Congress.
S. REP. NO. 1298, 93d Cong. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 7304; see also
Kim Newby, The Effectiveness of Special 301 in Creating Long Term Copyright Protection for
U.S. Companies Overseas, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 29, 33 (1995) (“The enacting
of 301 was seen as a direct result of Congressional dissatisfaction with the manner in
which U.S. trade was being protected under GATT.”); Susan Tiefenbrun, Piracy of
Intellectual Property in China and the Former Soviet Union and Its Effects upon International
Trade: A Comparison, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 40 (1998) (“Section 301 for the Trade Act of
1974 arose from the need perceived by the United States to strike back against unfair
trade practices that were not enforced by GATT panel condemnation.”).
36. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Aggressive Unilateralism: An Overview, in AGGRESSIVE
UNILATERALISM, supra note 33, at 1, 4 (identifying the objectives behind Section 301
as addressing unfair trade practices and opening foreign markets).
37. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420. Section 301 provides for both mandatory and
discretionary actions:
Action must be taken when trade agreements are being violated. Action is
not required in five specific circumstances: if (1) a GATT panel concludes
there is no unfair trade practice; (2) the USTR believes the foreign
government is taking steps to solve the problem; (3) the foreign government
agrees to provide compensation; (4) the action could adversely affect the
American economy disproportionately to the benefit to be achieved; and
(5) the national security of the United States could be harmed through
action. The USTR has discretion to investigate foreign practices and impose
sanctions on its own initiative or at the behest of domestic industries that
petition for redress. To impose sanctions, the USTR must determine
(1) that an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country is unreasonable or
discriminatory and burdens or restricts United States commerce; and
(2) that action by the United States is appropriate.
A. Lynne Puckett & William L. Reynolds, Rules, Sanctions and Enforcement Under Section
301: At Odds with the WTO?, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 675, 677-78 (1996) (footnotes
omitted).
38. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2495.
39. “The new Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988 is probably the most criticized piece of U.S. foreign trade legislation since the
Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act of 1930.” Robert E. Hudec, Thinking About the New Section
301: Beyond Good and Evil, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM, supra note 33, at 113, 113.
See generally AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM, supra note 33, for an excellent collection of
essays discussing Super 301 and Special 301.
40. See 19 U.S.C. § 2420(a)(1)(A)-(B). Super 301 expired in 1990, and President
Clinton reinstated the provision by an executive order in March 1994. See Exec.
Order No. 12,901, 59 Fed. Reg. 10,727 (1994). Despite the reinstatement, thenUSTR Mickey Kantor did not identify any Super 301 targets. See Puckett & Reynolds,
supra note 37, at 681. Due to heavy criticism, the Clinton Administration did not
request legislative renewal of this controversial provision. Id.
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301 targets only unfair trade practices concerning intellectual
property rights. Special 301 requires the USTR to identify foreign
countries that provide inadequate intellectual property protection or
that deny American intellectual property goods fair or equitable
41
market access. Upon either identification, the USTR must initiate
within thirty days an investigation into the act, policy, or practice of
42
the identified country and request a consultation with the country
43
regarding its offending practices. If the issues remain unresolved
44
after six months, which may be extended to nine months under
45
certain statutory conditions, the USTR may suspend or withdraw
trade benefits, impose duties or other restrictions, or enter into
binding agreements that require the offending nation to eliminate or
46
phase out its offending practice or to compensate the United States.
Since the introduction of Super 301 and Special 301, the American
government has used them repeatedly to pressure foreign countries
47
to reform their intellectual property regimes.
48
In 1989, the USTR, urged by American business executives,

41. See 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a)(1)(A).
42. See id. § 2412(b)(2)(A).
43. See id. § 2413(a)(1); see also ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE
NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 107
(1995) (“Under Section 301, the ‘defendant’ has an opportunity to be heard, but as
a matter of grace, not of right.” (emphasis added)).
44. See 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(3)(A); see also Davis, supra note 5, at 519 (“Unlike the
more typical section 301 investigation, which has a twelve to eighteen month
timetable, a section 301 investigation stemming from a Special 301 priority
designation is conducted under a six month ‘fast-track’ system.” (footnotes
omitted)).
45. The three statutory requirements are as follows:
(i) complex or complicated issues are involved in the investigation that
require additional time,
(ii) the foreign country involved in the investigation is making substantial
progress in drafting or implementing legislative or administrative measures
that will provide adequate and effective protection of intellectual property
rights, or
(iii) such foreign country is undertaking enforcement measures to provide
adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights.
19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(3)(B).
46. See id. § 2411(c)(1).
47. See Newby, supra note 35, at 39 (discussing the Special 301 actions in Taiwan,
China, and Thailand).
48. See Daniel Southerland, U.S. Businesses Urge Trade Sanctions to Stop Piracy of
Software in China, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1989, at E7; see also MANN, supra note 9, at 13132, 302-03 (comparing the relationships between the U.S. government and U.S.
business executives during the Reagan era and the Clinton era); Jeffrey E. Garten,
Business and Foreign Policy, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 1997, at 67, 69 (“Business was able
to drive a good deal of foreign policy because of unique features of American society.
Corporate leaders, lawyers, and investment bankers were able to move in and out of
the highest levels of government.”); Paul C.B. Liu, U.S. Industry’s Influence on
Intellectual Property Negotiations and Special 301 Actions, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 87, 87
(1994) [hereinafter Liu, U.S. Industry’s Influence] (“The influence of U.S. industries
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49

placed China on the “Priority Watch List.” By doing so, the United
States gained leverage in negotiations with China while it did not
need to initiate a Section 301 investigation. In response to the
50
Priority Watch List designation, China passed a new copyright law
51
and issued new implementing regulations in 1990. A separate set of
52
computer software regulations followed in 1991.
Notwithstanding these legislative efforts, the United States found
intellectual property protection in China unsatisfactory. On April 26,
1991, the United States upgraded China to a “Priority Foreign

and industrial organizations is evident in recent legislative actions [concerning
intellectual property protection]. Although Congress still accommodates different,
and sometimes conflicting, interests in a given issue, industries have gained enough
government recognition, if not sufficient protection, for their special interests.”).
Dean Garten, the former Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade,
argued that business becomes more important to the American government than it
used to be:
Washington needs business more than ever to reinforce its goals. The
executive branch depends almost entirely on business for technical
information regarding trade negotiations, all the more so as the Washington
bureaucracy is downsized even as it negotiates an even broader range of
issues. In all emerging markets, America’s political and economic goals
depend largely on the direct investments in factories or other hard assets
that only business can deliver. It can make an enormous difference, too, if
American business executives reinforce Washington’s human rights efforts
with private diplomacy as well as public actions to improve working
conditions.
Garten, supra, at 71.
“Under Section 301, industry representatives serve as advisors to the USTR and
have direct input in U.S. international negotiation strategies.” Id. at 88; see also
19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(2) (requiring the USTR to determine whether to initiate an
investigation within forty-five days after receiving a petition regarding unfair foreign
trade practices). Among the most active and influential industry participants in the
Special 301 processes are International Intellectual Property Alliance, Business
Software Alliance, International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition, Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association, International Trademark Association, Microsoft
Corporation, and Nintendo Corporation. See Liu, U.S. Industry’s Influence, supra, at
88-89; see also id. at 97-110 (describing the operations of major U.S. interest groups
and industries in the intellectual property industry); ROBERT G. SUTTER, U.S. POLICY
TOWARD CHINA: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ROLE OF INTEREST GROUPS (1998)
(examining the growing influence of organized interests on the U.S. policy toward
China).
49. The “Priority Watch List” includes “countries whose actions, policies, and
practices meet some, but not all, of the criteria for priority foreign country
identification. These actions, policies, or practices warrant active work for resolution
and close monitoring to determine whether further Special 301 action is necessary.”
Liu, U.S. Industry’s Influence, supra, at 95. The USTR also maintains a “watch list” of
countries whose intellectual property practices or market access barriers warrant
special attention. See id.
50. Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China 1990, translated in 2 China
L. Foreign Bus. (CCH) ¶ 11-700 (1993) [hereinafter Copyright Law].
51. Copyright Law Implementing Regulations 1990, translated in 2 China L.
Foreign Bus. (CCH) ¶ 11-702(7) (1993).
52. Computer Software Protection Rules 1991, translated in 2 China L. Foreign
Bus. (CCH) ¶ 11-704 (1993).
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53

Country.” A month later, the United States initiated a Special 301
54
investigation on China’s intellectual property rights practices. To
increase its leverage, the American government threatened to impose
retaliatory tariffs of $1.5 billion on Chinese textiles, shoes, electronic
55
instruments, and pharmaceuticals. China quickly responded with
countersanctions of a similar amount on American commodities,
56
such as aircraft, cotton, corn, steel, and chemicals. Hours before
the deadline for imposing sanctions, both countries averted a
57
potential trade war by signing the Memorandum of Understanding
Between China (PRC) and the United States on the Protection of
58
Intellectual Property (“1992 MOU”).
59
Pursuant to the 1992 MOU, China amended the 1984 Patent Law,
60
promulgated new patent regulations, and acceded to the Patent
61
Cooperation Treaty. The new patent law extends the duration of
patent protection from fifteen to twenty years; affords protection to
all chemical inventions, including pharmaceuticals and agrichemical
products; and sharply restricts the availability of compulsory
62
licenses.
In addition, China acceded to the Berne Convention for the
63
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and ratified the Geneva
Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against
64
Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms. To comply with

53. See OFFICE OF USTR, 1995 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN
TRADE BARRIERS 47, 54 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 NTE REPORT].
54. See id.
55. See Sheryl WuDunn, Nonstate Plants in China at Risk in U.S. Talks, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 1992, at A9.
56. See David Holley, China Warns of Trade War with U.S. over Patents, Copyrights;
Economic Ties: ‘Excessive’ Demands May Lead to Higher Tariffs on American Commodities
Worth $1.2 Billion, Beijing Warns, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1992, at A6.
57. See Stuart Auerbach, China, U.S. Reach Trade Accord; Beijing Agrees to Curb Piracy
of Products, Safeguarded Material, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1992, at A24; Keith Bradsher,
U.S. and China Reach Accord on Copying, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1992, at D1.
58. 1992 MOU, supra note 7.
59. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China 1992, translated in 2 China L.
Foreign Bus. (CCH) ¶ 11-600 (1993); see also 1992 MOU, supra note 7, art. 1(2),
T.I.A.S. No. 12,036, at 3 (agreeing that China would exert its best efforts to
implement amendments to the Patent Law by January 1, 1993).
60. Patent Law Implementing Regulations of the People’s Republic of China
1992, translated in 2 China L. Foreign Bus. (CCH) ¶ 11-602 (1993).
61. See Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S.
231.
62. See 1992 MOU, supra note 7, art. 1(1), T.I.A.S. No. 12,036, at 3.
63. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, as last revised in Paris, July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221; see also 1992 MOU, supra
note 7, art. 3(1), T.I.A.S. No. 12,036, at 6 (stipulating that China would adhere to the
Berne Convention and will submit legislation authorizing such accession).
64. Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against
Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms, Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309; see
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these newly adopted multilateral treaties, the Chinese government
amended the 1990 Copyright Law and issued new implementing
65
regulations.
The amended copyright statute protects computer
software programs as literary works for fifty years; removes formalities
on copyright protection; and extends protection to all works
originating in a Berne Convention country, including sound
66
recordings in the public domain.
In 1993, China updated its
67
trademark law by including criminal penalties within the statute. It
also adopted a new unfair competition law that affords protection to
68
trade secrets.
Taken as a whole, the 1992 MOU was very successful in establishing
a new intellectual property regime in China. However, a regime
alone was not enough, especially when it was not properly
implemented. By 1994, American businesses again complained about
the lack of intellectual property protection in China and the
69
significant losses incurred as a result.
The 1995 National Trade
Estimate Report estimated that U.S. industries suffered almost $850
70
million in losses due to copyright theft alone. The entertainment
and business industries were greatly concerned because China
71
exported its counterfeit products to other countries. According to
then-USTR Mickey Kantor, enforcement of intellectual property laws
in China was “sporadic at best and virtually non-existent for
72
copyrighted works.” In addition to inadequate intellectual property
protection, a study by the United States Semiconductor Industry
Association identified other problems, such as “the imposition of ad
hoc taxes and charges, corruption, smuggling, frequent sweeping
changes in laws and regulations, and the blurring of lines of

also 1992 MOU, supra note 7, art. 3(2), T.I.A.S. No. 12,036, at 6 (stipulating that
China would accede to and ratify the Geneva Convention).
65. See 1992 MOU, supra note 7, art. 3(4), T.I.A.S. No. 12,036, at 6 (stipulating
that China would issue regulations to ensure compliance of its copyright laws with
the 1992 MOU and with the Berne and Geneva Conventions).
66. See id. art. 3(6)-(8), T.I.A.S. No. 12,036, at 7-8.
67. Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China of 1993, translated in
2 China L. Foreign Bus. (CCH) ¶ 11-500 (1993).
68. See 1992 MOU, supra note 7, art. 4, T.I.A.S. No. 12,036, at 8.
69. See generally Patrick H. Hu, “Mickey Mouse” in China: Legal and Cultural
Implications in Protecting U.S. Copyrights, 14 B.U. INT’L L.J. 81, 93 (1996).
70. See 1995 NTE REPORT, supra note 53, at 54.
71. See Hu, supra note 69, at 93 (pointing out that American companies were
particularly concerned about exports of counterfeits because those exports would
deprive those companies of other foreign markets); Feder, supra note 12, at 242
(“The ‘last straw’ seems to have come when China began exporting pirated products
in large volume.”); Seth Faison, Copyright Pirates Prosper in China Despite Promises, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 1996, at A1 (highlighting the illicit export market as the most serious
concern for international music and software companies).
72. Feder, supra note 12, at 242.
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73

authority.”
On June 30, 1994, the USTR again designated China a Priority
Foreign Country and immediately initiated a Special 301
74
investigation.
By December 31, the two countries still had not
75
reached an agreement. To allow time for more negotiations, the
Clinton Administration extended the negotiation period for sixty
76
days. The Administration also threatened to impose 100% tariffs on
over $1 billion worth of Chinese imports, ranging from plastic picture
77
frames to cellular telephones. In response, China retaliated with a
counterthreat of 100 percent tariffs on American-made compact discs
78
(“CDs”), cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, and other products. China
also announced that it would suspend negotiations with American
auto-makers over the creation of joint ventures in China for
manufacturing mini-vans and passenger cars, one of the top trade
79
priorities of the Clinton Administration. According to the Xinhua
News Agency, China’s international news service, China needed to
take such retaliatory measures “to protect its sovereignty and national
80
dignity.” Both trade sanctions were slated to take effect on February
81
26, 1995.
Despite these threats and counterthreats, the two countries
reached a compromise hours before the February 26 deadline.
Through an exchange of correspondence, the countries reached the
82
Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights
(“1995
83
Agreement”), averting another potential trade war.
While many
attributed this last-minute compromise to the closure of twenty-nine

73. Assafa Endeshaw, A Critical Assessment of the U.S.-China Conflict on Intellectual
Property, 6 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 295, 315 (1996) (quoting USA: SIA Warning—Chinese
Chips Burn Fingers, REUTER TEXTLINE ELECS. WKLY., Feb. 22, 1995, at 10, available at
LEXIS, World Library, TXTLNE File) (internal quotations omitted). Interestingly,
the coercive American foreign intellectual property policy was partly responsible for
the frequent sweeping changes in laws and regulations in China.
74. See 1995 NTE REPORT, supra note 53, at 54.
75. See David E. Sanger, U.S. Threatens $2.8 Billion of Tariffs on China Exports, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 1995, at A14 [hereinafter Sanger, U.S. Threatens $2.8 Billion of Tariffs].
76. See U.S. Delay on China Move, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1994, at D2.
77. See Martha M. Hamilton, U.S. to Hit China with Stiff Tariffs; Sanctions Are Largest
Ever Imposed, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1995, at A1 [hereinafter Hamilton, U.S. to Hit China
with Stiff Tariffs].
78. See id.
79. David E. Sanger, President Imposes Trade Sanctions on Chinese Goods, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 5, 1995, at A1.
80. Hamilton, U.S. to Hit China with Stiff Tariffs, supra note 77, at A1.
81. See id.
82. 1995 Agreement, supra note 7.
83. See Seth Faison, U.S. and China Sign Accord to End Piracy of Software, Music
Recordings and Film, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1995, at A1; Steven Mufson, Trade War Averted
by U.S. China; Beijing Would Protect Intellectual Property in Tentative Accord, WASH. POST,
Feb. 26, 1995, at A1 [hereinafter Mufson, Trade War Averted by U.S. China].
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84

CD factories, including the notorious Shenfei Factory in Shenzhen,
most China watchers were not surprised by the eleventh-hour final
85
agreement.
“Too much was at stake for both countries. U.S.
businesses did not want to lose deals or to be edged out of China’s
market, and China could ill afford to be shut out of the U.S. market,
86
which absorbs a third of its exports.”
The 1995 Agreement comprised a letter from Chinese Minister of
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Wu Yi to then-USTR
87
Mickey Kantor (“Agreement Letter”) and the Action Plan for
Effective Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property
88
Rights (“Action Plan”). The Agreement Letter summarized the
enforcement measures China had undertaken in the past few months
89
or would undertake in the near future. The letter also included a
90
pledge to improve market access for American products and to

84. U.S. negotiators singled out Shenfei Factory, a key plant in Shenzhen, as the
most notorious maker of bootleg music and video tapes. See Martha M. Hamilton &
Steven Mufson, Clinton Hails Accord with China on Trade: Piracy Enforcement Provision
Called Tough, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1995, at A1; see also Mufson, Trade War Averted by
U.S. China, supra note 83, at A28 (crediting the raid and closure of the Shenfei
factory by the People’s Liberation Army for ending the China-U.S. intellectual
property dispute).
85. See Julia Chang Bloch, Commercial Diplomacy, in LIVING WITH CHINA: U.S.-CHINA
RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 185, 197-98 (Ezra F. Vogel ed., 1997)
[hereinafter LIVING WITH CHINA] (commenting that observers were not surprised
when the copyright agreement finally came down despite having anxiety leading up
to it).
86. Id.; see Sanger, U.S. Threatens $2.8 Billion of Tariffs, supra note 75, at A14
(suggesting that sanctions could hurt both Chinese industries, including state-run
factories closely linked to government leaders and their families, and injure
American consumers due to price increases in Chinese-made goods, such as
electronic products, toys, and clothing).
87. Letter from Wu Yi, Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation,
People’s Republic of China, to Mickey Kantor, United States Trade Representative
(Feb. 26, 1995), in 1995 Agreement, supra note 7, 34 I.L.M. at 882 [hereinafter
Agreement Letter].
88. Action Plan for Effective Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights, in 1995 Agreement, supra note 7, 34 I.L.M. at 887 [hereinafter Action Plan].
89. See Agreement Letter, supra note 87, 34 I.L.M. at 883; see also infra text
accompanying notes 97-112 (detailing the measures China had undertaken or would
undertake to curtail piracy).
90. The relevant provision of the Agreement Letter provides:
China confirms that it will not impose quotas, import license requirements,
or other restrictions on the importation of audio-visual and published
products, whether formal or informal. China will permit U.S. individuals
and entities to establish joint ventures with Chinese entities in China in the
audio-visual sector for production and reproduction. These joint ventures
will be permitted to enter into contracts with Chinese publishing enterprises
to, on a nationwide basis, distribute, sell, display and perform in China.
China will immediately permit such joint ventures to be established in
Shanghai, Guangzhou, and moreover, other major cities, and will then
expand the number of cities, in an orderly fashion, to thirteen (13) by the
year 2000. U.S. individuals and entities will be permitted to enter into
exclusive licensing arrangements with Chinese publishing houses to exploit
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promote transparency by publishing all laws, rules, and regulations
concerning limitations on imports, joint ventures, and other
91
economic activities. Suspiciously, the Action Plan did not contain
92
any provisions regarding market access for American products.
Such omission strongly suggests that a compromise was struck
between the two governments during the negotiations.
Moreover, the Agreement Letter delineated the mutual
responsibilities that would be undertaken by both countries, which
included training customs officers and bureaucrats, exchanging
93
information and statistics, and undertaking future consultations.
The end of the Agreement Letter contained the United States’
promise to terminate its Section 301 investigation of China and
94
China’s Priority Foreign Country designation as well as a mutual
agreement to rescind the order imposing retaliatory tariffs on the
95
other country’s exports.
Unlike the Agreement Letter, the Action Plan was more detailed,
96
focusing specifically on improving the enforcement structure and
97
the legal environment regarding intellectual property protection.
The Action Plan included short-term and long-term remedial
98
measures and a special enforcement period of six months, during
which China would make intensive efforts to crack down on major
infringers of intellectual property rights and to target regions in
which infringing activity was particularly rampant at the time of the
99
agreement.
The Action Plan also introduced a new enforcement structure
known as the State Council Working Conference on Intellectual
Property Rights (“Working Conference”), which was responsible for
the central organization and coordination of protection and

the entire catalogue of the licensor and to decide what to release from that
catalogue. China will also permit U.S. individuals and entities to establish
computer software joint ventures and those joint ventures will be permitted
to produce and sell their computer software and computer software products
in China.
Agreement Letter, supra note 87, 34 I.L.M. at 884.
91. See id.
92. See Action Plan, supra note 88, pmbl., § I[A][3], 34 I.L.M. at 887-88 (failing to
include any provisions regarding market access for American products).
93. See Agreement Letter, supra note 87, at 885-86.
94. See id. at 886.
95. See id.
96. See Action Plan, supra note 88, pmbl., § I, 34 I.L.M. at 887-905.
97. See id. at 905-07 (detailing actions that Chinese authorities would take to
foster a more favorable environment for intellectual property laws).
98. See infra text accompanying notes 100-02 for a discussion of the various shortterm and long-term measures provided by the 1995 Agreement.
99. See id. pmbl., § I[C], 34 I.L.M. at 887, 892.
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enforcement of all intellectual property laws throughout the
100
country. This Working Conference was designed specially to target
101
local protectionism and the vulnerability of the Chinese judicial
102
system to that problem.
In addition, the Action Plan created Enforcement Task Forces,
which comprised administrative and other authorities responsible for
intellectual property protection. Such authorities included the
National Copyright Administration, the State Administration for
Industry and Commerce, the Patent Office, police at various levels,
103
and customs officials. These Task Forces were authorized to enter
and search any premises allegedly infringing on intellectual property
rights, to review books and records for evidence of infringement and
damages, to seal suspected goods, and to confiscate materials and
implements directly and predominantly used to make infringing
104
goods.
If the Task Forces found infringement, they had authority
to impose fines; to order a stoppage of production, reproduction,
and sale of infringing goods; to revoke production permits; and to
confiscate and destroy without compensation the infringing goods
and the materials and implements used to manufacture the
105
counterfeit products.
To protect CDs, laser discs (“LDs”), and CD-ROMs, the Action Plan
106
It proposed to
established a unique copyright verification system.
punish by administrative and judicial means any manufacturer of
audiovisual products who failed to comply with the identifier
107
requirement.
It also called for title registration of foreign
audiovisual products and computer software in CD-ROM format with
the National Copyright Administration and local copyright
108
authorities. Moreover, it contained provisions requiring all customs
offices to intensify border protection for all imports and exports of

100. See id. § I[A], 34 I.L.M. at 887-89.
101. See sources cited infra note 495 (describing the problem of local
protectionism in China).
102. “In drafting the 1995 MOU, it appears that China and the U.S. understood
that the weaknesses of China’s judicial system made it especially susceptible to
localism.” Jeffrey W. Berkman, Intellectual Property Rights in the P.R.C.: Impediments to
Protection and the Need for the Rule of Law, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 18 (1996).
However, “[t]he lack of coordination among [National Copyright Administration,
the Patent Office, the Trademark Offices, and the local agencies of each body]
undermines unified enforcement actions.” Id. at 21.
103. See Action Plan, supra note 88, § I[B][1], 34 I.L.M. at 890.
104. See id. § I[B][1][b], 34 I.L.M. at 890.
105. See id. § I[B][1][c], 34 I.L.M. at 890.
106. See id. § I[H], 34 I.L.M. at 903.
107. See id. § I[H][1][b], 34 I.L.M. at 903.
108. See id. § I[H][2][a], 34 I.L.M. at 903.
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109

CDs, LDs, CD-ROMS, and trademarked goods.
Finally, the Action Plan stipulated that relevant authorities would
conduct training and education on intellectual property protection
110
throughout China.
The plan stated that the Working Conference
would “make publicly available the laws, provisions, regulations,
standards, edicts, decrees and interpretations regarding the
authorization, management, and implementation of intellectual
111
To foster a better understanding of the legal
property rights.”
provisions and methods for protecting intellectual property rights in
China, the Working Conference would also compile and publish
guidelines regarding application and protection in the areas of
112
copyright, trademark, and patent.
Initially, many commentators considered the 1995 Agreement “the
single most comprehensive and detailed [intellectual property]
113
enforcement agreement the United States had ever concluded.”
American government officials also found promising early
114
implementation of the Agreement.
By November 1995, however,
the Agreement had become apparently inadequate to induce
115
effective intellectual property protection in China.
On April 30,
1996, the Clinton Administration again designated China as a Priority
Foreign Country for its failure to protect intellectual property
116
rights.
A couple of weeks later, the Administration announced its
intention to impose approximately $2 billion worth of trade sanctions
on Chinese textiles, garments, consumer electronics, sporting goods,

109. See id. § 1[G], 34 I.L.M. at 900-03.
110. See id. § II[A]-[B], 34 I.L.M. at 905-06.
111. Id. § II[C], 34 I.L.M. at 906.
112. See id. § II[D], 34 I.L.M. at 906-07.
113. Helen Cooper & Kathy Chen, China Averts Trade War with the U.S., Promising a
Campaign Against Piracy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1995, at A3; see Hamilton & Mufson,
supra note 84, at A1 (“This is a strong agreement for American companies and
American workers.” (quoting U.S. President Bill Clinton)).
114. See Feder, supra note 12, at 245 (noting that U.S. government officials
regarded large-scale raids against intellectual property rights infringers in China as
evidence that the Agreement initially was being implemented successfully).
115. See Paul Blustein, U.S. Warns China to Step Up Efforts Against ‘Piracy,’ WASH.
POST, Nov. 30, 1995, at B13 (describing U.S. trade officials’ dissatisfaction with
China’s efforts to crack down on piracy of American products). Testifying before the
Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, then-deputy USTR Charlene
Barshefsky stated that, despite the raids on retailers of pirated goods and the efforts
to establish intellectual property courts, “China’s overall implementation of the
agreement falls far short of the requirements of the agreement.” Id.; see OFFICE OF
USTR, 1996 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 54
(asserting that the rate at which China exported pirated and counterfeit goods to
third markets continued at the same or higher levels than before the conclusion of
the 1995 Agreement).
116. See Richard W. Stevenson, U.S. Cites China for Failing to Curb Piracy in Trade,
N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1996, at D4.
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117

Within thirty minutes of the announcement, China
and bicycles.
responded with a retaliatory sanction of a similar amount on
American
agricultural
products,
cars
and
car
parts,
118
telecommunications equipment, and CDs.
While the two countries were posturing for a compromise, China
closed down fifteen CD factories, six major CD distribution markets,
and more than 5000 minitheaters that showed pirated videos for a
119
fee. China also “expanded permission for foreign music and movie
120
companies to produce and sell their products inside China.”
In
light of these remedial measures, the United States reached a new
121
122
accord with China just before the June 18 deadline. According to
then-Acting USTR Charlene Barshefsky: “China’s actions over the
past few weeks demonstrate that the core elements of an operational
IPR enforcement system are in place. As a result of these actions,
123
sanctions will not be imposed.”
Likewise, China rescinded its
124
threatened countersanctions.
As before, this eleventh-hour compromise did not surprise trade
analysts and sinologists, who had anticipated such a compromise
125
when the trade sanctions were first announced.
The retaliatory
tariffs would have hurt both the Chinese textiles industry and the

117. See Helene Cooper & Kathy Chen, U.S. and China Announce Tariff Targets as
Both Nations Step Up Trade Rhetoric, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1996, at A3 [hereinafter
Cooper & Chen, U.S. and China Announce Tariff Targets].
118. See id.
119. See Kathy Chen & Helene Cooper, U.S. and China Reach an Agreement, Averting
Trade Sanctions by Both Sides, WALL ST. J., June 18, 1996, at A2.
120. Seth Faison, U.S. China Agree on Pact to Fight Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1996,
at A1 [hereinafter Faison, U.S. China Agree on Pact].
121. See 1996 Accord, supra note 7.
122. The terms of the Accord include the closing of pirate plants, criminal
prosecution for those who violate intellectual property laws, a special enforcement
period in which police assume responsibility for the investigation of piracy, improved
border surveillance by customs officers, and a new registration system for CD
manufacturers. See Faison, U.S. China Agree on Pact, supra note 120, at A6.
123. Office of USTR, Statement by Ambassador Barshefsky (June 17, 1996), available at
But see CHENGSI ZHENG,
http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1996/06/96-53.html.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA: LEADING CASES AND COMMENTARY
xxvi (1997) [hereinafter ZHENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA]
(“In the 1996 Sino-U.S. negotiations, what the USTR really wanted was not the
impossible short term elimination of pirate copies, but access to the Chinese markets
for its cultural products.”).
124. See ZHENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA, supra note 123, at
xxvii.
125. See Cooper & Chen, U.S. and China Announce Tariff Targets, supra note 117; see
also Marcus W. Brauchli & Joseph Kahn, Intellectual Property: China Moves Against
Piracy as U.S. Trade Battle Looms, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1995, at 1 (“This is the way
America does business. It puts on lots of pressure, acts very strong . . . . But just
before the deadline, then they’ll be concessions and a compromise.” (quoting Li
Changxu, head of the China United Intellectual Property Investigation Center)).
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The
American aerospace, automobile, and agricultural industries.
tariffs might even have closed the Chinese market to American
cultural products while opening it up to products from Europe,
127
Japan, Australia, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.
Thus, it would have
been in the interest of both countries to reach an agreement that
would avert a potential trade war. Nonetheless, for political and
diplomatic reasons, it was important for both countries to take a firm
128
Indeed,
stand regarding their positions before compromising.
commentators suggested that the last-minute compromise had
helped the Clinton Administration gain “domestic political
129
mileage.”
Unlike the 1992 MOU and the 1995 Agreement, which spelled out
new terms, the 1996 Accord mainly reaffirmed China’s commitment
to protect intellectual property rights.
This Accord included
measures China had undertaken or would undertake in enforcing
130
It also confirmed the market access
intellectual property rights.
131
arrangements concluded under the 1995 Agreement.
In light of prior dealings and the two previous ineffective
agreements, business executives and trade analysts were very skeptical
132
of the effectiveness of this new Accord. In fact, the Accord suggests

126. See Editorial, An Ultimatum on Chinese Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1996, at A24
[hereinafter An Ultimatim on Chinese Policy] (“A trade war between the United States
and China could prove costly to both countries.”); Chen & Cooper, supra note 119
(stating that retaliatory tariffs would have hurt major industries of both countries,
including the Chinese textiles industry and American automobile and agricultural
industries); Evelyn Iritani, Boeing Likely Loser If U.S.-China Talks Fail, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
24, 1995, at D1 (arguing that trade sanctions could cause Boeing to lose a $2 billion
deal to its European rival, Airbus Industrie).
127. See ZHENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA, supra note 123, at
xxvi.
128. See An Ultimatum on Chinese Piracy, supra note 126 (arguing that the Clinton
Administration could not allow China to pirate intellectual property without
weakening the United States’s credibility among other Asian countries and trade
partners around the world).
129. See Surprise! A Deal with China, supra note 12, at A22. The Clinton
Administration has used copyright piracy as a political tactic to appear tough on
China. One journalist explained this political tactic:
When United States-China relations were strained in 1996, the Clinton
Administration wanted to appear tough on China, and copyright piracy was
an obvious lever to pull.
This year, as President Clinton prepares to come to China for a summit
meeting in June, pressuring China on trade disputes has receded as a
political priority, as has enforcing the intellectual property rights agreement.
Faison, China Turns Blind Eye, supra note 8, at D1.
130. See 1996 Accord, supra note 7.
131. See id.
132. See, e.g., Chen & Cooper, supra note 119, at A2 (“Some trade analysts were
more skeptical, saying that the shuttering of the 15 bootleg factories, which helped
Beijing clinch the deal, may be the most the U.S. is going to get out of the latest
saber-rattling. Anything beyond that, they said, may well require another battle next
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the contrary, reflecting instead China’s increasing reluctance to bow
133
down to American pressure in its intellectual property negotiations.
Even though the Accord stipulated that the Chinese government
would close its piracy factories, the Accord did not contain any
provisions allowing American officials to monitor or conduct on-site
134
verification of factory closings. Instead, to verify such closings, U.S.
officials must “rely on the word of local officials, who may be
135
beholden to local interests.”
Since the 1996 Accord, the Chinese government has taken a
number of measures to improve intellectual property protection in
China. In August 1996, China issued Regulations on Certification
136
and Protection of Famous Trademarks, thus bringing its laws in
conformity with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
137
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs Agreement”) and the new
138
WIPO treaties. In March 1997, China issued the Regulations on the
139
Protection of New Plant Varieties and China also amended its
140
Criminal Law to include a section on intellectual property crimes.
Last year, China became a member state of the International Union
141
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants. Most recently, China
has also enacted its first law to protect the owners of recognized
142
trademarks from cybersquatters.
In addition, in April 1998, the Chinese government upgraded the
State Patent Bureau to a ministry-level branch of the State Council,

year.”); Faison, U.S. China Agree on Pact, supra note 120 (expressing skepticism toward
pledges made by China); Surprise! A Deal with China, supra note 12 (suggesting that
the deal made in 1996 would be “only marginally more effective” than the one struck
in the prior year). See also Loke-Khoon Tan & Mabel M.B. Lau, Enforcement of 1996
United States-China Intellectual Property Rights Agreement, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L.
Daily (BNA), at D4 (Oct. 21, 1997) (analyzing the enforcement of the 1996 Accord).
133. See Faison, U.S. China Agree on Pact, supra note 120, at A1 (reporting the
announcement by the Chinese government that attempted to dispel the perception
that the United States had dictated the terms of the agreement).
134. See 1996 Accord, supra note 7, at A1 (failing to include any provisions
allowing U.S. officials to monitor or conduct on-site verification of factory closings).
135. Faison, U.S. China Agree on Pact, supra note 120.
136. See China: Laws Being Promulgated to Protect IPR, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 10, 1997,
available at 1997 WL 13647865 [hereinafter China: Laws Being Promulgated].
137. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 5.
138. See China: Laws Being Promulgated, supra note 136.
139. See id.
140. See id.; see also Mary L. Riley, Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights, in PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 91, 96-97
(Mary L. Riley ed., 1997) (discussing the 1997 amendments to the criminal law).
141. Shoukang Guo, China: Status Report on the Protection of New Varieites of Plants in
the PRC, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA), at D5 (Sept. 1, 2000).
142. Noah Smith, China: New Chinese Law Protects Trademarks from Internet Squatters;
Patent Law Revised, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA), at D2 (Aug. 29,
2000).
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known as the State Intellectual Property Office. Replacing the State
144
Council Working Conference on Intellectual Property Rights, this
new office is responsible for improving “trademark, copyright, patent
application and management and other intellectual property rights
aspects. It . . . co-ordinate[s] regional intellectual property rights
145
department to identify laws and regulations enforcement” and
works closely with the State Administration of Industry and
146
Commerce and the State Press and Publication Administration.
The office is also responsible for building a patent information
147
for assisting enterprises and research institutions to
network,
protect their own technology and products, and for cooperating with
other countries to speed up China’s intellectual property protection
148
to meet international practice.
To facilitate research and provide training, the China Intellectual
Property Training Center was established in Beijing in January
149
1997. This Centre provides China with a training and research base
on intellectual property rights and offers copyright, trademark, and
patent courses to government officials, lawyers, patent and trademark
150
agents, and business people.
It also holds international and
151
regional seminars and training courses with WIPO. In August 1998,
China opened the first government-run training center for fostering
special personnel for the country’s intellectual property rights
152
department.
In addition to these centers, many Chinese
153
universities now offer courses on intellectual property; some even

143. The website of the State Intellectual Property Office is available at
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 100–02 (discussing the State Council
Working Conference on Intellectual Property Rights).
145. China: New IPR Commissioner Interviewed, CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK, Apr. 14,
1998, available at 1998 WL 7561417.
146. See id.
147. This information network will establish databases providing laws and
regulations, patent cases, and information about organizations involved in handling
patent disputes. See China to Launch Nationwide Patent Information Network, CHINA BUS.
INFO. NETWORK, Jan. 18, 2000, available at 2000 WL 3888595.
148. See China: New IPR Commissioner Interviewed, supra note 145.
149. See China: Training Centre to Help Strengthen IPR Protection, CHINA BUS. INFO.
NETWORK, Jan. 17, 1997, available at 1997 WL 9840723.
150. See id.
151. Id.
152. See China: First IPR Protection Personnel Center Opens in Beijing, CHINA BUS. INFO.
NETWORK, Apr. 17, 1998, available at 1998 WL 7561463 (reporting the joint effort by
the Chinese Software Alliance and the Business Software Alliance to promote the use
of original software in China).
153. See Jianyang Yu, Protection of Intellectual Property in the P.R.C.: Progress, Problems,
and Proposals, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 140, 149 (1994) [hereinafter Yu, Progress,
Problems, and Proposals] (“The People’s University, the Huazhong Science and
Technology University, and the Zhejiang University now offer a second bachelor
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have intellectual property departments or offer degrees in
154
intellectual property law.
With all these new implementation and education efforts,
intellectual property protection has improved greatly in China. As
the 2000 National Trade Estimate Report stated: “Today, China has
improved its legal framework—and it has virtually shut down the
illegal production and export of pirated music and video CDs and
CD-ROMS. Indeed, today it is an importer of such products from
155
third countries.”
Nevertheless, significant problems still exist with
the enforcement of intellectual property laws at the grassroots level.
These problems include “local protectionism and corruption,
reluctance or inability on the part of enforcement officials to impose
deterrent level penalties, and a low number of criminal
156
prosecutions.”
Although the Clinton Administration seems to have moved away
157
from unilateral sanctions and the use of Section 301 investigations,
one can hardly predict whether the United States will return to these
coercive tactics if domestic politics generate such a need in the
future. Nevertheless, if the American government decided to return
to such tactics, it would not be difficult to predict the pattern in
which the events would play out in the next confrontation. The
United States would begin by threatening China with trade sanctions.
China would retaliate quickly with countersanctions of a similar
amount. After several months of bickering and posturing, both
countries would come to a last-minute compromise by signing a new
intellectual property agreement. Even though intellectual property

degree in intellectual property law.”); Liangjun Xie, New School Starts on Rights Track,
CHINA DAILY, Dec. 16, 1993, available at 1993 WL 10866676 (reporting the opening of
the Intellectual Property Rights School at Beijing University); Shanghai Protects
Intellectual Property, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 31, 1994, available at LEXIS, News
Library, AFP File (reporting that Shanghai University has decided to open an
intellectual property department and to communicate with foreign universities in the
field).
154. Universities offering second bachelors degrees in intellectual property law
include the People’s University, the Huazhong Science and Technology University,
and the Zhejiang University. See Yu, Progress, Problems, and Perspectives, supra note 153.
Also, the Beijing University has a school dedicated to intellectual property. See id.
155. OFFICE OF USTR, 2000 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE
BARRIERS 50 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 NTE REPORT].
156. Id.; see also Tom Korski, AV Piracy Still “Rampant” Despite Crackdowns, Chinese
Authorities Say, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA), at D3 (Jan. 21, 1998)
(“[P]iracy of audio-visual products in China remains ‘rampant’ despite expanded
police raids on black marketeers . . . .”).
157. See Steven Mufson, Piracy Still Runs Rampant in China; Yet Industries Oppose
Asking for Sanctions, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 1998, at E3 (reporting that U.S. industries,
which drive the American trade policy, opposed sanctions on China despite a
persistent piracy problem).

YUPPREPAGED6501USETHISONE.DOC

154

8/15/2001 11:34 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:131

protection may improve during the first few months immediately
after the signing of the agreement, the piracy problem would revive
once international attention was diverted and the foreign push
dissipated. Within a short period of time, American businesses would
complain again to the U.S. government, and the cycle would repeat
itself. If history has any ability to predict the future, this pattern may
very well suggest how the two countries would behave if the United
States continued its existing self-deluding policy. Indeed, this pattern
explains, in retrospect, the events and the brinkmanship surrounding
the 1992 MOU, the 1995 Agreement, and the 1996 Accord.
II. CONSTRUCTIVE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
Since the Tiananmen incident in 1989, U.S.-China relations have
been particularly strained. Even though both the Bush and Clinton
Administrations renewed China’s MFN status, such renewals had
158
brought up concerns over human rights abuses in China, which
159
China considers a matter of internal affairs.
Tension further
escalated when the United States agreed to sell 150 F-16 fighter jets to
160
Taiwan in September 1992 and permitted President of Taiwan Lee
161
Teng-hui to visit Cornell University in February 1995.
In March
1996, the tension between the two countries almost reached a
breaking point when China held a large-scale naval exercise in the
Taiwan Strait and fired missiles into designated targets within thirty
162
miles of the Taiwanese cities Kaohsiung and Keelung. In response
to China’s actions, the United States dispatched a seven-ship carrier
group, which included the aircraft carrier Independence, to the Taiwan
Strait and transfered the Nimitz carrier group from the Indian Ocean
163
toward the West Pacific, stopping near the Philippines.
Even
though China eventually called off its military exercise and the crisis
164
passed without an incident, more crises would have taken place if
U.S.-China relations continued to deteriorate.

158. See IMMANUEL C.Y. HSÜ, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 960-67 (6th ed. 2000)
(discussing policies made by the Bush and Clinton Administrations out of their
concerns over human rights abuses in China).
159. See id. at 968-72.
160. See id. at 964. “From the standpoint of the stunned Beijing leadership, the
sale of the F-16s was probably the single most infuriating action taken by any
American president since the Nixon era; it ended Beijing’s delusion that it could
regain Taiwan by slowly cutting off its access to modern weaponry.” MANN, supra
note 9, at 254.
161. See HSÜ, supra note 158, at 1009.
162. See MANN, supra note 9, at 336.
163. See HSÜ, supra note 158, at 1012.
164. China called off the military action in the Taiwan Strait on March 25, 1996.
See id.
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To stabilize the relationship between the two countries, President
Clinton invited Chinese President Jiang Zemin to pay a state visit to
165
the United States in October 1997. After exchanging views on the
international situation and U.S.-China relations in a bilateral summit,
the two presidents issued the Joint Statement, proclaiming that “a
sound and stable relationship between the United States and China
serves the fundamental interests of both the American and Chinese
peoples and is important to fulfilling their common responsibility to
166
work for peace and prosperity in the 21st century.”
The Joint
Statement also stated that, “while the United States and China have
areas of both agreement and disagreement, they have a significant
common interest and a firm common will to seize opportunities and
meet challenges cooperatively, with candor and a determination to
167
To protect this common interest, the
achieve concrete progress.”
Joint Statement proposed to establish a “constructive strategic
partnership between the [two countries] through increasing
cooperation to meet international challenges and promote peace and
168
development in the world.”
Since the announcement of the partnership, commentators and
policymakers have downplayed the significance of the new
partnership model. Although some regarded the partnership as
169
“more symbolic than substantive,” others refused to speculate,

165. See Broder, supra note 13.
166. Joint Statement, supra note 14.
167. The Joint Statement elaborated on the agreements of and differences
between the two countries:
The United States and China have major differences on the question of
human rights. At the same time, they also have great potential for
cooperation in maintaining global and regional peace and stability;
promoting world economic growth; preventing the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction; advancing Asia-Pacific regional cooperation; combating
narcotics trafficking, international organized crime and terrorism;
strengthening bilateral exchanges and cooperation in economic
development, trade, law, environmental protection, energy, science and
technology, and education and culture; as well as engaging in military
exchanges.
Id.
168. Id.
Aspirations,
169. Jiemian Yang, Summit Diplomacy and Strategic Partnership:
Expectations, and Realization [hereinafter Yang, Summit Diplomacy], in THE OUTLOOK
FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS FOLLOWING THE 1997-1998 SUMMITS:
CHINESE AND
AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY, TRADE, AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE 49, 62 (Peter
Koehn & Joseph Y.S. Cheng eds., 1999) [hereinafter OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-CHINA
RELATIONS]; see STEVEN M. MOSHER, HEGEMON: CHINA’S PLAN TO DOMINATE ASIA AND
THE WORLD 139 (2000) (arguing that the constructive strategic partnership was a
cover-up for the Clinton Administration’s appeasement policy); James Przystrup &
Robert A. Manning, Clinton’s Inscrutable China Policy, NAT’L REV., Dec. 8, 1997
(quoting a senior official conceding that the constructive strategic partnership is less
a shift in policy than “a debasing of language”); Robert Sutter & James J. Przystup,
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contending that the partnership “lacks a clear definition.”
Nevertheless, if examined closely, the partnership model may hold
the key to correcting the existing misguided American foreign
intellectual property policy.
By definition, a “constructive” relationship implies the possibility of
a destructive relationship and the existence of differences between
the two countries.
The intention to develop a constructive
relationship thus indicates that both countries value their common
interests more than their differences and are determined to handle
171
their relationship in a positive way.
A “constructive” relationship

U.S.-China Relations: Issues and Options, in BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND DETERRENCE:
STRATEGIES FOR U.S. RELATIONS WITH CHINA 1, 6 (Kim R. Holmes & James J. Przystup
eds., 1997) [hereinafter BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND DETERRENCE] (criticizing the
Clinton Administration’s engagement policy for “lack[ing] any clear sense of
priorities”); Robert Sutter & James J. Przystup, U.S.-China Relations: Strategies for the
Future, in BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND DETERRENCE, supra, at 241, 249 (criticizing the
Clinton Administration’s engagement policy for “becloud[ing] strategic vision” and
for being “virtually content-free”). But see MANN, supra note 9, at 354 (noting the
warning of National Security Advisor Sandy Berger that a summit that was merely
ceremonial would worsen U.S.-China relations in the long run).
170. Yebai Zhang, Can a “Constructive Strategic Partnership” Be Built Up Between China
and the United States? [hereinafter Zhang, Can a “Constructive Strategic Partnership” Be
Built Up?], in OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, supra note 169, at 142, 144; see
Yang, Summit Diplomacy, supra note 169, at 61 (“U.S. politicians are fond of adopting
new labels without giving serious thought to their meaning.”).
While the model may seem meaningless to the Americans, it has significant
implications when viewed within the context of Chinese negotiating behavior. As
Professor Solomon explained:
[The Chinese emphasize] negotiating from a “principled” position. Rather
than initiating a negotiating exchange with exaggerated demands from
which they retreat in incremental compromises, the Chinese will press for
acceptance of certain general principles, and only after these have been
codified and the negotiating counterpart’s position tested against them over
an extended period of time will the Chinese move to conclude an
agreement.
RICHARD H. SOLOMON, CHINESE NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR: PURSUING INTERESTS
THROUGH ‘OLD FRIENDS’ 71 (1999); see also id. at 71-75 (discussing China’s emphasis
on negotiating from a “principled” position).
171. See Zhang, Can a “Constructive Strategic Partnership” Be Built Up?, supra note
170, at 144 (“[B]oth sides should handle the relationship in a positive way, being
fully aware of, and attaching more importance to, the common interests between the
two countries and recognizing that such common interests are more important than
the differences between them.”); Matthew Vita & Juliet Eiplerin, House Passes China
Trade Bill; Measure to Normalize Ties Wins Easily in the End, 237 to 197, WASH. POST, May
25, 2000, at A1 (“America, of course, will continue to defend our interests, but at this
stage in China’s development we will have more positive influence with an
outstretched hand than with a clenched fist.” (quoting U.S. President William
Clinton)); see also YVES L. DOZ & GARY HAMEL, ALLIANCE ADVANTAGE: THE ART OF
CREATING VALUE THROUGH PARTNERING 145 (1998) (“The process and norms of
interaction between partners also determine alliance success. Intentions are
converted into real cooperation through interactions.”); id. at 169 (“[F]ew alliances
can succeed by holding fast to their initial plans. Indeed, what separates alliances
that last long enough to fulfill their aspirations from those that break apart at the
first difficulty is their capacity for learning and adjustment.”).
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also suggests the countries’ intention to pursue a dialogue that aims
172
to prevent any single issue from damaging the overall relationship.
To facilitate this dialogue, the two countries “agree to regular visits by
173
They also “agree to a
their Presidents to each other’s capitals.”
Washington-Beijing presidential communications link to facilitate
direct contact . . . [and] to regular exchanges of visits by cabinet and
sub-cabinet officials to consult on political, military, security and arms
174
control issues.”
The word “strategic” implies that “neither side will treat the
175
relationship as merely a bilateral one.” Rather, each country views
the partnership as a combination that provides strategic advantages
176
for itself and enhances its global competitiveness. Needless to say,
being the only remaining superpower after the disintegration of the
Soviet Union, the United States is a very important player in both the
177
global economy and world politics. The United States is also a very
important trading partner to China, absorbing a third of China’s
178
A healthy and harmonious relationship with the United
exports.
States is therefore very important and beneficial to China. If bilateral
relations deteriorated and trade wars took place, the confrontation
would disrupt China’s modernization process and very likely would
put an end to its continuous economic growth. Not only would

172. See Zhang, Can A “Constructive Strategic Partnership” Be Built Up?, supra note
170, at 145.
173. Joint Statement, supra note 14.
174. Id.
175. Zhang, Can a “Constructive Strategic Partnership” Be Built Up?, supra note 170, at
144.
176. See DOZ & HAMEL, supra note 171, at xiii (“[T]he strategic alliance has
become a cornerstone of global competitiveness.”).
177. Some commentators argued that the United States is a power in decline:
Although the United States was generally considered the only remaining
superpower, its strength was compromised by its large national debt,
debilitating budgetary deficit, and serious domestic problems. It was no
longer the undisputed leader of a Western alliance against the nonexistent
Soviet Union, but one of the many contending states, albeit a very powerful
one. Although its hegemonistic ambitions could not be ignored, it was a
superpower in decline.
HSÜ, supra note 158, at 959-60; see PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT
POWERS: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000 (1987)
(discussing the relative decline of American economic and military power). But see
HENRY R. NAU, THE MYTH OF AMERICA’S DECLINE: LEADING THE WORLD ECONOMY INTO
THE 1990’S 256 (1990) (commenting that the United States’s decline is neither
inevitable nor irreversible); Samuel P. Huntington, The U.S.—Decline or Renewal?,
FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1988/1989, at 76, 77 (asserting that the United States is in an
era of “renewal,” not one of “decadence”); Jacek Kugler & A.F.K. Organski, The End
of Hegemony?, 15 INT’L INTERACTIONS 113 (1989) (arguing that the United States is
enjoying its best international position ever).
178. See Bloch, supra note 85, at 198.
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179

China fail to regain its past glory, but it might remain dominated by
180
the West for the rest of the twenty-first century.
By the same token, China is an important trading partner to the
181
United States, providing the United States with an attractive market
182
that contains one-fifth of the world’s population. If China’s current
economic development continues, China will become one of the
three largest economies in the world by the early twenty-first
183
century.
China thus will be more important to the United States

179. See BERNSTEIN & MUNRO, supra note 10, at 4 (stating China believes its
historical legacy is to take up the role of being a great power); id. at 56 (arguing that
China has acquired over the past 50 years the conditions needed for “renewed
historic greatness”); HSÜ, supra note 158, at 991 (“There is a new confidence in the
Chinese psyche, and many believe the country’s destiny is on the ascent and that it is
time for China to assert its own ‘Manifest Destiny’.”).
180. See Michael B. McElroy & Chris P. Nielsen, Energy, Agriculture, and the
Environment: Prospects for Sino-American Cooperation, in LIVING WITH CHINA, supra note
85, at 217, 248 (“China’s rise to superpower status will mark the end of an era, the
centuries-long monopoly of world economic and political power by nations of the
West.”).
181. See WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, THE RISE OF CHINA: HOW ECONOMIC REFORM IS
CREATING A NEW SUPER POWER 365 (1993) (“China presents the United States with the
greatest opportunities of the coming generation, for instance, the largest market in
the 1990s for aircraft, power plants, and telecommunications . . . .”).
182. Commentators explained the importance of China’s demographic size as
follows:
Merely by being so numerous, the Chinese affect the fates of the rest of the
world whatever they do—when they emigrate, when they purchase grain on
world markets, when they build roads and drive cars. They could strain
world food resources by failing to feed themselves, or damage the global
atmosphere by not reducing the rate at which they cook and heat their
homes with charcoal briquettes. Because of its demographic size, no global
problem can be solved without China.
ANDREW J. NATHAN & ROBERT S. ROSS, THE GREAT WALL AND THE EMPTY FORTRESS:
CHINA’S SEARCH FOR SECURITY 17 (1997); see also ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS bk. I, ch. 8, at 434 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937) (1776) (“The most decisive
mark of the prosperity of any country is the increase of the number of its
inhabitants.”). One commentator disagreed:
[E]ven if China enforces United States intellectual property rights according
to the recent agreement and establishes a level playing field, the demand for
United States movies and software will not emerge from the general
populace. The market in China cannot seriously be equated to the
proverbial one billion consumers, however often that number is repeated.
Endeshaw, supra note 73, at 333.
183. See Daniel A. Sharp, Preface to LIVING WITH CHINA, supra note 85, at 9. As
Samuel Kim pointed out:
[T]he aggregate economic numbers seem impressive enough. According to
the purchasing power parity (PPP) estimates of the World Bank (which are
not unproblematic), China, with a 1994 gross domestic product (GDP) just
under $3 trillion, has become the second-largest economy in the world, after
the United States. It is simultaneously the world’s largest recipient of
multilateral aid from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank
(ADB) and of bilateral aid from Japan! And in 1996, China was the secondlargest recipient (after the United States) of foreign direct investment flow
to the developing countries. In mid-1997 its foreign exchange reserves were
$2.8 billion, more than Germany ($78.0 billion). If we accept the
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184

than Japan, Mexico, Canada, or Russia. In the years to come, China
185
As President
may even join the United States as a superpower.
Clinton pointed out, “the role China chooses to play will powerfully
186
shape the [twenty-first] century.”
The recent compromises regarding human rights and intellectual
property already have demonstrated that the United States can no
187
longer afford to lose this enormous market.
Indeed, China’s
responses to American threats of trade sanctions underscore how
significantly a confrontational policy will hurt American businesses.
Taking advantage of the United States’s stubborn position, Japanese
and European competitors seek to “promote their own commercial
advantage by portraying Washington as the sole factor preventing
188
China’s entry” into the WTO.

projections of a 1995 Rand Corporation study, China’s PPP-based GDP will
reach $11.3 trillion by the year 2000 (in 1994 PPP dollars) compared to
$10.7 trillion for the United States, $4.5 trillion for Japan, $3.7 trillion for
India, and $2 trillion for a unified Korea.
Samuel S. Kim, Chinese Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice, in CHINA AND THE WORLD:
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY FACES THE NEW MILLENNIUM 3, 6 (Samuel S. Kim ed., 4th ed.
1998) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter CHINA AND THE WORLD]. Nevertheless,
“because of the localizing pressures from below and new risks and challenges (e.g.,
rising unemployment, expanding floating population, growing income inequality,
mounting environmental pressures, incomplete market reforms, trade frictions),
China will not so easily become the economic superpower that many have
predicted.” Id. at 7; see also James Mann, Our China Illusions, AM. PROSPECT, June 5,
2000, at 22 (arguing that China’s economic explosion has created a huge build-up of
inventories of low-quality goods that will never be sold).
184. See Sharp, supra note 183, at 9. But see Gerald Segal, Does China Matter?,
FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 1999, at 24 (pointing out the overexaggeration of China’s
importance in the global economy and world politics); NATHAN & ROSS, supra note
182, at 15 (arguing that China is a vulnerable power whose most pressing security
problems are powerful rivals at its own borders).
185. See Ezra F. Vogel, Introduction to LIVING WITH CHINA, supra note 85, at 17, 1820.
186. Peter Koehn & Joseph Y.S. Cheng, Introduction to OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-CHINA
RELATIONS, supra note 169, at 1 (quoting President Clinton’s Remarks on U.S.-China
Relations in the 21st Century).
187. See Bloch, supra note 85, at 208 (acknowledging the United States’s heavy
dependence on exports to less developed countries); Julia Cheng, Note, China’s
Copyright System: Rising to the Spirit of TRIPS Requires an Internal Focus and WTO
Membership, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1941, 1979 (1998) (acknowledging the United
States’s heavy dependence on trade in the Pacific Rim).
188. David M. Lampton, A Growing China in a Shrinking World: Beijing and the
Global Order, in LIVING WITH CHINA, supra note 85, at 120, 137; see also Bloch, supra
note 85, at 209 (pointing to the German company Bertelsmann and the Japanese
company Sony as two of the biggest beneficiaries of the United States’s tough stance
on the Chinese piracy problem); Garten, supra note 48, at 71 (“If Boeing does not
play by China’s rules, Airbus will. If AT&T does not meet Brazilian requirements,
Alcatel would be happy to help.”); id. at 71 (claiming that unilateral sanctions will
disadvantage U.S. firms in the international market); Cheng, supra note 187, at 1978
(“Repetitive threats of trade sanctions might cause China to lose patience with the
United States and switch to Europe, Japan, and Russia for trade and technology
transfers.”); David E. Sanger, U.S. Blames Allies for Undercutting Its China Policy, N.Y.
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In military terms, China is also very important to the United States.
Despite criticism over the backwardness of the Chinese military
189
“[a]ny long-term peaceful solution to the conflicting
forces,
territorial claims in the South China Sea will require China’s active
190
cooperation.” Because China holds a permanent seat in the United
Nations Security Council, the United States needs China’s support,
through either an affirmative vote or an abstention, in order to gain
191
U.N. support of its initiatives. Past initiatives included forcing Iraq
to withdraw from Kuwait and maintaining peace in Cambodia or the
former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, China has the ability to produce
weapons of mass destruction, such as missles, nuclear technology, and
192
chemical weapons.
Its ability to export these weapons overseas
therefore makes China strategically important to the United States.
In addition to mutual strategic significance, the word “strategic”
has a second meaning. The word suggests that a U.S.-China strategic
relationship may be considered “as part of a strategic framework for
the Asia-Pacific region and the whole world, geared toward
maintaining world peace and regional stability, enhancing global
development, and promoting extensive cooperation between the two
193
countries on regional and global issues.”
Under this framework,
both sides intend to approach the relationship from a long-term

TIMES, June 12, 1996, at A1 (reporting that the Clinton Administration accused
Europe and Japan of exploiting U.S. efforts to force China to respect trade accords).
189. See NATHAN & ROSS, supra note 182, at 137-57 (discussing the backwardness of
China’s military forces); Segal, supra note 184, at 29 (same). Richard Bernstein and
Ross Munro disagreed with these commentators:
Some of this argument is correct, but most of it misses the point. China will
not become a military power to rival the United States in the next decade.
But the essential measure of any country’s military strength is not its absolute
power, but its power relative to others, and in this sense China is already by
far the most powerful country in Asia, and it is rapidly becoming even more
powerful. It faces no credible military threat from any of its neighbors,
almost all of whom are relatively weak, and its defense spending is growing
faster than that of any other major country.
BERNSTEIN & MUNRO, supra note 10, at 64-65; see also Richard D. Fisher, Jr., The
Accelerating Modernization of China’s Military, in BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND DETERRENCE,
supra note 169, at 97 (noting the impressive growth of military capabilities of the
People’s Liberation Army). See generally CHINA’S MILITARY FACES THE FUTURE (James
R. Lilley & David Shambaugh eds., 1999) for a collection of essays examining China’s
military power and its implications for security in East Asia.
190. Lilley, supra note 9, at 55.
191. See id. at 54-55.
192. See MANN, supra note 9, at 228.
193. Zhang, Can a “Constructive Strategic Partnership” Be Built Up?, supra note 170, at
144; see also MANN, supra note 9, at 15 (“Other recently declassified materials show
that when the leaders of America and China sat down with one another, they began
working together to shape the future of the rest of Asia, including Japan, the two
Koreas and India.”); Richard Nixon, Asia After Viet Nam, FOREIGN AFF., Oct. 1967, at
111, 121 (“Any American policy toward Asia must come urgently to grips with the
reality of China.”).
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perspective, and to maintain a stable and healthy relationship
194
Such a long-term relationship is
throughout a sustained period.
especially important in light of the growing number of global
problems that range from nuclear proliferation to environmental
degradation and from terrorism to illicit drug trafficking.
Finally, the word “partnership” suggests an emphasis on common
195
interests and active cooperation.
Indeed, a partnership is “a
196
relationship that is neither hostile nor confrontational.” The word
also indicates that neither side assumes or intends to assume a
197
dominant position, thus implying equality and mutual respect.
By
putting the two countries on an equal footing, the partnership model
will reduce hostilities built up between the two countries since the
Tiananmen incident and will alleviate China’s skepticism toward
198
The
Western institutions and paranoia about foreign aggression.
model will also facilitate the development of mutually beneficial

194. See Joint Statement, supra note 14, at 1681 (stating that both countries “agree
to approach U.S.-China relations from a long-term perspective on the basis of the
principles of the three U.S.-China joint communiqués”); Yang, Summit Diplomacy,
supra note 169, at 54 (noting the long-term implications of the term “strategy”);
Zhang, Can a “Constructive Strategic Partnership” Be Built Up?, supra note 170, at 144
(“[T]he constructive strategic partnership] calls on both sides to regard the
relationship from a long-term perspective, and build toward a healthy and stable
Sino-U.S. relationship oriented toward the 21st century.”); see also Harry Harding, The
Clinton-Jiang Summits: An American Perspective [hereinafter Harding, The Clinton-Jiang
Summits], in OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, supra note 169, at 29, 31
(commenting that President Jiang’s and President Clinton’s commitment to a
constructive strategic partnership illustrates their new-found desire to develop a
more positive, stable relationship).
195. See DOZ & HAMEL, supra note 171, at 142 (“The strategic context of the
alliance allows . . . the partner wholehearted, fully committed cooperation by shaping
the strategic significance and scope each partner assigns to the alliance, by setting
the tone of the relationship, and by setting each partner’s expectations about the
outcome.”); Koehn & Cheng, supra note 186, at 3 (“[T]he emphasis under the
[partnership] scenario is on common interests, which are viewed as more important
than differences, and on active cooperation, which is seen as preferable to conflict.”);
see also DOZ & HAMEL, supra note 171, at 33 (emphasizing team commitment as
crucial to a successful strategic partnership).
196. Zhang, Can a “Constructive Strategic Partnership” Be Built Up?, supra note 170, at
144; see Harding, The Clinton-Jiang Summits, supra note 194, at 41 (describing strategic
partnership as a model under which the two countries consider themselves as
“partners in addressing international issues,” rather than as “allies” or “adversaries”);
see also DOZ & HAMEL, supra note 171, at 118 (conceding that alliances are always
vulnerable, no matter how well they have been conceived); id. at 143 (arguing that
most partners in a strategic alliance “probably harbor private expectations that they
do not share with their allies”).
197. See Zhang, Can a “Constructive Strategic Partnership” Be Built Up?, supra note
170, at 144; Koehn & Cheng, supra note 186, at 3 (arguing that the partnership
scenario is “based on equality, mutual respect, and mutual benefit”); Yang, Summit
Diplomacy, supra note 169, at 58 (“[The Joint Statement] points out that the two
countries should carry out dialogue . . . on an equal footing.”).
198. See Yu, Piracy, Predjudice, and Perspectives, supra note 11 (describing China’s
skepticism toward Western institutions and paranoia about foreign aggression).
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199

international regimes.
This partnership model not only represents a process, but it also
200
signifies a goal.
“[B]y portraying that this is a goal to be worked
toward, not a situation already achieved, [the two countries] . . .
acknowledged that creating such a relationship requires additional
201
work.”
This additional work includes “the serious pursuit of
additional collaborative efforts, reassurances that stem from
successful cooperative experiences, and effective approaches to
202
conflict management and negotiation.” As a goal toward which the
two countries should work, the model recognizes that the
203
relationship may not be conflict-free and may involve potential
204
risks.
Thus, the two countries need to be patient while they are
building the partnership.
Combined together, a “constructive strategic partnership” provides
a new conceptual framework under which U.S.-China relations can
205
206
strategic,
and adaptive
be built.
It serves both symbolic,

199. See Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic
World, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 115, 120 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (arguing
that a regime will not arise “when some actors obtain their most preferred outcomes
while others are left aggrieved”).
200. See Xinghao Ding, Basis for a Constructive Strategic Partnership Between China and
the United States, in OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, supra note 169, at 157, 158.
201. Harding, The Clinton-Jiang Summits, supra note 194, at 31; see also Ding, supra
note 200, at 158 (arguing that the success of the constructive strategic partnership
model requires serious mutual efforts by both China and the United States).
202. Koehn & Cheng, supra note 186, at 9; see also DOZ & HAMEL, supra note 171, at
32 (“Alliances cannot be crafted and set on ‘autopilot.’ They require ongoing
management of the relationship within a clear strategic framework.”); id. at 118
(“[A]n alliance cannot be fully designed at the start; we must expect that it will evolve
over time.”). As Professors Doz and Hamel explained:
[I]nitial interface should be seen as something to be perfected with time and
experience. Partners need to continually ask: Does the interface facilitate
mutual understanding and trust? Does it allow us to share enough
information to make the alliance work? Will it become broader and more
open as collaboration develops?
Id. at 118.
203. Zhang, Can a “Constructive Strategic Partnership” Be Built Up?, supra note 170, at
144.
204. See Final Report of the Eighty-ninth American Assembly [hereinafter Final Report],
in LIVING WITH CHINA, supra note 85, at 295, 309 (“The risks of trying and failing are
negligible compared to the risks of not trying at all.”); Robert O. Keohane, The
Demand for International Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 199, at 141,
167 (“[C]reating international regimes hardly disposes of risks and uncertainty.
Indeed, participating in schemes for international cooperation entails risk for the
cooperating state. If others fail to carry out their commitments, it may suffer.”); see
also DOZ & HAMEL, supra note 171, at 147 (“The initial context of an alliance seldom
encourages cooperation:
the partners generally lack mutual familiarity,
understanding, and trust, and the absence of these can easily lead to an adversarial
relationship.”).
205. A symbolic purpose is one that “allow[s parties] to declare themselves in favor
of truth, beauty, goodness, and world community, while leaving governments free to
pursue national self-interests and to do exactly as they wish.” Susan Strange, Cave! hic
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207

Instead of challenging the other’s “core values” or
purposes.
208
competing against the other under a zero-sum game, the model
recognizes the other’s sensitive differences and calls for a resolution
209
of those differences in a non-confrontational manner.
The new
model also allows for an efficient dialogue between the two countries,
thus helping the other understand its present and future strategic
intentions and national objectives. This dialogue will also help
210
In sum,
reduce the mutual suspicion between the two countries.
the model “will be conducive to achieving the purposes of ‘enhancing
mutual understanding, broadening common ground, developing
211
cooperation, and building a future together.’”
It will also help
build new international regimes, including an international
intellectual property regime that takes into consideration the needs
and resources of both countries and the continuous challenges in the

dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 199, at
337, 342.
206. A strategic purpose is one that “serv[es] as [an] instrument[] of the structural
strategy and foreign policy of the dominant state or states.” Id.
207. An adaptive purpose is one that “provid[es] the necessary multilateral
agreement on whatever arrangements are necessary to allow states to enjoy the
political luxury of national autonomy without sacrificing the economic dividends of
world markets and production structures.” Id.
208. See Zhang, Can a “Constructive Strategic Partnership” Be Built Up?, supra note
170, at 144 (“[A] partnership is quite different from the big-power relations of the
past; it is a new pattern of relations among major powers who possess different
histories, cultures, social systems, and levels of economic development together with
broad common interests and deep differences.”).
209. See Xinbo Wu, China and the United States: Toward an Understanding on East
Asian Security, in OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, supra note 169, at 83 (arguing
that the “balance-of-power” approach should be replaced with a “balance-of-interest”
approach). As Professor Wu explained:
[A]pproaches to major-power relations should replace the practice of
balance-of-power with one of balance-of-interests. Although balance-ofpower has long guided the external behavior of nations (especially major
powers), the past has revealed two fundamental flaws in this principle.
Firstly, the approach is confrontational by nature, and the underlying
rationale is mutual checking, not mutual cooperation. Second, it is
precarious, as each side constantly seeks to gain an upper hand vis-à-vis the
next stage of the competition. In contrast, the approach of balance-ofinterests represents an effort of a different kind. It is conciliatory by nature
as the underlying rationale is reciprocal accommodation of the interests of
the other. Secondly, by nurturing cooperation rather than stirring up
competition among nations, the approach contributes to the stability of the
international system. Thirdly, in a time of growing interdependence, the
idea of “spheres of influence” should be abandoned. Policy makers in both
Beijing and Washington should conceive of their respective policies as aimed
at building an Asia-Pacific community benefiting all parties, not creating or
expanding their own “turfs” that divide the region and generate conflict.
Id.
210. See Ding, supra note 200, at 164.
211. Zhang, Can a “Constructive Strategic partnership” Be Built Up?, supra note 170, at
141.
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information age.
To provide guidelines for the implementation of this new
partnership, the Joint Statement outlined the agreements of and
212
differences between the two countries in nine important areas.
These areas include high-level dialogue and consultations, energy
and environment cooperation, economic relations and trade,
peaceful nuclear cooperation, nonproliferation, human rights,
cooperation in the legal field, military-to-military relations, and
exchanges in the areas of science and technology, education and
213
culture.
Intellectual property is classified within the category of
economic relations and trade. Under this category, the Joint
Statement emphasized the importance of information technology
and indicated China’s intention to sign the Information Technology
214
The Joint Statement also stated that “[t]he two
Agreement.
Presidents are prepared to take positive and effective measures to
215
expand U.S.-China trade and economic ties.” The Joint Statement,
however, did not indicate clearly what these positive and effective
216
measures are or what they will be.
Although the word “positive” suggests that the United States may
reformulate its foreign intellectual property policy and abandon such
negative measures as unilateral sanctions and Section 301
217
investigations, the word “effective” indicates the possibility that the
United States would continue its coercive tactics if such tactics were
needed to promote an effective intellectual property regime in China.
Equally ambiguous is the conjunction “and.” On the one hand, the
use of the conjunction suggests that future American actions will be
both “positive” and “effective”; on the other hand, the conjunction
allows the United States to carry out both “positive” measures and
“effective” measures at the same time. Thus, it would be consistent
with the latter interpretation if the United States instituted long-term
education projects while simultaneously imposing unilateral
sanctions to coerce China into cooperation.
Because the Joint Statement can be open to two contrary
interpretations, the policymakers implementing the Joint Statement

212. See Joint Statement, supra note 14.
213. See id.
214. See id. The Information Technology Agreement “will reduce tariffs [in
China] from the present level of 13.3 percent to 0 percent for semiconductors,
computers, computer equipment, telecommunications equipment, and other
information technology-related products.” MARK A. GROOMBRIDGE & CLAUDE E.
BARFIELD, TIGER BY THE TAIL: CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 32 (1999).
215. Joint Statement, supra note 14, at 1682 (emphasis added).
216. See id.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37 for a discussion of Section 301.
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and the constructive strategic partnership must always remind
themselves of the needs for, and the ultimate goals behind, the new
model. With respect to intellectual property, the need for the new
model is the ineffectiveness of the existing American foreign
intellectual property policy, the hostility created by this ill-advised
policy, and the limited understanding American scholars,
policymakers, the mass media, and the general public have about
218
The ultimate goals of the new policy are therefore a selfChina.
sustainable intellectual property regime, a more stable and
harmonious bilateral relationship, and better mutual understanding
between the two countries.
III. TWELVE-STEP ACTION PLAN
219

220

221

The 1992 MOU, the 1995 Agreement, and the 1996 Accord
have provided China with a comprehensive intellectual property
regime. Yet, enforcement of intellectual property laws is far from
222
As
satisfactory, and piracy remains rampant in China.
commentators, including myself, have pointed out, the culprit
behind the Chinese piracy problem is the Confucian beliefs
ingrained in the Chinese culture, the country’s socialist economic
system, the leaders’ skepticism toward Western institutions, the
xenophobic and nationalist sentiments of the populace, the
government’s censorship and information control policy, and the
223
significantly different Chinese legal culture and judicial system.
Unfortunately, the existing American intellectual property policy
toward China does not target any of these problems. Rather, it masks
the ideological differences between the two countries and conceals
the limited understanding American scholars, policymakers, the mass
224
media, and the general public have about China.
Even worse, by

218. See supra text accompanying noted 59-68 for a discussion of the 1992 MOU.
219. See id.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 87-112 for a discussion of the 1995
Agreement.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 130-35 for a discussion of the 1996 Accord.
222. See infra text accompanying notes 247-48 (noting the rampant piracy problem
in China).
223. See, e.g., ALFORD, supra note 23; Glenn R. Butterton, Pirates, Dragons and U.S.
Intellectual Property Rights in China: Problems and Prospects of Chinese Enforcement, 38
ARIZ. L. REV. 1081 (1996); Tiefenbrun, supra note 35; Yu, Piracy, Predjudice, and
Perspectives, supra note 11.
224. See PAUL A. COHEN, DISCOVERING HISTORY IN CHINA: AMERICAN HISTORICAL
WRITING ON THE RECENT CHINESE PAST 4 (1984) (arguing that most American
historians ask the wrong questions about China’s past); MANN, supra note 9, at 373
(asserting that one of the greatest misperceptions of Washington in the 1990s is that
China does not understand American politics); OVERHOLT, supra note 181, at 400
(stating that American relations with Asia have always been troubled by

YUPPREPAGED6501USETHISONE.DOC

166

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/15/2001 11:34 AM

[Vol. 50:131

creating hostility among the Chinese people and by alienating those
local people who support intellectual property protection within the
country, this misguided policy makes it more difficult for the Chinese
to espouse Western intellectual property rights.
To target these shortcomings, this Part proposes a twelve-step
action plan that aims to reformulate the existing ineffective American
foreign intellectual property policy. The first three steps of the
action plan cover actions that are needed to cultivate a stable and
harmonious relationship between China and the United States and to
foster a better understanding of China by American scholars,
policymakers, the mass media, and the general public. If a
constructive strategic partnership is to be developed, a stable and
harmonious relationship and a better understanding of each other
will be needed. The next three steps outline the actions that must be
taken to change the mindsets of the Chinese leaders, to relieve their
skepticism toward Western intellectual property rights, and to
overcome their paranoia about foreign aggression. Under the
existing political apparatus in China, nothing matters more than the
wholehearted support of the Chinese leaders. The final six steps
focus on the long-term efforts that are needed to promote a selfsustainable intellectual property regime. So far, the intellectual
property regime in China is fairly weak and has to be constantly
rejuvenated by external “pushes,” such as the threat of trade
sanctions and Section 301 investigation. The efforts outlined in these
steps aspire to replace these intrusive pushes with internal
development that will promote and sustain the regime. Although
these steps are presented in a numerical order, they are equally
important and should be carried out simultaneously.
Step One: Abandon The Coercive Policy
The case in which it may sometimes be a matter of deliberation how far it is
proper to continue the free importation of certain foreign goods is, when
some foreign nation restrains by high duties or prohibitions the importation
of some of our manufactures into their country. Revenge in this case
naturally dictates retaliation, and that we should impose the like duties and

misconceptions of China and Japan because Americans do not know as much about
Asia as they do about Canada and Europe); Lilley, supra note 9, at 36 (“Americans
have always had a propensity for misunderstanding China.”); Mann, supra note 183
(arguing that the Americans are overestimating the ease of transforming China); see
also William P. Alford, “Seek Truth from Facts”—Especially When They Are Unpleasant:
America’s Understanding of China’s Efforts at Law Reform, 8 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 177,
184 (1990) (discussing the impediments that have impaired American scholars from
understanding Chinese legal development).
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prohibitions upon the importation of some or all of their manufactures into
ours. Nations, accordingly, seldom fail to retaliate in this manner.
225

— Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776)
226

Coercion invites retaliation.
The first thing the United States
needs to do is to abandon its coercive foreign intellectual property
policy. As pointed out by the U.S.-China Business Council, the
umbrella group for American firms doing business in China, “there is
little evidence that unilateral U.S. sanctions can effectuate policy
227
changes in other nations.” In fact, unilateral sanctions tend to hurt
228
Today,
American businesses without any guarantee of change.
goods produced in the United States are also produced in Europe
and Japan. Because Europe and Japan do not impose similar
229
demands on China, “the Chinese government will react to sanctions

225. SMITH, supra note 182, at 434.
226. See Keohane, supra note 204, at 180, 182-83; see also Scott Fairley,
Extraterritorial Assertions of Intellectual Property Rights in International Trade, in
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 4, at 141, 144
(“Unilateralism begets unilateralism.”). Professor Sykes disagreed:
[The retaliation argument] relies on the assumption that a considerable
danger of counter-retaliation arises when the United States sanctions
cheating. In cases of blatant cheating, counter-retaliation amounts roughly
to a strategy whereby a foreign government announces that it intends to
cheat periodically in a manner that everyone can recognize as cheating, and
if caught and sanctioned it will respond by cheating to an even greater
extent. Such countries will obviously enjoy poor reputations in the trading
community, and discourage other nations from entering trade agreements
with them. For this reason, it is questionable whether any nation sanctioned
for a blatant act of cheating would find counter-retaliations to be an optimal
strategy.
Alan O. Sykes, “Mandatory” Retaliation for Breach of Trade Agreements: Some Thoughts on
the Strategic Design of Section 301, 8 B.U. INT’L L.J. 301, 313 (1990).
227. Bloch, supra note 85, at 205.
228. See id. at 205 (discussing the ineffectiveness of economic sanctions); CHAYES &
CHAYES, supra note 43, at 22. As some commentators noted:
During the last several years, America has imposed some form of unilateral
economic sanctions against 26 countries, accounting for half the world’s
population. These sanctions have not achieved their goals; indeed, sanctions
often harm exactly those they seek to help. And sanctions have cost the
United States about $20 billion in lost exports, 200,000 jobs, and the
goodwill and trust of its allies abroad.
W. Bowman Cutter et al., New World, New Deal; A Democratic Approach to Globalization,
FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2000, at 80, 92. But see Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade Linkage and
Human Rights, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR
DUNKEL 241, 243 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Marhias Hirsch eds., 1998) [hereinafter
URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND] (arguing that moral absolutists are willing to suffer
economic harm even though the sanctions may not result in any policy changes).
229. See Bloch, supra note 85, at 206 (arguing that the United States is increasingly
alone in imposing sanctions); Robert P. O’Quinn, Integrating China into the World
Economy, in BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND DETERRENCE, supra note 169, at 45, 80 (asserting
that imposing unilateral sanctions without cooperation from the international
community tends to isolate the country imposing the sanctions more than the target
country); William J. Dobson, China’s Europe Card, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1996, at A21
(“[T]o be effective, America’s China policy cannot simply be manufactured in
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by becoming even more hostile to the United States and by switching
230
from U.S. products to European and Japanese ones.” For example,
when the United States threatened to sanction China over its lack of
intellectual property protection, Chinese Premier Li Peng went to
France to sign a $1.5-billion order for thirty short-haul Airbus planes,
231
instead of Boeing planes. China also gave a European consortium
232
the rights to develop a new hundred-seat airliner.
As “the growth prospects for the U.S. economy . . . have become
233
increasingly dependent on exports,” a confrontational policy will

Washington and delivered in Beijing; to some degree, it must be sold in London,
Paris and Bonn.”). As Greg Mastel explained:
Historically, the United States, . . . as the Cold War leader of the free world,
played a role in defining the direction of China’s relationship with the
West. . . . With the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. allies feel more free
than ever to set their own foreign policy independent of U.S. positions.
Given its geographic proximity and the long history involved, Japan in
particular looks at China independently of the United States. Attracted to
the potential of China’s market, many countries seem even less likely to look
to the United States for leadership on China policy in the future.
GREG MASTEL, THE MIDDLE KINGDOM EMERGES: THE RISE OF THE CHINESE ECONOMY 187
(1997).
230. Bloch, supra note 85, at 206; Tony Walker et al., Li Peng Backs Trade with “More
Lenient” Europeans, FIN. TIMES, June 11, 1996, at 1 (“[I]f the Europeans adopt more
co-operation with China in all areas, not just in economic areas but also in political
and other areas, then I believe the Europeans can get more orders from China.”
(quoting Chinese premier Li Peng)); see also Haiying Zhao, Sino-U.S. Economic
Relations Across Time and Space, in OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, supra note
169, at 207, 216 (“Given the current world economic landscape, the United States
has to compete with Europe and Japan in the emerging Chinese market, and China
has to compete with other developing countries in the U.S. market.”).
231. See Craig R. Whitney, China Awards Huge Jet Order to Europeans, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 11, 1996, at A1 (“Most observers believe the Airbus decision was made for
business reasons, with the human rights linkage tacked on later.”); see also ANDREW J.
NATHAN, CHINA’S TRANSITION 254 (1997). As Professor Nathan pointed out, there is
no other case in which the Chinese government discriminated against an American
See id. at 254.
company because of United States human rights activism.
Nevertheless, “[c]ontinued U.S. division over human rights . . . may encourage the
Chinese to start enforcing such linkages.” Id.
232. See China and France Will Study Developing a 100-Seat Jet, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,
1996, at D2.
233. Bloch, supra note 85, at 205. As Dean Garten explained:
To begin with, the health of the American economy is more closely linked to
foreign markets than ever before. The country can no longer generate
enough growth, jobs, profits, and savings from domestic sources. More than
one-third of American’s economic growth now derives from exports. By the
turn of the century, more than 16 million jobs will be supported by overseas
sales. From Coca-Cola to Caterpillar, many U.S. companies are taking in
more than 50 percent of their revenues abroad. From a foreign policy
standpoint, moreover, America’s links to most countries, and its potential
influence on them, depend increasingly on commercial relationships. Trade
finance, and business investment have become the sine qua non of links with
Russia, China, Japan, Southeast Asia, the European Union, and the nations
of the western hemisphere.
Garten, supra note 48, at 69-70.
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hurt American businesses even more. Due to the constant use of
trade threats by the American government and the uncertain trade
relations between the two countries, many risk-aversive American
234
businesses have limited their business in China to avoid risks.
Unreliable as long-term suppliers, some of the American businesses
have also been replaced by their foreign competitors. Even worse,
the trade threats and constant bullying have sparked a new
235
resurgence of nationalism and xenophobia in China.
Evidence of
236
this resurgence includes two recent bestsellers, the Chinese reaction
237
to the United States’s bombing of their embassy in Belgrade, and
China’s recent standoff with the United States over the collision
238
between its jet fighter and a U.S. reconnaissance plane.
If these
sentiments continue to grow, they may even lead to boycotts of
239
American products or harassment of American businesses.
At the global level, a coercive policy will threaten the integrity of
240
the international trading system and may even lead to its collapse.

234. See OVERHOLT, supra note 181, at 381.
235. Commentators have argued that there might be a resurgence of national
sentiment in China “because a new ideology is necessary as faith in Marxism or
Maoism declines and nationalism, if handled properly, can justify the political
legitimacy of leadership.” YONGNIAN ZHENG, DISCOVERING CHINESE NATIONALISM IN
CHINA:
MODERNIZATION, IDENTITY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2 (1999)
[hereinafter ZHENG, DISCOVERING CHINESE NATIONALISM]; see also id. at 17 (arguing
that the rise of nationalism in post-Mao China is “a response to the ‘Chinese
problems’ that post-Mao China has encountered”); Yue Ren, China’s Perceived Image of
the United States: Its Sources and Impact, in OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, supra
note 169, at 247, 251 (showing a poll that indicates anti-American sentiment). See
generally CHINESE NATIONALISM (Jonathan Unger, ed. 1996) for a collection of essays
examining Chinese nationalism.
236. These two bestsellers include, China Can Say No, QIANG SONG ET AL.,
ZHONGGUO KEYI SHUO BU [CHINA CAN SAY NO] (1996), and Behind a Demonized China,
XIGUANG LI ET AL., YAOMOHUA ZHONGGUO DE BEIHOU [BEHIND A DEMONIZED CHINA]
(1997).
237. Although the United States insisted that the bombing was an accident and
apologized for the incident, many Chinese considered the bombing a deliberate
attack to slow down China’s rise in world affairs and to warn China against
challenging American hegemony. See MOSHER, supra note 169, at 81; see also John
Pomfret & Michael Lavis, China Suspends Some U.S. Ties; Protestors Trap Ambassador in
Embassy, WASH. POST, May 10, 1999, at A1 (reporting on the anti-American protests
outside the U.S. embassy after the bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade).
238. See John Pomfret, New Nationalism Drives Beijing; Hard Line Reflects Public Mood,
WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2001, at A1 (attributing the recent standoff with Washington to
the growing nationalist sentiments among the Chinese people); Elisabeth Rosenthal,
Many Voices for Beijing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2001, at A1 (noting that anti-Americanism
is running high in China).
239. To highlight these possibilities, one commentator entitled a chapter of his
book “To Screw Foreigners Is Patriotic.” GEREMIE R. BARMÉ, IN THE RED 255-80
(1999); see also James Cox, U.S. Firms: Piracy Thrives in China, USA TODAY, Aug. 23,
1995, at 2B (“[A] pirate program in China is often referred to as ‘patriotic software,’
out of a belief that it speeds the nation’s modernization at little or no cost.”).
240. As one commentator cautioned:
What if the EC was to assert that the U.S. patent system is discriminatory and
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China’s responses to the United States’s threats of trade sanctions

should be repealed since it takes “first applying, first served” as its basis for
dealing with foreigners? What if Central and South American countries were
to insist that U.S. restrictions on sugar imports are clear impediments to
trade and demand their removal? What if Japan and Taiwan were to claim
that the U.S. requirement for voluntary restraints on machine tool exports
are harmful to domestic industry and demand compensation? Would the
United States enter into negotiation with these trading partners? If the
United States decided not to make the required concessions and these
countries responded with countermeasures or sanctions against U.S. imports
without recourse to GATT procedures, what would become of the world freetrading system?
Makoto Kuroda, Super 301 and Japan, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM, supra note 33, at
219, 220-21.
Professor Milner pointed out the two central problems of unilateral sanctions as
follows:
First, . . . unilateralism will cause problems. Countries simply will not let
another nation cast judgement on, and try to force change in, their laws,
policies, and practices. It is an infringement on their sovereignty and will
provoke resistance. Moreover, the United States will be judging its own case;
it is an interested, not a neutral judge. No fair way exists for one country to
evaluate its own case in a dispute with another. Judgement by the United
States, then, is likely to be seen as unfair and hence to provoke retaliation.
Unilateralism will bring destructive spirals of mutual retaliation with each
country viewing the other as acting unfairly. . . .
This unilateralism leads to a second problem. Aggressive, bilateral
reciprocity violates central tenets of the postwar international trading system.
GATT upholds the principles of multilateralism, nondiscrimination, and
neutral dispute settlement. Super 301 may encroach upon all of these. It
implies bilateralism, may lead to discriminatory trade agreements that favor
American commerce, and constitutes unilateral dispute settlement. Super
301 will bypass GATT, and it will violate its central principles. Its legality
under international trade law is debatable. The United States thus may be
violating international law as well as undermining GATT. Both actions will
be costly. Violations of international law by leading powers will induce other
states to violate those laws as respect for them declines. Disregarding GATT
norms will bring the entire system into question and may lead to its
breakdown, as U.S. actions did to the Bretton Woods monetary regime in the
early 1970s. Since GATT has helped provide a stable, prosperous trading
environment for forty years, ending it should not be done lightly. Moving
from a system of multilateral negotiation and dispute settlement to a
bilateral one will increase the costs of negotiating trade liberalization and
will greatly politicize the process. Undermining the GATT system in
exchange for marginal improvements in the U.S. trade balance does not
seem to be a rational strategy.
Helen Milner, The Political Economy of U.S. Trade Policy: A Study of the Super 301
Provision, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM, supra note 33, at 163, 176-77; see also CHAYES
& CHAYES, supra note 43, at 100 (“The central lessons the drafters [of GATT] took
from interwar history was that unilateral action on trade questions and disputes led
ultimately to the collapse of the international trading system.”); Marshall A. Leaffer,
Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism, 76
IOWA L. REV. 273, 297 (1991) (arguing that the bilateral trade-based approach
“run[s] counter to U.S. long-term interests for a healthy, stable trade environment”
and “tend[s] to fragment the world trading system . . . [by creating] resentment,
particularly among Third World countries who view imposed bilateral agreements as
a species of colonialism”). But see William Safire, Smoot-Hawley Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
17, 1983, at A23 (arguing that protectionism may be the only solution to unfair
competition from foreign countries).
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have demonstrated that a coercive policy always leads to retaliation
and may even result in a global trade war. In such a war, resources
tend to be allocated inefficiently, and the whole world will become
worse off. A coercive policy would also lead to criticism from other
countries, thus alienating the United States from its trading
241
partners. Even worse, in their transition from a command economy
to a market economy, the emerging democracies are constantly
looking to the policies of Western democracies, in particular the
242
United States, for guidance.
A coercive policy would lead to
243
The United
unrevised adoption by these emerging democracies.
States has taken a tremendous effort to create the TRIPs Agreement
and to build an international intellectual property system. Ironically,
its foreign intellectual property policy is attempting to destroy what it
244
has worked so hard to achieve.

241. See Cheng, supra note 187, at 1979; see also GATT Bill Brings Major Reforms to
Domestic Intellectual Property Law, 11 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1966, 1966-67 (Dec. 21,
1994) (noting the dissatisfaction of the less developed countries over the United
States’s ability to impose Special 301 sanctions despite their compliance with the
TRIPs Agreements); David Hartridge & Arvind Subramanian, Intellectual Property
Rights: The Issues in GATT, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 893, 909 (1989) (suggesting
that states may not accept new multilateral commitments in the intellectual property
area if they are going to be vulnerable to unilateral actions).
242. Professor McGee pointed out the tendency of emerging democracies to look
to the United States for guidance in making its transition from a command economy
to market economy:
One major implication of U.S. protectionism that could have an effect on
trade in Europe is the possibility that our trading partners, especially those
in emerging democracies, could decide to adopt U.S. trade policies as their
own, not in order to retaliate, but because they think that U.S. policies are
somehow better than those of other countries. Nothing could be farther
from the truth.
There is a tendency in emerging democracies, especially those that are
attempting to convert from a centrally planned system to a market system, to
look to the policies of Western democracies for guidance. For example, the
government of Poland invited representatives of the U.S. Internal Revenue
Service to Poland to teach Polish tax collectors how to collect taxes. Many
Americans who learned of this invitation were horrified at such a prospect.
The Internal Revenue Service is one of the least freedom loving of all
government bureaucracies. It has been known to confiscate and destroy or
sell assets with little or no due process. Yet Poland and other countries want
to copy U.S. policies and methods.
ROBERT W. MCGEE, A TRADE POLICY FOR FREE SOCIETIES: THE CASE AGAINST
PROTECTIONISM 160 (1994) (footnotes omitted); see also Whitmore Gray, The Challenge
of Asian Law, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1, 5-6 (1995) (“After the Second World War,
however, a new era of global interaction of legal systems developed. U.S. economic
dominance reinforced the idea that U.S. legal institutions and, particularly, recent
U.S. substantive law, should be considered as normal models for modernization.”).
243. MCGEE, supra note 242, at 160.
244. As Professor Endeshaw explained:
[The] United States approach will work towards overthrowing any measure
of success that the United States has achieved in placing intellectual property
on an arguably “international” pedestal (the TRIPs) after passing through
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Moreover, a coercive policy is self-deluding in nature, and it rarely
succeeds in the long run. Even though a coercive policy may be
effective in facilitating immediate compliance and inducing short245
term concessions, such as those improvements made during the
first few months immediately after the signing of a new intellectual
property agreement, such a policy “fail[s] to generate[] the type of
domestic rationale and conditions needed to produce enduring
246
Apart from the lukewarm responses it was able to elicit,
change.”
the coercive American foreign intellectual property policy failed to
create any sustainable and continuous protection for American
products. Intellectual property piracy still remains rampant in China.
As the Chinese economy grows, the problem will exacerbate. In
1995, the United States lost about $1 billion of revenues due to
247
intellectual property piracy in China.
By 1998, this figure has
248
doubled to $2 billion, despite the government’s increased efforts to
combat piracy and the public’s heightened awareness of intellectual
property rights.
To illustrate the self-delusive nature of a coercive policy, there is no
better example than the TRIPs Agreement, which many regard as

long periods of bilateral arrangements. Consequently, the quiet overhaul
that the international IP system has been subjected to through the TRIPS
may now be in danger of collapse by the American insistence that it will
interpret IP treaties and take any measures it deems appropriate, unilaterally
and from its own national perspective. Each move of the United States to
take IP matters throughout the world in its own hands will increasingly
reduce the global significance of the TRIPs formula to a national system that
has been outdated for quite some time.
Endeshaw, supra note 73, at 337-38; see also A. Samuel Oddi, The International Patent
System and Third World Development: Reality or Myth?, 1987 DUKE L.J. 831, 874
[hereinafter Oddi, International Patent System] (arguing that the United States’s
unilateral actions and its approach toward protection of patents and mask works
“hav[e] raised a significant question of its continued commitment to the principle of
national treatment”).
245. See ALFORD, supra note 23, at 118; see also CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 43, at
89 (arguing that U.S. unilateral economic sanctions have been effective at times in
inducing countries to fulfill treaty obligations); Alan O. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral
Threats in International Commercial Relations: The Limited Case for Section 301, 23 LAW &
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 262, 313 (1992) (“Section 301 is fairly successful in inducing foreign
governments to modify their practices when they are accused of violating U.S. legal
rights; . . . success is more likely with a GSP beneficiary.”).
246. See ALFORD, supra note 23, at 118; see also CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 43, at
32 (“[T]he experience in the international arena is that unilateral sanctions in the
more coercive form of military or economic penalties are but infrequently and
sporadically deployed to redress violations of treaty obligations, and are not very
effective when they are.”); Leaffer, supra note 240, at 278 (“A durable agreement
must be based on mutual gain and cannot be imposed by the information-producing
countries on the developing world.”).
247. See Tony Munroe, Action Aside, Chinese Intellectual Property Hasn’t Slowed, WASH.
TIMES, Aug. 31, 1995, at B7.
248. See Faison, China Turns Blind Eye, supra note 8.
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Although the Agreement gives less
coercive and “imperialistic.”
developed countries reductions in tariffs on apparel and agriculture,
it provides developed countries universal minimum standards of
intellectual property protection and relaxation of restrictions in
251
Undeniably, bringing less developed
foreign direct investment.
countries into the TRIPs Agreement allows developed countries to
impose economic sanctions on infringing countries and to “achieve
treaties in diplomatically and politically difficult areas in which
252
agreement would otherwise be elusive.”
By trying to circumvent
these difficult areas so that countries can reach a compromise,
however, the TRIPs Agreement fails to attack the crux of the
intellectual property piracy problem. In fact, the Agreement masks
the significant cultural and ideological differences between the
developed and less developed countries and has created an illusion
253
that these differences can be easily resolved.
Finally, the repercussions of the existing coercive policy are not

249. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and
Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 613, 614 (1996) [hereinafter Hamilton,
TRIPS Agreement] (“Far from being limited to trade relations, correcting the
international balance of trade, or lowering customs trade barriers, TRIPS attempts to
remake international copyright law in the image of Western copyright law.”);
Surendra J. Patel, Can the Intellectual Property Rights System Serve the Interests of Indigenous
Knowledge?, in VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 305, 316 (Stephen B. Brush & Doreen Stabinsky eds., 1996)
[hereinafter VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE] (arguing that the TRIPS Agreement makes
the U.S. system of copyright law universal and harms the national interests of the less
developed world).
250. See Robert Burrell, A Case Study in Cultural Imperialism: The Imposition of
Copyright on China by the West, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ETHICS 195 (Lionel
Bently & Spyros M. Maniatis eds., 1998); Hamilton, TRIPS Agreement, supra note 249,
at 614 (contending that TRIPs could become “one of the most effective vehicles of
Western imperialism in history”); id. at 617 (equating the TRIPs Agreement with
“freedom imperialism”); A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS—Natural Rights and a “Polite Form of
Economic Imperialism,” 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 415 (1996) (considering the TRIPS
Agreement as a “polite form of economic imperialism”); J.H. Reichman, Intellectual
Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 747, 813 (1989) (“Imposition of foreign legal standards on unwilling
states in the name of ‘harmonization’ remains today what Ladas deemed it in 1975,
namely, a polite form of economic imperialism.” (citing 1 STEVEN P. LADAS, PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 14-15
(1975))); see also SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE
REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER 184 (1996) [hereinafter HUNTINGTON, CLASH OF
CIVILIZATIONS] (“What is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest.”);
Strange, supra note 205, at 340 (arguing that the American policy is a form of
“nonterritorial imperialism”). Interestingly, as Professor Strange pointed out, one
French author titled his book on American foreign policy, The Imperial Republic. Id.
(referencing RAYMOND ARON, THE IMPERIAL REPUBLIC: THE U.S. AND THE WORLD,
1945-1973 (1974)).
251. See MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE
POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 12-13 (1998).
252. Id. at 12.
253. See id.
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only limited to the trade arena. By demonstrating that a country
should rely heavily on pressure and ultimata to protect its economic
interests, the existing foreign intellectual property policy backfires
and jeopardizes the United States’s longstanding interests in
promoting human rights and civil liberties in China. It also discredits
the very important message that one should respect rights and the
254
legal process. Even worse, the coercive policy provides China with
“a convenient legitimization for repressive measures [the Chinese
authorities] intended to take in any event while simultaneously
255
constraining America’s capacity to complain about such actions.”
For example, to comply with the Western demands to crack down on
piracy, the Chinese authorities have enlisted the help of some of their
toughest law enforcers, including those who are notorious for gross
256
human rights violations, to clean up the pirate factories. To create
a deterrent effect and to demonstrate to the West their eagerness in
eradicating the piracy problem, the authorities have also enforced
257
the death penalty on infringers in severe cases.
Even though the
incidence of piracy may have been reduced, human rights violations
may have actually increased as a result.
Step Two: Recast the Debate on U.S.-China Intellectual Property Conflict
Intellectual property rights are very important to the economic
258
development and the progress of modern society.
There is no
question that China’s intellectual property protection is inadequate
according to international standards, not to mention the American

254. See William P. Alford, Making the World Safe for What? Intellectual Property
Rights, Human Rights and Foreign Economic Policy in the Post-European Cold War World,
29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 135, 143 (1997) [hereinafter Alford, Making the World Safe
for What?]; Berkman, supra note 102, at 42 (“If the system requires action by the
powerful elite within the government, the Party, or both to ensure enforcement, rule
of law is replaced by rule of men.”); Burrell, supra note 250, at 198 (“[The Western
approach toward China] suggests that the western governments are more concerned
with property rights than with the more fundamental rights of China’s population.”);
see also J.H. Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agreement: The
Case for Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property
Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 11, 48 (1998) (“Coercion is . . . a delicate,
risky, and possibly counterproductive strategy, one that could easily backfire on those
governments that succumb to this temptation.”).
255. Reichman & Lange, supra note 254, at 144-45.
256. See id. at 143.
257. See ALFORD, supra note 23, at 91 (stating that China has imposed death
penalty on at least four individuals, life sentences on no fewer than five others, and
imprisonment on some 500 people for trademark violations); Tom Korski, China
Sentences Three to Life in Prison for CD Piracy in Harshest Sanction So Far, Pat. Trademark
& Copyright L. Daily (BNA), at D2 (Dec. 11, 1997) (reporting that China has
imposed life sentences on three violators).
258. See infra text accompanying notes 331-35.
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There is also no question that the rampant piracy
standards.
problem has a substantial adverse impact on the American economic
260
interests.
The current debate on the U.S.-China intellectual
property conflict, however, is far from presenting the true picture. As
Professor Boyle has pointed out vividly and insightfully, the current
debate is presented like a morality play:
For a long time, the evil pirates of the East and South have been
freeloading on the original genius of Western inventors and
authors. Finally, tired of seeing pirated copies of Presumed Innocent
or Lotus 1-2-3, and infuriated by the appropriation of Mickey
Mouse to sell shoddy Chinese toys, the Western countries—led by
the United States—have decided to take a stand. What’s more, the
stand they take is popularly conceded to have more moral force
than that of United Fruit protecting its investments in Central
America or Anaconda Copper complaining about nationalization
in Salvador Allende’s Chile. In this case, the United States is
standing up for more than just filthy lucre. It is standing up for the
rights of creators, a cause that has attracted passionate advocates as
diverse as Charles Dickens and Steven Spielberg, Edison and
261
Jefferson, Balzac and Victor Hugo.

Significantly, this morality play omits the main reasons behind the
inadequate intellectual property protection in China, such as the
Confucian beliefs ingrained in the Chinese culture, the country’s
socialist economic system, the leader’s skepticism toward Western
institutions, xenophobic and nationalist sentiments of the populace,
the government’s censorship and information control policy, and the
262
significantly different Chinese legal culture and judicial system.
Thus, the current debate “obscure[s] far more than . . .
263
illuminate[s].” It baffles American scholars, policymakers, the mass
media, and the general public and prevents them from
understanding the roots of the Chinese piracy problem.
To avoid this illusion, the United States must recast its public
debate concerning intellectual property protection in China. To
capture attention, the current debate tends to overstate the extent of
the Chinese piracy problem. Most of the reported losses in
intellectual property in China are estimated under the assumption
that the Chinese would be able to afford and would be willing to

259. See discussion supra Part I.
260. See Faison, China Turns Blind Eye, supra note 8 (estimating that U.S. businesses
lost more than $2 billion in revenues in 1998 due to piracy in China).
261. BOYLE, supra note 5, at 123.
262. See Yu, Piracy, Predjudice, and Perspectives, supra note 11.
263. Alford, Making the World Safe for What?, supra note 254, at 135.
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purchase the pirated goods at the retail price set by Western
264
These assumptions, however, are largely
manufacturers.
unfounded. One can hardly imagine how a Chinese, or even an
American, who earns fifty dollars a month would spend half of his or
265
her monthly salary to buy a single book. Even if that person could
afford such a product, he or she might not be interested in
purchasing it. The fact that pirated products are very cheap or are
virtually free induces people to make irrational choices. For
example, it is common to find teenagers in China owning a large
collection of sophisticated computer software that they are incapable
of using. Indeed, as one commentator controversially suggested,
some software manufacturers “deliberately allow [software piracy] to
take place, in the hope that their software may become widely used
and establishes [sic] as industry standard, preferably becoming a
266
necessity in many organizations.”
Thus, one may wonder whether
some of these losses due to software piracy should be considered the
promotion expense needed to capture the Chinese market.
In addition, the current debate tends to exaggerate the impact of
267
the piracy problem on the existing U.S.-China trade deficit.

264. Professor Alford cautioned us not to take these reported losses at face value:
These figures should not be taken at face value. They are based on data
supplied by domestic industries [seeking] government assistance against
infringers and typically calculate losses by multiplying estimated instances of
infringement by market prices. Even assuming the accuracy of estimates of
the numbers of infringers, there is no reason to presume that each infringer
would prefer to pay a market price rather than cease using the item in
question, were these the only two alternatives available.
ALFORD, supra note 23, at 129 n.13.
265. See William P. Alford, How Theory Does—and Does Not—Matter: American
Approaches to Intellectual Property Law in East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 8, 13 (1994)
[hereinafter Alford, How Theory Does—and Does Not—Matter] (emphasizing how
unlikely a Chinese person “earning fifty dollars a month would be to fork out more
than a month’s salary to buy even such an outstanding work as Melville Nimmer and
Paul Geller’s treatise on worldwide copyright”); see also RYAN, supra note 251, at 80
(“Chinese officials defended the book piracy by claiming that people are too poor to
pay for Western books, ‘yet we must obtain this knowledge that we can develop our
economy.’”).
266. KENNETH HO, A STUDY IN THE PROBLEM OF SOFTWARE PIRACY IN HONG KONG
AND CHINA ¶ 2.6 (1995), available at http://info.gov.hk/ipd/piracy.html (last visited
Feb. 7, 2000); Mark A. Groombridge, The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights
Protection in the People’s Republic of China [hereinafter Groombridge, Political Economy of
Intellectual Property Rights], in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EMERGING MARKETS
11, 38 (Clarisa Long ed., 2000) (“As long as they are going to steal software, we want
them to steal ours.” (quoting William Gates, CEO of Microsoft Corp.)).
267. As Professor Hsü pointed out:
China did not always enjoy trade surplus with the United States. From 1972
to 1982, it had a trade deficit almost annually with the United States and
accumulated a total loss of U.S. $8,196 billion. The trade was more or less
balanced between 1983 and 1985, but then it turned rapidly in China’s favor.
HSÜ, supra note 158, at 961.
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Although some of the trade deficit may be attributable to the piracy
problem and the limited access to the Chinese market for American
products, there are other equally important factors. For example,

In fact, some commentators argued that the trade deficit is irrelevant to the
United States-China bilateral trade relationship:
On the broader level, the vast literature of economic theory suggests that
trade deficits matter very little to the economic health of a country. The
trade deficit (or surplus) is a reflection of the current account, which records
all trade in merchandise goods and services. Conversely, the capital account
records all trade in assets, including portfolio or direct investments. As
economists routinely note, “The magnitude of the account deficit or surplus
is determined by a country’s savings-investment ratio. By definition, a
country’s current account balance equals its excess of saving over investment:
when saving exceeds investment, the current account is positive, and
domestic residents are acquiring foreign assets.” It ill behooves us to blame
the lender who tides U.S. citizens over in this situation. For this reason,
Douglas Irwin, speaking for most international trade economists, notes that a
“country’s trade balance is related to international capital flows—not to
open or closed markets, unfair trade practices, or national competitiveness.”
Unfortunately, though, “this lesson is still apparently lost on many policy
officials today.”
GROOMBRIDGE & BARFIELD, supra note 214, at 11 (footnotes omitted); see MCGEE,
supra note 242, at 32-44 (arguing that the balance of trade figure is an “irrelevant
statistic” that should not influence a country’s economic policy); id. at 43 (“Whether
or not a country’s exports exceed its imports is completely irrelevant as far as
determining whether the economy benefits by trading with foreigners.”); MASTEL,
supra note 229, at 33-34 (“Trade deficits are not the best indicator of protectionism
and mercantilism. Under the correct economic conditions protectionist countries,
such as South Korea, can run a trade deficit. Under other conditions, a completely
open market can run a trade surplus.”). Likewise, one commentator criticized the
trade deficit argument for ignoring the difference between the size of the two
trading partners:
Another problem with the trade deficit mentality is that it totally ignores the
effect of measuring bilateral trade between countries of different sizes. For
example, Japan has about half the population of the United States. Even if
the Japanese buy the same amount of products from the United States per
capita as the United States buys from Japan, there will be a trade deficit
because the United States has twice the population of Japan. In order to
have a zero trade deficit with Japan, Japan would have to buy twice as much
from the United States per capita as the United States buys from Japan. Yet,
both sides benefit by voluntary trade, so, even though there is a trade
“deficit,” there is no cause for concern.
Id. at 43.
Indeed, as Adam Smith emphasized more than two centuries ago, voluntary trade
is always advantageous:
Nothing . . . can be more absurd than this whole doctrine of the balance of
trade. . . . When two places trade with one another, this doctrine supposes
that, if the balance be even, neither of them either loses or gains; but if it
leans in any degree to one side, that one of them loses, and the other gains
in proportion to its declension from the exact equilibrium.
Both
suppositions are false . . . that trade which, without force or constraint, is
naturally carried on between any two places, is always advantageous . . . to
both.
SMITH, supra note 182, bk. IV, ch. 3; see MCGEE, supra note 242, at 43 (“Trade is not a
zero-sum game where one party benefits and the other loses. Both parties benefit by
trade. Otherwise, no trades would be made, because individuals do not enter into
trade with the idea of making themselves worse off.”).
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economists have attributed the trade deficit to the American
macroeconomic policy in the early 1980s, which has raised the value
of the American dollar, thus pricing American exports out of foreign
268
Commentators have also attributed the enormous trade
markets.
deficit to the policy constraints the United States placed on its
269
exports and the constant threats of trade sanctions by the American
270
While the United States’s unfavorable export credits
government.
271
have cost American companies some large procurement deals, its
increasing use of trade sanctions has made American companies less
272
reliable, or even unreliable, as long-term suppliers. Given the lack
of transparency in the Chinese authorities, it would not be surprising
to see “day-to-day bureaucratic actions that hold back, divert, or delay
action on U.S. companies’ permits, applications, and bids whenever
273
U.S.-China relations sour.”
In fact, the current debate becomes even more distorted when the
trade deficit figure does not reflect the Hong Kong variable. The
figure does not “fully take into account that half of what U.S.
companies sell to Hong Kong is subsequently reexported to China,
while two-thirds of what the United States buys from China also
274
It ignores “a large
passes through Hong Kong entrepreneurs.”
portion of China’s export earnings [that] goes to foreign firms who
275
process about half of all Chinese exports.”
It also ignores the fact
that factories in Hong Kong and Taiwan relocated to China in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. Between 1987 and 1992, “[t]he U.S.
deficit with Hong Kong and Taiwan decreased by about 13 billion. . . ;
for the same period, the U.S. deficit with China rose by 15.5 billion.
276
In effect Hong Kong and Taiwan shifted their surpluses to China.”
Furthermore, the current debate tends to overstate the extent of
protection the relevant American laws provide within the United

268. See Maruyama, supra note 31, at 175.
269. See Bloch, supra note 85, at 202; see also GROOMBRIDGE & BARFIELD, supra note
214, at 84 (arguing that the Chinese market is more open than experts suggested
because Europe’s and Japan’s exports to China have been increasing); Greg Mastel,
How to Deal with China, J. COM., July 16, 1998, at A9 (noting that U.S. exports to
China have fallen behind those from Japan and Asia).
270. See OVERHOLT, supra note 181, at 381-82; Bloch, supra note 85, at 202; see also
Jerome A. Cohen & Matthew D. Bersani, Leveling the Playing Field for U.S. Firms in
China, in BEYOND MFN, supra note 9, at 107, 108 (“The current U.S. policy is partly
responsible for the underachievement of American business in the China market.”).
271. See Bloch, supra note 85, at 202.
272. See OVERHOLT, supra note 181, at 381.
273. Bloch, supra note 85, at 209.
274. Id. at 201; see also BERNSTEIN & MUNRO, supra note 10, at 133.
275. Bloch, supra note 85, at 201.
276. Id. at 202; see also BERNSTEIN & MUNRO, supra note 10, at 133; MASTEL, supra
note 229, at 33.
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277

Even though American intellectual property laws afford
States.
authors and inventors rights to their own creations, these rights are
278
always qualified with exceptions and limitations.
In fact, these
exceptions and limitations are “just as important as the grant of the
279
Consider for example the 1976 Copyright Act. The
right itself.”
statute grants to the copyright holder the exclusive rights to
reproduce, distribute, perform, and display the copyrighted work and
280
to prepare derivative works based upon such a work.
Despite its
breadth, this bundle of rights is granted with significant limitations.
To protect the public domain against ill-advised impovertization by
copyright holders, the statute includes safeguards such as the
281
282
originality requirement, the fair use privilege, durational limits of
283
284
copyright protection, and the idea-expression dichotomy.

277. Cf. ALFORD, supra note 23, at 5.
278. See infra text accompanying notes 281-84 for a discussion of how copyright is
qualified by exceptions and limitations.
279. BOYLE, supra note 5, at 138.
280. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
281. See id. § 102 (requiring originality for copyright protection); Feist Publ’ns,
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (“Originality is a constitutional
requirement.”).
282. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (codifying the fair use privilege); see also Folsom v. Marsh,
9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (articulating for the first time the
concepts that evolved into the fair use doctrine). For comprehensive discussions of
fair use, see generally MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 10.110.6 (2d ed. 1995); WILLIAM PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW (2d ed.
1995); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1661 (1988); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105
(1990); William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions,
and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667 (1993).
283. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting authors the exclusive right to their
writings “for limited Times”); 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304 (specifying copyright duration in
various situations). For discussions of durational limits of copyright, see generally
LEAFFER, supra note 282, at § 6.1-6.4; 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 1.05[A][1] (1998); Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright Duration Extension
and the Dark Heart of Copyright, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 655 (1996); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD.
325, 361-63 (1989) (discussing the economic rationale for durational limits of
copyright); William F. Patry, The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Or How
Publishers Managed to Steal the Bread from Authors, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 661,
(1996); see also Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act).
284. The idea-expression dichotomy “is the term of art used in copyright law to
indicate the elements in a copyrighted work which the grant of the copyright
monopoly does not take from the public.”
Howard B. Abrams, Copyright,
Misappropriation, and Preemption: Constitutional and Statutory Limits of State Law
Protection, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 509, 563. This dichotomy “‘strike[s] a definitional
balance . . . by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an
author’s expression.’” Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d
195, 203 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). For excellent discussions of the
idea-expression dichotomy, see generally Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of
Objectivity: The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgments,
66 IND. L.J. 175 (1990); Robert A. Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for
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Finally, in assessing the current debate, one must not assume that
copyright infringement is only a problem in the East or in the less
285
“[A]s Charles Dickens, Anthony Trollope,
developed countries.
and many others learned the hard way, the United States did not
grant even formal protection for foreign copyrighted materials until
1891—by which time [the United States] had passed through what
286
arguably might be termed [its] period as a developing country.”
Even today, the problems of software piracy, home taping, and mp3
287
piracy constantly appear on newspaper headlines.
In fact, as a

Copyright, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 560 (1982); Leslie A. Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost: Idea
and Expression in Copyright, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1221 (1993); Edward Samuels, The
Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. L. REV. 321 (1989). See also
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) (“[I]t is
convenient to define such a use by saying that others may ‘copy’ the ‘theme,’ or
‘ideas,’ or the like, of a work, though not its ‘expression.’”); Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (“[T]here is a point in this series of
abstractions where [creative works] are no longer protected, since otherwise the
playwright could prevent the use of his ‘ideas,’ to which, apart from their expression,
his property is never extended.”); Landes & Posner, supra note 283, at 347-49
(discussing the economic rationale for the idea-expression dichotomy).
285. See ALFORD, supra note 23, at 5. A recent study by the software industry
indicated that the industry lost about $3.2 billion of revenues in 1999 due to software
See INTERNATIONAL PLANNING & RESEARCH
piracy within the United States.
CORPORATION, 1999 GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY REPORT 5 (2000), available at
http://www.bsa.org/usa/globallib/piracy/1999_Piracy_Stats.pdf; see also id. (estimating the piracy rate in the United States at 25%); State Troopers, Following Leads About
Stolen Laptops, Uncover Huge Worldwide Counterfeiting Operation, PR NEWSWIRE, June 12,
2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File (reporting on the investigation
and discovery of a significant counterfeit distribution operation in Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania).
286. ALFORD, supra note 23, at 5; see Alford, Making the World Safe for What?, supra
note 254, at 147 (arguing that the United States did not always provide robust
copyright protection and that if policymakers in the United States recognized this
fact, much of the U.S. “moralism” which “inflames passions” in both the United
States and China could be eliminated); Thomas Bender & David Sampliner, Poets,
Pirates, and the Creation of American Literature, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 255, 255
(1997) (arguing that the United States did not afford intellectual property legislation
for non-U.S. citizens until it became a major industrial power); Gerhard Joseph,
Charles Dickens, International Copyright, and the Discretionary Silence of Martin Chuzzlewit,
10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 523 (1992) (demonstrating how Dicken’s novel reflects
his distress over the United States’s lack of copyright protection to British authors);
see also ASSAFA ENDESHAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY FOR NON-INDUSTRIAL
COUNTRIES 120 (1996) (“Historically, each of the advanced countries today was
determined to industrialize first before either ‘opening up’ to forces and interests
that they might previously have dreaded and before calling for a stronger
international IP system.”). Even though the United States’s historical indifference to
foreign intellectual property rights does not necessarily justify China’s abuse of
intellectual property rights, “an appreciation of [the] nation’s own ‘sins’ would
temper the moralism that infuses governmental and industry rhetoric about Chinese
infringement and inflames passions in both nations about the other’s intentions and
integrity.” Alford, Making the World Safe for What?, supra note 254, at 147.
287. See, e.g., Jason Chervokas, New CD-Copying Trend Threatens Record Industry, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 17, 1998, at 70 (explaining that college students copying music files has
become a threat to the music industry); Neil Strauss, Free Web Music Spreads from
Campus to Office, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1999, at A1 (reporting on the growing popularity
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Hong Kong government official pointed out, “it is not uncommon for
Westerners from places such as America and Canada to come to
Hong Kong [or China] specifically for the purchase of cheap
counterfeit computer software which are actually pirated copies of
288
Thus, cynical observers may wonder
mostly American products.”
whether the United States uses China as a convenient scapegoat for
289
its largest trade deficit in years
and a rallying cry for its
290
This
disagreement over domestic intellectual property issues.
observation is particularly justified when the United States singled out
China even though many other countries infringed upon American
291
intellectual property rights.
To these observers, “Americans are

of downloading music from the Internet). See also A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming the district court’s grant of primary
injunction enjoining Napster from engaging in, or facilitating others in, copying,
downloading, transmitting, or distributing copyrighted musical compositions or
sound recordings without express permission of copyright holders); Recording
Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir.
1999) (denying an injunction against the manufacturers of the Rio, a portable digital
audio device); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352-53
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that mp3.com violated copyright law by creating a database
in which users could store music and access it via any access point connected to the
Internet).
288. HO, supra note 266, ¶ 2.5 (citing Peter Cheung, Assistant Director of
Intellectual Property, Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region). As Peter Cheung noted:
Any trip to one of the more prominent shopping arcades where pirated
software are on sale, and it would not be an unusual sight to see Americans
with a huge catalogue of software to be purchased, and this is not surprising
considering that the difference in the total price of counterfeit software and
the price of legitimate software would probably be sufficient to cover the cost
of the trip.
Id.
289. See Alford, How Theory Does—and Does Not—Matter, supra note 265, at 13.
290. See Harding, The Clinton-Jiang Summits, supra note 194, at 42 (“A variety of
interest groups—concerned with issues such as religion, national security, labor,
human-rights, nonproliferation, and the environment—regularly attack Chinese
behavior, often because doing so helps them mobilize public support for their
broader political agenda.”). For example, American software manufacturers have
used competition against foreign software developers to justify the need for software
patents. See Claire Whitmer, Industry Divided over Software Patents; Patent and
Trademark Office Weighs Protecting vs. Stifling Innovation, INFOWORLD, Feb. 28, 1994, at
20 (reporting on the arguments made for and against software patents during
hearings held by the United States Patent and Trademark office).
291. See OVERHOLT, supra note 181, at 383 (“[T]he United States is pushing China
harder and faster than it pushed Taiwan, South Korea, and the ASEAN countries. It
is insisting that China solve intellectual property issues in a single year that Thailand,
Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia—proportionately much worse offenders—
refused to resolve for decades.”); see also Thomas L. Friedman, Deal with China Urged
by Bentsen, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1994, at A20 (“The United States maintains a triple
standard. For their own human rights problems they shut their eyes. . . . For some
other countries’ human rights questions they open one eye and shut the other. And
for China, they open both eyes and stare.” (quoting Chinese Finance Minister Liu
Zhongli)). Professor Huntington explained this varying standard:
Hypocrisy, double standards, and “but nots” are the price of universalist
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disguising a political dispute as a trade dispute and are bringing
unfair trade pressure to bear in order to undermine China’s political
292
Such a use of trade pressure not only interferes with
system.”
China’s sovereignty, but also violates the principles of customary
293
international law.

pretensions.
Democracy is promoted but not if it brings Islamic
fundamentalists to power; nonproliferation is preached for Iran and Iraq but
not for Israel; free trade is the elixir of economic growth but not for
agriculture; human rights are an issue with China but not with Saudi Arabia;
aggression against oil-owning Kuwaitis is massively repulsed but not against
non-oil-owning Bosnians. Double standards in practice are the unavoidable
price of universal standards of principle.
HUNTINGTON, CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS, supra note 250, at 184. One commentator
explained the double standard under a conspiracy theory:
When the Soviet Union collapsed the U.S. government was eager to identify
potential rivals. China became the target. The Chinese leaders tend to
think the “china-threat” conspiracy is organized by Washington politicians
and widely supported by the latter’s allies. Any conflicts between the two
countries with regard to issues such as trade, human rights, Taiwan and
Tibet, arms sales, etc., are perceived by Beijing as reinforcing evidence that
U.S. decision makers would like to keep China weak and divided.
Ren, supra note 235, at 262.
292. OVERHOLT, supra note 181, at 384.
293. To China, state sovereignty is the most fundamental principle of
international law and society. Peter K. Yu, Succession by Estoppel: Hong Kong’s
Succession to the ICCPR, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 53, 88 & n.207 (2000) [hereinafter Yu,
Succession by Estoppel]; see also CHINA RISING: NATIONALISM AND INTERDEPENDENCE 181
(David S.G. Goodman & Gerald Segal eds., 1997) (“China is the rearguard great
power when it comes to the erosion of state sovereignty.”). As Professor Zhao
explained:
Beijing has been able to set clear principles in advance to establish a
negotiating position aimed at self-preservation and achieving the maximum
advantage. Once principles are set, some conditions are negotiable and
some are not. The non-negotiable principles (yuanzexing) are those that
involve vital national interests such as regime legitimacy and the internal
power politics. The negotiable principles are those regarded as low
priorities or technical issues.
Beijing’s is a deductive approach to
international behaviour: it insists on the clarification and codification of
basic principles that allow a flexible application to reach a desired
agreement.
QUANSHENG ZHAO, INTERPRETING CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY 143-44 (1996); see also U.N.
CHARTER art. 2, ¶ 7 (“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state . . . .”). But see Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217 III(A), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 27(2) (1948)
(“[E]veryone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the
author.”); Meinhard Hilf & Thomas Oppermann, International Protection of Intellectual
Property: A German Proposal, in RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 287, 291 (“[I]t
should be considered inconsistent with general public international law to deny an
adequate protection of intellectual property only on the basis of the exercise of
sovereignty.”).
Some commentators argued that “the trend toward international agreements and
the formation of international institutions are consistent with the basic desire of
government to maintain their sovereignty.” Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R.
Macey, A Public Choice Model of International Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the
Nation State, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 925, 926 (1996). As Professors Colombatto and
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Step Three: Foster a Better Understanding of China by the American People
Henry Kissinger: Many visitors have come to this beautiful, and to us,
mysterious land. . . .
Zhou Enlai (interrupting): You will not find it mysterious. When you have
294
become familiar with it, it will not be as mysterious as before.

If the United States and China are to build a constructive strategic
295
partnership, they must understand each other better and “deal with
[the other] as it exists and is becoming, not as some imagine it or
296
hope it to be.”
To promote this understanding, the two countries
have to foster more exchanges (in particular educational and cultural
297
ones) between academics, professionals, and government officials.

Macey explained:
All else equal, regulators would prefer not to cede or to share authority with
their counterparts from other countries. Thus, regulators in a particular
country generally will not sacrifice autonomy by coordinating their activities
with regulators from other countries. . . . [H]owever, . . . technological
change, market processes, and other exogenous variables may deprive the
regulators in a particular country of the power to act unilaterally. Such
change can cause regulators acting alone to become irrelevant. When this
happens, the regulators in a particular country will have strong incentives to
engage in activities such as international coordination in order to survive.
Id.
294. SOLOMON, supra note 170, at 15.
295. See Ding, supra note 200, at 161; see also HELEN V. MILNER, INTERESTS,
INSTITUTIONS AND INFORMATION: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
20 (1997) (“[T]he uncertainty created by incomplete or asymmetric information
leads to outcomes that prevent optimal levels of exchange or that foster conflict. In
other words, incomplete information leads to inefficient outcomes.”); id. at 259
(“[W]hen assessing other countries’ behavior, policy makers should make sure they
understand the domestic situation their foreign counterparts face.”); ARTHUR STEIN,
WHY NATIONS COOPERATE: CIRCUMSTANCE AND CHOICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 58
(1990) (“It is universally suggested that the result of misconception is conflict that
would have been otherwise avoidable. Although international conflicts are often
attributed to misperception, international cooperation never is.”).
296. Lee H. Hamilton, Introduction to BEYOND MFN, supra note 9, at 1, 4. As
Professor Ren explained:
An image is a perception of a reality. In this sense, there is no “real image.”
Under normal conditions, how an individual acts toward an object is
determined by his or her image, or perception, of that object. Such images
are rooted in personal beliefs and attitudes and shaped by experience. This
property of image makes it difficult for changes to take place. Furthermore,
an image “may cause people to make self-serving attributions and permit
them to believe what they want to believe because they want to believe it.”
Ren, supra note 235, at 247, 248 (quoting Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivational
Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 487 (1990)).
297. See Ding, supra note 200, at 167; see also Gregory P. Fairbrother & Gerard A.
Postiglione, Teaching About China in America: Shaping the Perspectives of a Generation, in
OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, supra note 169, at 267 (arguing for the
incorporation of China-related content in the U.S. social studies curriculum); see also
id. (“Schools have the potential to influence the formation of public opinion about
China and improve relations at the citizens’ level by teaching specific information
about issues important in present-day China and U.S.-China relations and by
enhancing students’ abilities to assess reports in the popular media objectively.”); see
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They also have to organize joint conferences, seminars, and research
projects that help identify the common interests of and differences
298
Given the significant differences
between the two countries.
between the two countries, these exchanges and joint projects will
help the other understand their respective positions, intentions, and
national objectives. They will also help reduce the mutual suspicion
between the two countries and be conducive to maintaining a stable,
299
healthy, and harmonious bilateral relationship.
A good example of a joint project in the intellectual property field
will be a joint conference examining the common traits between
Western intellectual property notions and Chinese philosophy, in
300
particular Confuciansim. Professor William Alford’s seminal work,
To Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese
Civilization, laid the groundwork for understanding the cultural
differences between China and the West in the intellectual property
301
So far, there is very little research regarding the common
area.
traits between Western intellectual property notions and Chinese
302
philosophy. Such an exploration will be constructive and beneficial

also China: Sino-US Seminar on Intellectual Property Rights Closes, CHINA BUS. INFO.
NETWORK, Sept. 21, 1998, available at 1998 WL 13494566 (reporting on the joint
seminar between Chinese and U.S. experts in Chongqing, which explored the
relations between the protection of intellectual property rights and economic
development).
298. See Ding, supra note 200, at 167; DOZ & HAMEL, supra note 171, at 80
(emphasizing the importance of creating an interface so that partners can learn from
each other); China Fair of Inventions, New Technologies Opens in US, CHINA BUS. INFO.
NETWORK, Sept. 2, 1999, available at 1999 WL 17730900 (reporting on the China Fair
of Inventions and New Technologies, an event co-sponsored by the State Intellectual
Property Office of China and the U.S.-China Council for International Exchange,
Inc. to promote better understanding and cooperation between China and the
United States in the intellectual property area).
299. See DOZ & HAMEL, supra note 171, at 36 (stating that trust is established
between parties to a joint effort as they work together); JORDAN D. LEWIS, TRUSTED
PARTNERS: HOW COMPANIES BUILD MUTUAL TRUST AND WIN TOGETHER (2000)
(emphasizing the importance of mutual trust to the success of a partnership).
300. See Paul Edward Geller, Legal Transplants in International Copyright: Some
Problems of Method, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 199, 205 (1994) (suggesting that Western
copyright principles would be best introduced to the Chinese by drawing from
traditional concepts of Chinese law).
301. See ALFORD, supra note 23, at 2.
302. One example is provided by Professor Ocko, who discusses the following
common traits between Western and Chinese intellectual property notions and
Chinese philosophy:
[T]he Romantic notion of the author . . . had its counterpart in Chinese
literati writing about painting. To the Romantics, a “work is an extension of
the artist’s personality.” For the Chinese, “to know [a painter’s] art was to
know the man himself,” for “the character of the artist is seen as the core of
painting.” Each Chinese painting, and each poem for that matter, was
unique, a singular creation of the moral character of the artist.
Jonathan Ocko, Copying, Culture, and Control: Chinese Intellectual Property Law in
Historical Context, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 559, 569 (1996) (book review) (footnotes
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to the success of the constructive strategic partnership.
Indeed, because “Chinese leaders . . . are not ready to accept
303
such an
Western concepts in their rhetoric and ideology,”
exploration becomes even more important. From time to time, the
Chinese leaders “have created various ‘new’ terms to characterize the
country’s development such as ‘socialist market economy,’ ‘socialism
with Chinese characteristics,’ and ‘democracy with Chinese
304
Research that will lead to the development of
characteristics.’”
“intellectual property rights with Chinese characteristics” will
therefore be very important.
In addition to joint projects, the U.S. government needs to sponsor
research that enhances understanding of China. So far, American
scholars, policymakers, the mass media, and the general public have
very limited understanding of China, in particular its political
305
institutions and decisionmaking processes and how it conducts its

omitted).
Most recently, substantial research has been devoted to explore the common
grounds between human rights and the Chinese culture, in particular Confucianism.
See, e.g., DANIEL A. BELL, EAST MEETS WEST: HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN EAST
ASIA (2000); CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Wm. Theodore de Barry & Tu
Weiming eds., 1998); THEODORE DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A
CONFUCIAN COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE (1998); THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS (Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999); HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CHINESE VALUES: LEGAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES (Michael C.
Davis ed., 1995).
303. ZHENG, DISCOVERING CHINESE NATIONALISM, supra note 235, at 90; see also ANN
KENT, BETWEEN FREEDOM AND SUBSISTENCE: CHINA AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1993)
(discussing the difficulties in establishing human rights protection in China); ANN
KENT, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE LIMITS OF COMPLIANCE
(1999) [hereinafter KENT, LIMITS OF COMPLIANCE] (discussing China’s evolving
human rights policies).
304. ZHENG, DISCOVERING CHINESE NATIONALISM, supra note 235, at 90.
305. See David Bachman, Domestic Sources of Chinese Foreign Policy, in CHINA AND THE
WORLD: NEW DIRECTIONS IN CHINESE FOREIGN RELATIONS 31 (Samuel Kim ed., 3d ed.
1989) (“[Domestic factors] have had a greater impact than international factors in
shaping Chinese foreign policy.”); Kenneth Lieberthal, Domestic Forces and Sino-U.S.
Relations, in LIVING WITH CHINA, supra note 85, at 254, 274-75 (“[T]he inability of each
nation’s leaders . . . to understand and empathize with the domestic political
constraints confronting the other side . . . limited both the ability and the desire of
each leadership to accommodate the other.”); Kenneth Lieberthal, Domestic Politics
and Foreign Policy, in CHINA’S FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE 1980S 43 (Harry Harding ed.,
1984) (“[Each of China’s domestic political campaigns] has had clear and direct
implications for its posture toward the rest of the world.”); see also BERNSTEIN &
MUNRO, supra note 10, at 105-29 (describing China’s progress in mastering American
domestic politics).
Greg Mastel explained the difficulties of understanding the Chinese political
system:
Even a cursory discussion of [Chinese politics and China’s government] is
difficult because the Chinese political system is not transparent; much occurs
behind closed doors, out of the public eye, and certainly away from western
eyes. It is usually possible to obtain formal organizational charts of the
Chinese government, but these tell, at most, only part of the story.
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306

Increased funding for research in this area, would
foreign affairs.
provide the United States with the information needed to overcome
307
the obstacles of negotiating with and transacting business in China.
It would also provide the American government with the capacity to
308
To
make a more accurate assessment of the conditions in China.
help create incentives for research in these areas, the American
government can “cultivate and reward its foreign service officers,

Observers of the Chinese political system often emphasize the importance of
shifting alliances between senior officials and family ties over positions on
organizational charts. The Chinese system is particularly difficult for
westerners to understand because what appear to be promotions can often,
in fact, be demotions. There is a long tradition in China of leaders
promoting rivals to “brightly lit shelves,” highly visible positions with no real
power.
MASTEL, supra note 229, at 43.
306. See ZHAO, supra note 293, at 9 (“[T]he study of Chinese diplomatic history has
become fairly well developed, the study of Chinese foreign policy decisionmaking
remains very underdeveloped, and the study of China’s foreign relations is barely on
the radar scope.” (quoting Kenneth Lieberthal)); Michel Oksenberg & Elizabeth
Economy, Introduction to CHINA JOINS THE WORLD: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 39
(Elizabeth Economy & Michel Oksenberg eds., 1999) [hereinafter CHINA JOINS THE
WORLD]; see also SOLOMON, supra note 170 (noting the peculiarities of Chinese
negotiating behavior); Lucian W. Pye, Understanding Chinese Negotiating Behavior: The
Roles of Nationalism and Pragmatism, in BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND DETERRENCE, supra
note 169, at 211 (noting the difference between American and Chinese negotiating
behavior).
In his Ten Commandments, Lazlo Ladany, a Jesuit priest and China watcher,
summed up his lifetime’s experience of analyzing and observing China, and, thus
providing a model guide for all those who work on China:
1. Remember that no one living in a free society ever has a full
understanding of life in a regimented society.
2. Look at China through Chinese spectacles; if one looks at it through
foreign glasses, one is thereby trying to make sense of Chinese events in
terms of our own problems.
3. Learn something about other Communist countries.
4. Study the basic tenets of Marxism.
5. Keep in mind that words and terms do not have the same meaning in a
Marxist society as they do elsewhere.
6. Keep your common sense: the Chinese may have the particular
characterists [sic] of Chinese, but they are human beings and therefore have
the normal reactions of human beings.
7. People are not less important than issues; they are probably more so. A
group may adopt the programme of those who oppose it in order to retain
power.
8. Do not believe that you know all the answers. China poses more
questions than it provides answers.
9. Do not lose your sense of humour. A regimented press is too serious to
be taken very seriously.
10. Above all, read the small print!
Jurgen Domes, Preface to LASZLO LADANY, LAW AND LEGALITY IN CHINA: THE
TESTAMENT OF A CHINA-WATCHER vii, ix (Marie-Luise Näth ed., 1992) (quoting Laszlo
Ladany, Ten Commandments, CHINESE NEWS ANALYSIS, Dec. 1982).
307. See Oksenberg & Economy, supra note 306, at 39.
308. See id.
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commercial counselors, military officers, and intelligence analysts
309
who have expertise on China.”
To help corporate officers anticipate those problems they will
encounter in transacting business in China, the American
government can provide awareness programs that help American
businesses understand the status of the piracy problem in China and
the pitfalls in transacting business there. These programs can alert
310
the business officers about the possible preventive measures and
311
protective techniques.
They can also highlight the strengths and
weaknesses of the available remedies and suggest alternative
solutions, including those that are unconventional to the American
312
public.
In addition to awareness programs, the American
government can promote research that helps find innovative
solutions to protect intellectual property in China. Examples of these
313
314
solutions include joint ventures, forum shopping, persuading the

309. Id.
310. One commentator explained the importance of preventive measures:
As in fighting a disease, prevention is always better than trying to cure the
disease and is vital for realizing a return on an investment in intellectual
property rights. Given the costs of bringing a product or brand to the
market place, such as research and development, tooling, raw materials,
manufacturing, distribution, marketing and sales and the cost of registering
intellectual property rights, it makes commercial sense to invest in the time
and resources to prevent counterfeiting.
Simon P. Cheetham, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Luxury Goods, in CHINESE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 31, at 385, 387.
311. See Thomas Lagerqvist & Mary L. Riley, How to Protect Intellectual Property Rights
in China, in PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra note 140, at
7, 15. As Thomas Lagerqvist and Mary Riley explained:
By introducing technological measures to protect legitimate rights, the costs
of counterfeiting will increase as counterfeiters will also have to replicate as
accurately as possible the technological measures that have become part of
the rights owner’s protection. Otherwise it would be too easy to identify the
fake from the original. Sometimes technical identifiers of genuine products,
for example, holograms on CDs, make it easier to prove the difference
between a genuine article and a fake, simplifying the burden of proof that
lies with the rights owner in connection with legal action taken with or
without the assistance of administrative authorities.
Id.
312. An example of an unconventional remedy is public shaming. This approach
“can be extremely effective even without strong government support when the pirate
product poses a significant health risk for Chinese people.” John Donaldson &
Rebecca Weiner, Swashbuckling the Pirates: A Communications-Based Approach to IPR
Protection in China, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note
31, at 409, 426. For example, to deal with local pirates of their infant formula, Heinz
Baby Food brought reporters to raids that exposed not only the pirates, but also the
shoddy quality and unsanitary facilities at the pirate factories. After a series of wellpublicized raids, the company has not experienced other serious piracy problems.
See id.
313. See infra text accompanying notes 393-400 for a discussion of the benefits of
establishing joint ventures in China.
314. See Yiqiang Li, Evaluation of the Sino-American Intellectual Property Agreements: A
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315

authorities to take criminal actions, preference of judicial action to
316
317
administrative enforcement, and indirect approaches.

Judicial Approach to Solving the Local Protectionism Problem, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 391,
414 (1996) (“Forum shopping can overcome an infringer’s string influence in the
local law enforcement apparatus.”).
315. See id. at 418-22.
316. See Lagerqvist & Riley, supra note 311, at 32 (asserting that Chinese judges are
less likely than administrative agencies to bend to local pressure); see also Susan
Finder, The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Through the Courts, in CHINESE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 31, at 255 (discussing issues
potential litigants in the Chinese courts must be aware of when considering whether
to seek enforcement of their intellectual property rights). An advantage to using
judicial action as opposed to administrative enforcement is that courts have greater
jurisdiction to apprehend criminals. See Li, supra note 314, at 414-15 (discussing the
growing power of Chinese courts). An administrative agency can only take action
against offenders within its locality, whereas the courts can take preliminary
measures against an infringer, regardless of where that infringer is located. See id.
But see Berkman, supra note 102, at 24 (discussing weaknesses in China’s court system
that were attributed to corruption in the bureaucracy); Lagerqvist & Riley, supra note
311, at 28. As one commentator explained:
The courts are . . . more powerful than administrative agencies. While an
administrative agency may only take action against infringers located in the
same area, a court, under proper procedure, may institute preliminary
measures against the infringer no matter where it is located. In the past, a
court could only detain a suspect with the consent of the suspect’s local
court. The Supreme People’s Court has recently waived this requirement,
apparently out of a concern for the undue influence of local protectionism.
In a breach of contract case, Yanbian Leather Factory vs. Mishan City Shoe
Factory, the defendant’s place of business was in Mishan City, Heilongjiang
Province whereas the breach took place in Longjing City, Jilin Province. The
City Court of Longjing City rendered a default judgment against the
defendant and ordered bailiffs to seize the defendant’s properties in Mishan
City. With the support of the local enforcement authority, the defendant
regained the confiscated properties. The City Court of Longjing held that
the defendant had seriously obstructed justice and, citing Articles 102(1)(2)
and 105 of the Civil Procedure Law, detained the manager and assistant
manager of the defendant’s company, who were in Mishan City at the time.
The defendant ultimately complied with the court’s order and surrendered
the confiscated properties. Here, the City Court of Longjing had not sought
the approval of the City Court of Mishan and the decision was upheld by the
Supreme People’s Court.
Li, supra note 314, at 414-15. But see Berkman, supra note 102, at 24 (“The court
system as an institution generally lacks the political muscle to stare down powerful,
local officials who may wish to impeded law enforcement.”); Lagerqvist & Riley, supra
note 311, at 28 (“In China, administrative enforcement is occasionally seen as more
cost effective than either civil or criminal proceedings against counterfeiters.”);
Gregory S. Kolton, Comment, Copyright Law and the People’s Courts in the People’s
Republic of China: A Review and Critique of China’s Intellectual Property Courts, 17 U. PA. J.
INT’L ECON. L. 415, 451 (1996) (“[I]t may be difficult for foreign firms which plan to
continue doing business in China to sue because doing so may wreck their
‘guanxi’—personal contacts or favors—that are integral for doing business in the
PRC.”).
317. As one commentator explained:
Another way may be available if the infringing party has conducted
advertising or trade mark sales or any sales (directly or indirectly) to
consumers. China has especially several laws and regulations containing
statutory warranties of the quality of goods manufactured or sold in such
cases. If the product copy is of inferior quality, selling it under a trade mark
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Step Four: Convince the Chinese Leaders Why Intellectual Property Protection
Will Benefit China
Since China’s defeat in the Opium War in the mid-nineteenth
century, the Chinese officials have viewed the West with a paradox of
318
admiration and skepticism. On the one hand, the Chinese admire
the military prowess and technological advancement of the Western
powers and believe modernization is the solution to China’s
319
backwardness and socio-economic problems.
On the other hand,
these people entertain skepticism toward Western institutions and
sometimes wonder whether these institutions are trojan horses that
help the West contain, if not control, China. While the colonial past
of the Western powers has demonstrated that these concerns are
justified, China’s growing world power status will lead to even more
skepticism and less admiration.
Even today, many Chinese leaders do not regard intellectual
property rights as institutions that are important to the country’s
strategy of economic development, foreign investment, and interstate
320
relations.
Rather, these Chinese leaders consider intellectual
property rights as weapons that were designed specifically to protect
321
the West’s dominant position and the United States’s hegemony, to
322
drain the Chinese purse, and to slow down China’s economic

is an offense, as is advertising it or selling it directly to a consumer.
Mary L. Riley, Strategies for Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights in China, in PROTECTING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra note 140, at 65, 70-72 (discussing
various indirect approaches).
318. See Yu, Piracy, Predjudice, and Perspectives, supra note 11.
319. See id.
320. See Robert Sherwood, Why a Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense for
the World [hereinafter Sherwood, Why a Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense],
in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY 68, 83 (Michael B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter GLOBAL
DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS] (“Strong intellectual property
safeguards seem likely to speed rather than retard progress toward world-class
achievement.”); Yu, Succession by Estoppel, supra note 293, at 100 (arguing that abiding
by international norms is important to China’s strategy of economic development,
foreign investment, and interstate relations); see also PETER HOWARD CORNE, FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN CHINA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL SYSTEM 1 (1997) (“[F]or continued
economic development, [China] needs to further amplify economic linkages with
West and Japan.”); id. at 284 (“Law’s overt purpose is to assist China’s modernization
by replacing policy decree and customary practices with a stable universal framework
of normative behavior.”).
321. See Lampton, supra note 188, at 121; Ren, supra note 235, at 262 (“From the
Chinese point of view, Washington is sensitive to any power that might pose a
challenge to its hegemonic position.”).
322. As commentators explained:
[D]eveloping countries tend to have scarce government resources. As a
result, they resist spending on the enforcement of foreign intellectual
property rights. As with the importation of capital, developing countries
often view the importation of intellectual property as a means of dominating
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323

Paranoid about Western
progress and its rise in world affairs.
aggression, the leaders consider these rights as a tool to divide
324
325
China, to erode its cultural identity, and to ensure that the nation
“follows the path of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—
326
toward economic decay, social unrest, and political instability.”
Unless the United States can convince the Chinese leaders, both
national and local, that intellectual property rights will benefit China
and that their fears and concerns are unjustified, their skepticism and
paranoia will persist and militate against further intellectual property
law reforms.
Undeniably, Western technology is far more advanced than what is
currently produced in China. Different countries, however, have

and exploiting the economic potential of the importing country. Paying for
imports or royalties is thus seen as an economic burden fostering a negative
balance of trade.
Tara Kalagher Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership of Information in a Global Economy,
27 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 327, 331 (1993) (footnotes omitted); Edgardo
Buscaglia, Can Intellectual Property in Latin America Be Protected, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EMERGING MARKETS, supra note 266, at 96, 111 (noting that Latin
American countries “have traditionally used intellectual property rights as an
instrument for regulating technology transfer and avoiding royalty payments on
innovations from the developed world”).
323. See Elizabeth C. Economy, China’s Environmental Diplomacy, in CHINA AND THE
WORLD, supra note 183, at 264, 281 (“[T]here was increasing discussion in the
Chinese media suggesting that sustainable development was part of a master plan by
the advanced industrialized countries (and especially the United States) to contain
China by forcing it to slow the pace of economic growth in order to protect the
environment.”); Paul H.B. Godwin, Force and Diplomacy: China Prepares for the Twentyfirst Century, in CHINA AND THE WORLD, supra note 183, at 171, 178 (“Beijing is
convinced that at the heart of U.S. strategy is the intent to delay, if not prevent,
China’s emergence as great power in the twenty-first century; that the United States
views China as the principal contender for the predominant position of the United
States in Asia.”); Michel Oksenberg, Taiwan, Tibet and Hong Kong in Sino-American
Relations, in LIVING WITH CHINA, supra note 85, at 53, 56 (“[The Chinese leaders]
believe that foreign leaders tend to be reluctant to welcome China’s rise in world
affairs and would prefer to delay or obstruct its progress.”). But see BERNSTEIN &
MUNRO, supra note 10, at 204 (“The goal of the United States is not a weak and poor
China; it is a China that is stable and democratic, that does not upset the balance of
power in Asia, and that plays within the rules on such matters as trade and arms
proliferation.”); Hamilton, Introduction to BEYOND MFN, supra note 9, at 5 (“The U.S.
interest is served by China’s continuing economic development, for the sake of both
improving the material welfare of the Chinese people and fostering political
liberalization.”).
324. See HUNTINGTON, CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS, supra note 250, at 223 (“By 1995, a
broad consensus reportedly existed among the Chinese leaders and scholars that the
United States was trying to divide China territorially, subvert it politically, contain it
strategically and frustrate it economically.” (internal quotations omitted)); Hamilton,
Introduction, supra note 323, at 7 (“[T]he United States must avoid creating the
impression within China’s elite that it intends to bring down the current system or
divide the country. That, of course, is not the U.S. objective.”).
325. See HUNTINGTON, CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS, supra note 250, at 223.
326. Harry Harding, Breaking the Impasse over Human Rights, supra note 194, at 172.
But see BERNSTEIN & MUNRO, supra note 10, at 204 (stating that the United States has
an interest in a stable China); Hamilton, Introduction, supra note 323, at 4 (same).
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327

A product or technology that is
different technological needs.
suitable to a Western developed country may not be suitable to
328
China.
Thus, China still has to provide adequate intellectual
property protection in order to create incentives for domestic authors
and inventors to invent, commercialize, and market their products.
In fact, such protection will allow consumers to identify their favorite
local products and may even help China “open up market
329
For example, Beijing Quanjude
opportunities in export markets.”

327. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Patent Policy of Developing Countries, 13 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L.J. 166, 172 (1994) [hereinafter Kitch, Patent Policy] (arguing that the needs of
the less developed countries are unique). As Professor Kitch explained:
The technological needs of a developing country are not the same as the
technological needs of a developed country. A technology does not exist
apart from the needs, conditions, and resources of its users. A technology
must be sensitive to the educational background of the users, and the related
available technologies. For instance, it will often be critical what type of
repair and maintenance services are available. A certain type of machinery
may be highly effective and productive when used in a mass production
system with an ample supply of electric power, skilled electronic engineers,
and easy access to spare parts, but utterly useless at a more remote location.
Thus, technological improvements which can make a substantial
contribution to the lives of people in a developing country may be irrelevant
in a different setting. A private firm has an incentive to make such an
improvement only if it will be protected against immediate copying in those
markets where the product has value. Thus, a no patent strategy may enable
a country, to some extent, to appropriate the technology of others, but that
technology will often not be the technology that the country needs.
Id. at 176-77.
328. See id.
329. Janet H. MacLaughlin et al., The Economic Significance of Piracy, in GLOBAL
CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT?, supra note 2, at 89, 104. As commentators explained:
Establishing national trademarks in developing countries can also open up
market opportunities in export markets. Consumers in developed countries
then can more easily identify products imported from developing countries.
This promotes economic growth in the developing country and also provides
new sources of foreign exchange. A good example of this phenomenon is
Mexican beer. On the strength of beer several well recognized brand names,
Mexico exported over $65 million of beer to the United States during 1985.
By 1986, a single Mexican beer, Corona, has become the second largest
selling imported beer, with total sales in the United States of 13.5 million
cases. As more countries implement intellectual property rights protection
that requires reciprocal treatment, the provision of full trademark protection
will be especially important for export markets.
Id. (footnotes omitted). By contrast, inadequate trademark protection encourages
competition policies that reduce the competitiveness of local products in export
markets:
Firms in a less developed country could be interested in having the right
to infringe trademarks for either of two reasons. Either they desire to
produce goods bearing infringing marks in order to export them into other
countries where they will be sold in violation of the trademark rights of that
country. Or they desire to infringe the mark in their own country because
the mark has established a reputation with consumers in the less developed
country.
The first motive is a case of simple piracy, in which the home industries
wish to use their home country as a “pirate base” to infringe in other
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Roast Duck Restaurant is world renowned for its roast ducks. A
successful trademark application can allow the owner to prohibit
other restaurants, including those abroad, from exploiting the name
330
of this 135-year-old restaurant.
In addition, a well-functioning intellectual property regime will
331
332
increase foreign investment,
thus creating new jobs
and
333
It will also promote indigenous
facilitating technology transfer.

countries. Such a competitive strategy will result in a parasitical business that
will always be dependent on the willingness of the targeted countries to
tolerate the infringing imports.
Because the status of the business in its target markets will always be illicit
and hence uncertain, it will never have an established market position that
can lay a foundation for the development of an internationally competitive
business. The second motive means that the mark the firms desire to copy
will inevitably lose its reputation in the less developed country as multiple
sources produce goods infringing it while none of them has an incentive to
protect its value as a signal of quality desired by consumers.
Kitch, Patent Policy, supra note 327, at 168.
330. See China: Famous Beijing Roast Duck Restaurant Secures Trademark, CHINA BUS.
INFO. NETWORK, Jan. 20, 1999, available at 1999 WL 5617961.
331. A survey of major U.S. companies conducted by a World Bank affiliate
demonstrated the correlation between intellectual property rights and foreign
investment:
48 percent said [the strength or weakness of intellectual property
protection] has a “strong effect” on whether to set up facilities to
manufacture components, 59 percent said it was a determining factor in
building overseas facilities to manufacture complete products; and 80
percent said the presence of such laws was a key factor in whether they would
establish research and development facilities in a given country.
Josh Martin, Copyright Law Reforms Mean Better Business Climate, J. COM., Mar. 7, 1996,
at 2C; see EDWIN MANSFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION, FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (1994) (discussing the correlation between
intellectual property and foreign investment); Lagerqvist & Riley, supra note 311, at 8
(listing the loss of foreign investment and know-how as a cost of counterfeiting);
Antonio Medina Mora Icaza, The Mexican Software, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 320, at 232, 236 (“Intellectual property
rights protection in a country is a way to seek the trust of foreign investors in the
country that will allow its economy to grow.”); A.R.C. Westwood, Preface to GLOBAL
DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 320, at v-vi (discussing how
corporations will be hesitant to do business in countries that do not provide
intellectual property); see also Robert M. Sherwood, Intellectual Property Systems and
Investment Stimulation: The Rating of Systems in Eighteen Developing Countries, 37 IDEA
261, 265 (1997) (using foreign investment as one of the variables in measuring
intellectual property protection in a less developed country); Mickey Mouse in China,
N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1993, at D4 (reporting that Disney bought Mickey Mouse back to
China after a self-imposed four-year absence due to copyright infringements). But see
Oddi, International Patent System, supra note 244, at 849 (noting that patent protection
seems an unlikely determinative factor for deciding whether or not to invest in a
foreign country).
332. See Lagerqvist & Riley, supra note 311, at 32; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,
CONTRIBUTION OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY TO THE CHINESE ECONOMY 4 (1998)
(estimating that a 60% decrease in piracy would translate into more than 79,000
jobs).
333. See MANSFIELD, supra note 331, at 20 (“[T]he strength or weakness of a
country’s system of intellectual property protection seems to have a substantial effect,
particularly in high-technology industries, on the kinds of technology transferred by
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334

industries and technologies and will generate considerable tax
335
As the economy grows, the Chinese
revenues for the country.
government is beginning to understand the benefits of intellectual
property rights. In April 1997, the Chinese government provided
assistance to set up special intellectual property affairs departments,
create intellectual property protection networks, and build a selfprotection system in forty-seven enterprises and institutes for which
336
intellectual property rights are particularly important.
These
enterprises and institutes included major oil and chemical

many U.S. firms to that country.”); SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS: NORTH-SOUTH
POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST 214 (1998) (arguing that an
operational intellectual property regime will promote foreign investment); Kitch,
Patent Policy, supra note 327, at 175-76.
Technology transfer is very important to a less developed country:
[Without technology transfer], the country will have to try to develop its own
technological capability without sharing in the common pool of existing
technology developed by others. This in turn will mean that its nationals
and firms will develop technological solutions, methods, and products which
are different from prevailing international standards. This will isolate the
domestic economy from the international economy, and deny the country
the advantages of international exchange of both goods and services. Such
economic isolation in turn increases the difficulty of enhancing the national
technological base.
Id. at 176. However, Professor Oddi suggested that the granting of intellectual
property protection such as patents may actually retard technology transfer. As he
explained:
The foreign owner may have little incentive to transfer technical information
related to that patent invention if the owner is deriving significant profits
from having an import monopoly on that invention. Moreover, even though
sources other than the patent owner may be willing to transfer adequate
technical information into the country, domestic enterprises would be
foolish to pay for such technology because the patent owner could bar
domestic production on the basis of the patent. The existence of the patent
therefore precludes competition in technology available from third-party
sources.
Oddi, International Patent System, supra note 244, at 852.
334. See Robert Merges, Battle of the Lateralisms: Intellectual Property and Trade, 8
B.U. INT’L L.J. 239, 246 (1990) (“[A] recording industry flourished in Hong Kong for
the first time after the passage of a copyright act protecting sound recordings; the
Indian software industry saw a growth surge after a copyright was extended to
software.”); Sherwood, Why a Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense, supra note
320, at 72 (noting that “immediately after Mexico reformed its patent law in June
1991, large numbers of patent applications were filed by Mexican nationals”); id. (“A
small but striking before-and-after shift comes from Columbia when copyright
protection for software took effect in 1989. More than 100 Columbian nationals
have since produced application software packages that have been registered with
the copyright office, with hundreds more written but not registered.”).
335. See Lagerqvist & Riley, supra note 311, at 32; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,
supra note 332, at 4 (estimating that a 60% decrease in piracy would translate into
more than $466 million in tax receipts).
336. See China: New Measure Will Be Taken to Protect IPR, CHINA BUS. INFO.
NETWORK, Apr. 4, 1997, available at 1997 WL 9842657; see also China Introduces AntiPiracy Technology, CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK, Mar. 15, 1999, available at 1999 WL
5618404 (reporting the efforts of the China Software Association to introduce new
anti-piracy technology to local software producers).
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corporations, computer companies, and prestigious universities and
337
scientific research institutes.
Finally, an operational intellectual property regime will help
prevent domestic problems that will arise due to inadequate
intellectual property protection. For example, adulterated drugs and
counterfeit products will lead to illness, extended injuries, and
338
unnecessary deaths. Emerging entrepreneurs, authors, and creative
artists will be unable to capture the benefits of their inventions,
339
innovations, and creative endeavors. To make up for the potential
infringement of their fellow citizens and organizations, businesses
and educational centers will have to pay more for the needed foreign
340
technologies and materials. Consumers who receive worse products
341
despite paying the same price will be reluctant to consume in the
342
Foreign entities will be wary of investing in China
open market.

337. See China: New Measure Will Be Taken to Protect IPR, supra note 336.
338. See Alford, Making the World Safe for What?, supra note 254, at 136.
339. See id. at 136-37.
340. See id. at 137; see also HO, supra note 266, ¶ 2.6 (noting that legitimate copies
of software are 20% more expensive in Hong Kong than they are in the United
States).
341. See Giunta & Shang, supra note 322, at 341 (“Many of [the less developed]
countries fail to realize that prices in countries that respect intellectual property are
not necessarily higher than prices in those countries where piracy abounds.”);
Sherwood, Why a Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense, supra note 320, at 82
(“In [some cases], notably pharmaceuticals, the price at which the imitation is sold is
often nearly as high as the original.”); James W. Peters, Comment, Toward Negotiating
a Remedy to Copyright Piracy in Singapore, 7 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 561, 589 (1986)
(“Pirated works are not necessarily cheaper than the originals.”).
342. As commentators explained:
Trademark protection provides various types of benefits to consumers which
are important for a consumer-based economy that offers a wide range of
goods. One such benefit is quality control, which can actually promote
economic activity in a market. Trademarks tie responsibility for the content
and quality of products to the specific producers of those products, and in
this way can assure the consumer of a certain level of quality associated with
a product.
If the consumer cannot distinguish between high and low quality
products in the market, then the low quality merchandise may chase the
high quality merchandise out of the market altogether as consumers become
discouraged and buy less. The market then shrinks and may even disappear.
This informational asymmetry results in an externality to the market that
can reduce economic activity. Lacking full information, potential buyers
cannot discern the actual quality of individual products in the market but
can discern the average quality in the market, and, therefore, are only willing
to pay a price that reflects this average. Potential producers know the actual
quality of their products, and at the price reflecting the average quality,
potential producers of more costly, higher quality goods stay out of the
market.
MacLaughlin et al., supra note 329, at 103 (footnotes omitted); see also George
Akerloff, The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84
Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (analyzing market dynamics when the supply of goods was
subject to varying degrees of quality known only by the individual producers and not
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And worst of
because of widespread intellectual property piracy.
all, “[t]he best and brightest from [China will] feel compelled to
leave their home countr[y] for the more remunerative systems in
344
developed nations.”
These problems will not only induce significant costs to the
economic system and generate social discontent, but will also incur
significant political costs to the existing reformist leaders. Although
the post-Mao reforms have turned China into the fastest growing
economy in the world, such reforms have significantly reduced the
345
power of the central government.
Dissatisfied with this decline of
state power, the conservative leaders are constantly looking for an
opportunity to regain their lost power and discredit their reformist

the consumers); Alford, Making the World Safe for What?, supra note 254, at 137
(stating that fake products were so prominent in Shanghai that government officials
had to inform citizens over the airwaves where they could purchase legitimate
products).
343. See Gordon C.K. Cheung, Social-Cost Analysis in Sino-American Disputes over
Intellectual Property Rights, in OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, supra note 169, at
229, 231 (“Infringement discourages U.S. industries from product investment,
distribution, and marketization.”).
344. Richard E. Vaughan, Defining Terms in the Intellectual Property Protection Debate:
Are the North and South Arguing Past Each Other When We Say “Property”? A Lockean,
Confucian, and Islamic Comparison, 2 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 307, 345 (1996); see
ROBERT SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 156 (1990)
(describing a reverse “brain drain” in South Korea after its implementation of
intellectual property laws in 1987). Robert Sherwood explained the impact of
inadequate intellectual property protection on human resources as follows:
Students who have gone abroad, prefer to stay abroad. Researchers on the
verge of innovation, leave for a protected environment to complete their
work. Technically skilled people are not much stimulated to do creative
work when assigned the task of copying and imitation. The research
establishment does not flourish and patterns for financing new technology
are not developed . . . .
Id. at 174; see Kitch, Patent Policy, supra note 327, at 174 (arguing that technologically
sophisticated students who obtain employment outside the country may, “over time,
become comfortable in their place of employment and will resist ever returning to
their country of origin”). This loss of talent is particularly devastating in light of the
blossoming software industry and the country’s eagerness to develop science and
technology parks. See China: Guangzhou to Establish “Silicon Valley,” CHINA BUS. INFO.
NETWORK, Dec. 4, 1998, available at 1998 WL 22707603 (reporting the municipal
government’s intention to develop an international science and technology park);
CHINA: Sales of Software Stay Strong Despite Fakes, ASIAINFO DAILY CHINA NEWS, June 20,
2000, available at LEXIS, News library, ASINFO File (“Despite the damage done by
piracy, China’s software industry is still moving ahead with sales in 1999 hitting 17.6
billion RMB yuan (US$ 2.13 billion), an increase of 27.5 percent over 1998.”); China:
Software Industry Booms in China, CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK, Oct. 30, 1997, available at
1997 WL 12878806 (reporting a 50% annual growth rate in the software industry
over the past several years).
345. See ZHENG, DISCOVERING CHINESE NATIONALISM, supra note 235, at 17; see also
MARGARET M. PEARSON, CHINA’S NEW BUSINESS ELITE: THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES
OF ECONOMIC REFORM 21 (1997) (noting that the intentional decentralization of
economic authority by the state has been the “hallmark of the post-Mao reform
strategy”).
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346

The above domestic problems would undoubtedly
counterparts.
347
provide this valuable opportunity. They would also help bolster the
conservatives’ nationalist argument that “the Americans [are] us[ing]
the economic opening to attempt to destroy China’s progress rather
348
than to welcome it into the world community.”
Eventually, the
problems would slow down China’s modernization efforts and
economic growth. They would also alienate the various diasporic
Chinese communities around the world. Disappointed by the
economic retrogression, these communities might decide to readjust
349
their ties with the motherland.
Under this scenario, China would
“retreat into a new kind of isolationism” and would have to continue
350
to struggle under an international order dominated by the West.
Step Five: Assist China to Integrate into the International Community and
the Global Economy
As intellectual property has become an integral part of the
351
international economy, a country that integrates well into the
global economy will likely provide stronger intellectual property
protection. To accelerate China’s integration into the global
economy, the United States needs to convince the Chinese leaders
why economic integration will benefit China and improve its standing
in the international community.
Since adopting an open door policy in 1978, China has broadly

346. See BERNSTEIN & MUNRO, supra note 10, at 63 (“[I]f there is a collapse, or even
just a slowdown, the consequence could be political turmoil or even chaos.”);
Margaret M. Pearson, China’s Integration into the International Trade and Investment
Regime, in CHINA JOINS THE WORLD, supra note 306, at 161, 186-87 (arguing that
China’s integration into the world trade and investment regimes has been the subject
of some domestic political wrangling between reformers and conservatives).
347. “Foreign policy is not usually the central issue in Chinese factional conflicts.
It is a realm unfamiliar to most of the senior Communist leaders, and one that affects
their power interests less than domestic issues.” NATHAN & ROSS, supra note 182, at
128; see David de Pury, Drawing National Democracies Towards Global Governance, in
URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND, supra note 228, at 171, 177 (arguing that politicians
have a clear preference for working on a national level, even if international matters
are involved).
348. OVERHOLT, supra note 181, at 393.
349. The following statistics demonstrate the importance of disaporic Chinese
communities:
In 1992, 80 percent of the foreign direct investment in China ($11.3 billion)
came from overseas Chinese, primarily in Hong Kong (68.3 percent), but
also in Taiwan (9.3 percent), Singapore, Macao, and elsewhere. In contrast,
Japan provided 6.6 percent and the United States 4.6 percent of the total.
Of total accumulated foreign investment of $50 billion, 67 percent was from
Chinese sources.
HUNTINGTON, CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS, supra note 250, at 170-71.
350. MICHAEL YAHUDA, HONG KONG: CHINA’S CHALLENGE 4 (1996).
351. See BOYLE, supra note 5, at 2-3.
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accepted traditional sources of international law and “has played an
active role in conferences formulating new rules of international law
in areas such as the law of the sea and the protection of the
353
environment.”
Reformulating its intellectual property laws along
international norms would not only be consistent with China’s
354
current approach toward international law, but would also foster
355
China’s role as a team player within the international community.
This team player identity may even change the perception of the
Western countries on China’s human rights protection, alleviate the
concerns of its neighboring countries regarding its territorial
ambitions, and consolidate its relations with the United States, Japan,
356
and other major European powers.
Indeed, China’s recent history has twice demonstrated that it is
dangerous to isolate the country from the international community.
Before the Opium War, China regarded foreigners as “outer
barbarians” and believed the country had no need for foreign
357
objects, manufactures, and ideas.
Ignorant and complacent,
Emperor Qianlong of the Qing dynasty told King George III of
England: “We possess all things. I set no value on objects strange or
358
ingenious, and have no use for your country’s manufactures.”
A

352. See YASH GHAI, HONG KONG’S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: THE RESUMPTION
CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BASIC LAW 431 (1st ed. 1997); Yu, Succession by
Estoppel, supra note 293, at 100. In 1981, China published its first textbook on
international law, and universities have since promoted studies of international law.
Instead of being skeptical of the economic ties to international law, Chinese scholars
try to “divorce the analysis of international law from remnants of Marxian ideology.”
GHAI, supra, at 431. See generally HUNGDAH CHIU, THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
AND THE LAW OF TREATIES (1972), for an excellent survey of China’s attitudes toward
international law in the Mao era.
353. GHAI, supra note 352, at 431.
354. See Roda Mushkat, The Future of Hong Kong’s International Legal Personality:
Does International Law Matter? A Post-Handover Snapshot, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 275, 285
(1998) (“[China] prides itself on abiding by all its international agreements and
commitments, and that it enjoys a reasonably good record of compliance with
treaties.”); Parliament Leader Li Peng Urges Study, Use of International Law, BBC
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, May 4, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library,
BBCSWB File (reporting that Chinese Premier Li Peng advocated the use of
international laws to handle state-to-state relations and international affairs and to
conduct foreign exchanges and cooperation).
355. For a discussion of China’s participation in the international legal order, see
generally CHINA JOINS THE WORLD, supra note 306; KENT, LIMITS OF COMPLIANCE, supra
note 303; James V. Feinerman, Chinese Participation in International Legal Order: Rogue
Elephant or Team Player, in CHINA’S LEGAL REFORMS 201 (Stanley Lubman ed., 1996).
356. See Yu, Succession by Estoppel, supra note 293, at 100-02.
357. See ALFORD, supra note 23, at 30-31; see also HSÜ, supra note 158, at 142 (“The
Chinese attitude toward foreign trade was an outgrowth of their tributary mentality.
It postulated that the bountiful Middle Kingdom had no need for things foreign, but
that the benevolent emperor allowed trade as a mark of favor to foreigners and as a
means of restraining their gratitude.”).
358. Letter from the Qianlong Emperor to King George III of England (Oct. 3,
OF
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couple of centuries later, the scientific progress and military prowess
of the Western powers have proved Qianlong wrong. In fact, they
brought China two centuries of tremendous pain and humiliation. It
was not until the resumption of sovereignty in Hong Kong in 1997
that China was able to recover from all the unequal treaties signed in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
During the Mao era, China made a similar mistake by withdrawing
completely from the global economy. Practicing self-reliance and
import substitution, China sought to produce domestically those
products it traditionally imported. By the late 1970s, China had
359
concluded that this self-reliant policy was ineffective. It had led to
high-cost, ineffective domestic production, and China remained a
360
backward country with limited foreign technology and capital.
When Deng Xiaoping returned to power in the late 1970s, he was
determined to “internationalize” China by renewing its diplomatic
361
ties with other countries, including the United States.
As
information and trade become increasingly globalized in this
362
information age, seclusion is no longer a viable foreign policy.

1793), quoted in HSÜ, supra note 158, at 161.
359. Some commentators criticized the self-reliance policy as follows:
According to ancient Greek philosophy, the world is composed of four
elements: earth, water, air, and fire. Ancient Chinese philosophy maintains
that the world consists of five elements: metal, wood, water, fire (energy)
and earth. Among these five elements, three are in short supply in China
(metal, wood, and energy), and the other two require future development.
The status of resource availability and development in China suggests that
China must participate actively in international economic cooperation of the
exploitation of its own natural resources and draw upon needed resources
from other countries. Such cooperative ventures must be wide-ranging and
extensive. The former policy that merely stressed “self-sufficiency” and “selfreliance” was harmful to China’s economic development and punctuated by
political turmoil.
SHIZHONG DONG ET AL., TRADE AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN CHINA: THE
CURRENT COMMERCIAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK 3 (1992).
360. Professor Pendley explained why China needs to integrate into the global
economy:
Despite its large relatively cheap labor supply, China will need continuing
transfers of technology to remain competitive in international trade. It will
need open markets for its exports to provide hard currency exchange and
reserves for its debt servicing, even as it attempts to maintain international
protections for some of the domestic sectors of its economy. The necessary
improvements in both economic and physical infrastructure will require
financial assistance from foreign public and private sources as well as
international organizations. Finally, China must find a way to reduce the
heavy drain on its economy caused by inefficient state industries without also
creating social instability.
William T. Pendley, China as International Actor, in BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND
DETERRENCE, supra note 169, at 19, 27.
361. See 1979 Agreement, supra note 17, at 4652 (renewing China’s diplomatic ties
with the United States).
362. See BOYLE, supra note 5, at 2 (“Information . . . is a central feature of the

YUPPREPAGED6501USETHISONE.DOC

2000]

FROM PIRATES TO PARTNERS

8/15/2001 11:34 AM

199

Today, one can easily find a product grown in Malaysia, processed in
Singapore, sold in China, and bought by an American. A seclusion
policy will prevent China from taking advantage of the specialization
capability within the global trading system.
Even though China has repeatedly emphasized the importance of
national sovereignty, the need for global cooperation has drastically
363
To resolve domestic
weakened the foundation of this principle.
problems that have ramifications beyond national frontiers, states
364
often have to cooperate with each other.
Even the United States,
which has been known to favor unilateral actions, has had to “go[]

international economy.”); INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA, supra note 2, at
2 (examining the shift in capital from tangible assets and labor to knowledge and
innovation resulting from the globalization of business activity in the past twenty-five
years); see also LESTER C. THUROW, BUILDING WEALTH: THE NEW RULES FOR THE
INDIVIDUALS, COMPANIES, AND NATIONS IN A KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY xiii (1999)
(“Knowledge is the new basis for wealth. . . . In the past, when capitalists talked
about their wealth, they were talking about their ownership of plant and equipment
or natural resources. In the future when capitalists talk about their wealth, they will
be talking about their control of knowledge.”); WIPO, FINAL REPORT OF THE WIPO
INTERNET DOMAIN NAME PROCESS ¶ 12 (1999) (“[T]he source of wealth is increasingly
intellectual, as opposed to physical, [or] capital and . . . markets are distributed
across the globe.”).
363. See de Pury, supra note 347, at 171 (“Global governance is what is needed to
make an increasingly global world economy function better and ensure sustainable
world-wide growth and development.”); Harding, Breaking the Impasse over Human
Rights, supra note 194, at 177 (stating that the need for global cooperation has
weakened the principle of national sovereignty); John O. McGinnis, The Decline of the
Western Nation State and the Rise of the Regime of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L.
REV. 903 (1996) (arguing that a new regime of “international federalism” has
replaced the regime of nation states); see also CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 43, at 27
(“[F]or all but a few self-isolated nations, sovereignty no longer consists in the
freedom of states to act independently, in their perceived self-interest, but in
membership in reasonably good standing in the regimes that make up the substance
of international life.”); id. (“Sovereignty, in the end, is status—the vindication of the
state’s existence as a member of the international system. In today’s setting, the only
way most states can realize and express their sovereignty is through participation in
the various regimes that regulate and order the international system.”); STEPHEN D.
KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999) (contending that states have
never been as sovereign as scholars argued); ARNOLD WOLFERS, DISCORD AND
COLLABORATION 27 (1962) (“Co-operation means sacrificing some degree of national
independence with a view to co-ordinating, synchronizing, and rendering mutually
profitable some of the political, military, or economic policies the cooperating
nations intend to pursue.”); John H. Jackson, The Uruguay Round Results and National
Sovereignty, in URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND, supra note 228, at 293, 294 (suggesting
that there is no longer absolute sovereignty for nations). See generally Symposium,
The Decline of the Nation State and Its Effects on Constitutional and International Economic
Law, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 903 (1996), for a collection of essays discussing the decline
of the nation state and its implications for international law.
364. These problems include, to name a few, illicit drug trafficking, refugees,
illegal immigration, environmental degradation, illegal arms sales, nuclear
proliferation, terrorism, and bribery and corruption. See Judith H. Bello, National
Sovereignty and Transnational Problem Solving, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1027, 1027 (1996)
(“Many of the most difficult problems that challenge nation states in the increasingly
interdependent world do not respect borders. . . . Nation states acting alone are
helpless to resolve or most effectively alleviate these problems.”).
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through difficult adaptations to the demands of global institutions,
international law, multinational companies, and transnational
financial networks and the loss of exclusive national decision-making
365
power associated with them.”
As China makes its transition to a world power, it can no longer
focus solely on its own internal development. World power status is
glamorous, but it does come with a price. This price may entail the
sacrifice of a country’s own internal development, its sovereignty, and
its decisionmaking power. As the Joint Statement indicated, both
China and the United States have a “common responsibility to work
366
for peace and prosperity in the 21st century.” Given this significant
responsibility, China, like the United States, has to assume the role to
maintain international peace and order and has to set examples for
367
other countries.
To help China integrate into the international community, the
United States can treat China and its leaders with the status

365. Lampton, supra note 188, at 123. The United States’s performance in the
international human rights arena clearly demonstrates its uncomfortable position:
The United States has been particularly reluctant in ratifying international
human rights instruments. Its representatives often took an active part in
the drafting of human rights treaties, mostly taking a particularly
conservative stand, with internal political interests as a primary guide.
Proponents of international human rights standards almost invariably pursue
compromises that would satisfy American demands, if for no other reason
than simply because the United States happens to carry the purse for
implementation expenditures. The result is quite often a mediocre
convention with lukewarm enforcement procedures, and subsequently, when
ratification is called for, Washington simply won’t play ball!
Johan D. van der Vyver, Universality and Relativity of Human Rights: American
Relativism, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 43, 66 (1998).
366. Joint Statement, supra note 14.
367. Even though China seeks to attain superpower status, the Chinese leaders are
particularly sensitive to the hegemony issue. As Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro
explained:
A slogan that has been a constant since the heyday of Chairman Mao is “We
will never seek hegemony.” Indeed, that slogan, a statement of China’s
peaceable intent in its foreign relations, is one of the few that has remained
in use in China as the country has passed through its various political stages,
from radical Maoism to the era of Deng Xiaoping. All along, China’s official
position has been that it seeks to develop a world-class economy, to maintain
military force only for defense, and to refrain from interfering in the
internal affairs of other countries. For three decades, China has promised
never to attack another country first—only to counterattack if another
country attacks it. It has vowed never to be the first to use nuclear weapons.
It proclaims itself to be a struggling Third World country with no
superpower capabilities and ambitions.
BERNSTEIN & MUNRO, supra note 10, at 51. But see ALASTAIR IAIN JOHNSTON, CULTURAL
REALISM: STRATEGIC CULTURE AND GRAND STRATEGY IN CHINESE HISTORY (1995)
(contending that China has a realist strategic culture); see also MOSHER, supra note
169 (arguing that hegemonistic tendencies are rooted in the Chinese culture and
such tendencies have resurged in the post-Mao era).
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appropriate to a major power.
It can also support China’s
participation at the G-7 and G-8 meetings and encourage Chinese
368
membership and active participation in international organizations.
With respect to the economy, the United States can accelerate
369
“Involving China in the WTO and
China’s entry into the WTO.

368. See Final Report, supra note 204, at 301. The G-7 is an informal forum of seven
major industrialized countries—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United
States, and the United Kingdom. Since 1998, the G-7 and the Russian Federation
have met as the G-8 to discuss global economic issues.
369. On November 15, 1999, China and the United States signed the U.S.-China
Bilateral Market Access Agreement. See OFFICE OF USTR, 2001 NATIONAL TRADE
ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 42 (2001). Last fall, Congress passed a
bill to normalize permanent trade relations with China. See Eric Schmitt, Senate Votes
to Lift Curbs on U.S. Trade with Beiging; Strong Bipartisan Support, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,
2000, at A1. This bill ended the annual congressional review of China’s MFN status.
Nevertheless, with the recent U.S.-China standoff over the midair collision of their
military planes, some legislators have introduced legislation to revoke China’s trade
privileges. See Allison Mitchell, Tempers are Cooling, but a Cloud Remains, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 12, 2001, at A14. As of this writing, China has yet to join the WTO.
For discussions arguing that the United States should accelerate China’s entry into
the WTO, see Cohen & Bersani, supra note 270, at 110; Lampton, supra note 188, at
137; see also Joint Statement, supra note 14, at 1682 (“The United States and China
agree that China’s full participation in the multilateral trading system is in their
mutual interest.”); id. at 1682 (agreeing “to intensify negotiations on market access,
including tariffs, non-tariff measures, services, standards and agriculture and on
implementation of WTO principles so that China can accede to the WTO on a
commercially meaningful basis at the earliest possible date”); China’s WTO Accession:
American Interests, Values and Strategies: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 106th Cong. 1 (2000), available at http://www.ustr.gov/speech-test/
barshefsky_t34.pdf (statement of USTR Charlene Barshefsky) (“China’s WTO
accession is a clear economic win for the United States.”); Laura D’Andrea Tyson,
China Policy: Means and Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1997, at A15 (“China’s admission to
the World Trade Organization—on commercially acceptable conditions—is probably
our single most effective means of shaping a more open, market-oriented China.”);
cf. MASTEL, supra note 229, at 176 (cautioning that China’s accession to the WTO is
“a double-edged sword”). But see BERNSTEIN & MUNRO, supra note 10, at 211 (arguing
against WTO membership for China); James V. Feinerman, Free Trade, Up to a Point,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1999, at A15 (discarding myths concerning China’s accession to
the WTO); Mann, supra note 183 (arguing that China’s entry into the WTO would
likely disappoint the American business community). As Richard Bernstein and Ross
Munro explain:
[S]uch [a] deal would give away the store to China without gaining any
compensating advantages for the United States. It would give Third World
privileges to a Chinese economy that, as we have shown, has developed large,
First World enclaves ready to compete head-on, but unfairly, with the United
States.
In addition, WTO membership for China would virtually prohibit the
United States from taking meaningful action in its trade disputes with China,
since China would have the right to insist that any dispute be resolved via the
WTO’s system of binding arbitration. Like its predecessor, the GATT, the
WTO moves cautiously and slowly, rarely assertively or bravely. Disputes will
take years to resolve. And even if the United States wins every time, it will be
back to the issue-by-issue approach that China can always win by following its
People’s War strategy.
BERNSTEIN & MUNRO, supra note 10, at 211; see also Giunta & Shang, supra note 322, at
329 (“Bilateral agreements are most effective because they address the individual
concerns and circumstances facing each signatory. Importantly, such agreements
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obtaining deadlines for compliance (even if allowing for longer
transition times than one would wish) is preferable to having China
370
outside the WTO, with no deadlines for compliance whatsoever.”
Being an emerging world power, “China will more likely to adhere to
371
international norms that it has helped to shape.” Indeed, “[g]lobal
commerce can ill afford to have a major player like China not playing
by market rules and conventions. If China is allowed to pirate
whatever products and technology it chooses, the international
372
system could well break down.”
To help accelerate economic development in China, the United
States can “fully support [the World Bank]’s efforts to assist in the
reform of unproductive state enterprises in [China] and the
373
promotion of stable economic development.” “Although providing
more open markets will not necessarily directly produce a rapid
growth of intellectual property [protection] in [China], constricting

can take into consideration the particular phases of development confronting each
country, and provide for the gradual inclusion of a developing country into the
global economy.”); id. at 340 (stating that the bilateral agreements initiated after the
United States threat of trade sanctions “have generally encouraged speedier and
more substantial changes in suspect nations, as failure to comply might result in
immediate trade sanctions”); Ashoka Mody, New International Environment for
Intellectual Property Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY,
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 203, 255 (Francis W.
Rushing & Carole Ganz Brown eds., 1990) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL COMPARISONS]
(“In the short-run, bilateralism is proving more effective than multilateral efforts in
furthering U.S. interests. Bilateralism is quicker and allows more focused and
tailored responses.”). Likewise, Tara Giunta and Lily Shang argued that “bilateral
agreements provide the most workable vehicle for addressing the contentious issues
surrounding intellectual property protection.” Giunta & Shang, supra note 322, at
339. As they explained: “Unlike multilateral agreements, bilateral agreements are
country specific and thus may provide more protection for owners of foreign patent
rights. In addition to bilateral treaties specifically addressing intellectual property
protection are the ‘Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation’ and the
various income tax treaties.” Id. at 339-40 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 329
(stating that bilateral agreements allow less developed country to assume greater
responsibility in safeguarding intellectual property rights as it becomes a stronger
player). See generally CHINA IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: DEFINING THE PRINCIPLES
OF ENGAGEMENT (Frederick M. Abbott ed., 1998) for a collection of essays discussing
China’s accession to the WTO.
370. Lampton, supra note 188, at 137; see GROOMBRIDGE & BARFIELD, supra note
214, at 41 (“WTO is by no means a panacea to China’s economic problems, but both
China and the world trading community will be better served if China is a
member.”); Pearson, supra note 346, at 195 (“[W]ithout China in the WTO the
United States loses a key forum for seeing that China adheres to the rules of the
regime.”).
371. Sam Nunn, Address to the American Assembly, in LIVING WITH CHINA, supra note
85, at 277, 285.
372. Bloch, supra note 85, at 200; see Cheng, supra note 187, at 2005 (“Admitting
China into the WTO will encourage China to enforce its [intellectual property]
protection and enhance the international community’s position to contain China’s
piracy problem.”).
373. Cohen & Bersani, supra note 270, at 111.
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access to the markets of major industrialized countries almost
374
Liberalizing the American market would
certainly will retard it.”
also provide the non-state capital needed to develop a local
375
intellectual property industry.
Moreover, economic integration would “help the reformers tilt the
internal Chinese debate in directions that would minimize, if not
avoid, future economic conflicts. It would [also] encourage and
perhaps accelerate the inevitable transformation of China’s political
376
regime.”
In fact, if China were excluded from the international
community, in particular the WTO, “leaders might emerge in China
who would attempt to devise an alternative regime, rejecting the
377
WTO-based system as unnecessarily invasive.”
Given the growing
378
importance of Asia, this alternative regime may take the form of the

374. ALFORD, supra note 23, at 122-23. But see BERNSTEIN & MUNRO, supra note 10,
at 101 (“Trade with the West . . . has a double edge. It brings in practices and ideas
that ought to lead to political reform. But it also enhances the power of the regime
to resist and suppress political reform and to force other countries to drop their
demands for it.”).
375. See ALFORD, supra note 23, at 123; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright’s
Democratic Principles in the Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217, 278 [hereinafter
Netanel, Asserting Copyright’s Democratic Principles] (“If tailored to provide for licenses
for the printing and production of foreign works, rather than merely the importation
of foreign-produced copies, it could also help to provide a measure of income for
local media, thus contributing to their fiscal independence.”). But see Pearson, supra
note 346, at 164 (“[T]here is reason to be skeptical that the business elite in the PRC
will either emerge as a strong independent force or that it will be at the center of a
more progressive form of state-society relations.”).
376. Michael E. DeGolyer, Western Exposure, China Orientation: The Effects of Foreign
Ties and Experience on Hong Kong, in OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, supra note
169, at 299, 300 (quoting C. Fred Bergsten, The New Agenda with China, INT’L ECON.
POL’Y BRIEFS, May 1998, at 2) (internal quotations omitted); see David E. Sanger,
Playing the Trade Card: U.S. Is Exporting Its Free Market Values Through Global Commercial
Contracts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1997, at 1 (reporting that the Clinton Administration
considers the WTO as a tool to foster political change in China); see also
GROOMBRIDGE & BARFIELD, supra note 214, at 41 (“[A]n international institution such
as the WTO can help bolster China’s reform leadership against powerful hard-liners.
International institutions can tie the hands of leaders in ways that the ineffectual
bilateral relationship is not able to do so.”). But see Mann, supra note 183, at 22
(“‘[H]elping the reformers’ is a poor basis for American policy. It is too risky. It
plays into (and, indeed, accentuates) China’s internal political tensions.”).
377. Pearson, supra note 346, at 185.
378. Commentators explained the importance of East Asia:
East Asia is generally considered the new frontier for economic
development. According to some accounts, East Asia is generating wealth at
an unprecedented rate. As a result, experts predict a massive shift of global
economic power in the near future. Years of export surpluses, combined
with high savings rates and prudent fiscal policies, have left East Asian
governments with foreign reserves topping $250 billion. It has been
estimated that by the year 2000, East Asia will account for half of all growth
in world trade. Asia’s economic growth has such momentum that, according
to the International Monetary Fund, half of the estimated $7.5 trillion
surplus in gross world product over the next ten years will be contributed by
this region.
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Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, commonly known as
379
APEC. Although the financial crisis in Asia made the possibility of
380
such an Asia-based regime slim, there may be renewed interest in
creating such a regime once the region’s economy recovers.
Economic integration would also help promote the interests of
American businesses by opening up the Chinese market. In
exchange for China’s admission to the WTO and integration into the
global economy, the United States can request China to abandon its
381
382
protectionist trade barriers, such as quotas, import licensing,

Moreover, East Asians are expected to account for 3.5 billion of the
world’s 6.2 billion people by the end of the century. According to
conservative estimates, one billion of these Asians will be living in
households with some consumer-spending power. Furthermore, roughly 400
million of these consumers will have attained disposable incomes at least
equal to the average consumer in a developed country today. Such
phenomenal growth presents both opportunities and challenges to the West.
As an investment opportunity, East Asia’s future capital needs will be
enormous. Over the next ten years, the region must mobilize more than $1
trillion to build basic infrastructure such as high ways, communications
systems and power plants. Billions more are needed to establish capitalintensive industries such as microelectronics, steel and petrochemicals.
These opportunities, however, will be accompanied by their share of
problems.
Giunta & Shang, supra note 322, at 346-47.
379. Professor Pearson described this new possible alternative regime:
The core [of the alternative regime] would likely be a revised and strongly
Asia-oriented APEC that adheres to many norms of free trade (such as low
tariffs), and yet—like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—is more tolerant of
industrial policy, and that is not dominated by the United States (which
could continue to leverage trade policies to insert itself into areas many
Asian governments feel are their sovereign rights, such as treatment of
political dissidents).
An Asia-oriented APEC might be even more
sympathetic to a relationship-based norm of interactions that avoids binding
agreements of the sort that tend to make the PRC leadership uncomfortable
than to a rule of law-based norm. As it stands already, Chinese leaders
appear to feel APEC is an easy forum to operate in, saying it works in the
“Asian way”—not requiring signed agreements, but working according to
gradual negotiations to reach a consensus. It is already true that many
investments from overseas Chinese investors (who have contributed as much
as 70 percent of China’s FDI in the 1990s) are back-of-the-envelope deals
based on personal connections rather than the rule of law. Overseas
Chinese often are given preferential treatment (such as lower export
requirements), sometimes a result of relationships they may have cultivated
with PRC officials. A new APEC also could provide a buffer against Western
criticisms over lack of protection of intellectual property or Western attempts
to link trade policy to human rights. It also conceivably could be a forum in
which China could resist increased attempts by organizations such as the
WTO and the World Bank to use “good governance” and anticorruption as
criteria for membership or lending. Support from an Asia-exclusive trade
organization would be forthcoming from some other members, notably
Malaysia.
Pearson, supra note 346, at 185 (footnotes omitted).
380. See id.
381. The 2000 National Trade Estimate Report described China’s quota limits:
At present, quota limits over 40 categories of commodities, including
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import substitution and local content polices unnecessarily restrictive
383
certification and quarantine standards, and export performance
384
requirements.
The United States can also request that China

watches, automobiles, grains, edible oils, and certain textile products. The
central government sets annual quotas through negotiations usually held
late in each year. Officials at local and central levels evaluate the need for
quantitative restrictions on particular products. Once demand has been
determined, the central government allocates quota to provinces and special
economic zones who distribute it to end-users. Quota amounts are often
unannounced and allocation remains nontransparent to outsiders.
2000 NTE REPORT, supra note 155, at 45.
382. See id. (“Licenses are still required . . . for a number of items important to the
United States, including grains, oilseeds and oilseed products, cotton, iron and steel
products, commercial aircraft, passenger vehicles, hauling trucks, and rubber
products.”).
383. These certification and quarantine standards include inspection standards,
quality licenses, and safety licenses:
Chinese law provides that all goods subject to inspection by law or according
to the terms of a contract must be inspected prior to importation. China
maintains statutory inspection requirements known as “conformity
assessment procedures” on about 800 imported goods, and an even greater
number of exported products. Chinese buyers or their purchase agents
must register for inspection of imported goods at the port of entry. The
scope of inspection includes quality, technical specifications, quantity,
weight, packaging, and safety requirements.
....
For manufactured goods, China requires that a quality license be issued
before the goods can be imported into China. Obtaining quality licenses is a
time-consuming process. While requirements vary according to the product,
U.S. exporters have complained that they are burdensome and contrary to
principles of national treatment.
....
China also imposes safety licensing requirements on certain products
under the terms of the “Import and Export Commodity Inspection Law” of
1989. National health and quarantine regulations in addition require that
all imported (but no domestic) food items be marked with a laser sticker as
evidence of the product’s safety. Importers are charged between 5 and 7
cents per sticker.
Id. at 47-48.
384. See id. at 44-45; see also OVERHOLT, supra note 181, at 381 (discussing China’s
protectionist trade barriers); id. (“China is trying to export like a capitalist and
import like a communist.”) (quoting statement of Ambassador Arthur W. Hummel,
Jr.)). One commentator described the “shadowy and unwritten system of quotas
for films, video, and television”:
There are de facto bans on non-Chinese ownership in joint ventures for
producing and distributing recorded music, and also on establishing joint
ventures for publishing. There is also an informal quota on the number of
non-Chinese recordings that can be released annually in China.
Additionally, while an import license is required to import books into China,
these licenses are not available to non-Chinese publishers. Non-Chinese
publishers are not permitted to prepare translations of their books; instead,
they must have their books translated and published locally. China also
imposes export performance requirements on U.S. products manufactured
in China, and imposes prohibitive tariff rates for many imported U.S.
products.
Commentators argue that these market access barriers facilitate
intellectual property piracy and impede enforcement. The prohibitive tariff
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eliminate the restrictions on foreign investment and trade contained
in its industrial policies and provide full trading rights to foreign
385
In addition, the United States can require China to
companies.
promote transparency by publishing laws, regulations, and related
measures and procedures and by making available the informal
386
administrative “guidance” or “approval” used in its rulemaking.
Such transparency is particularly important given the significant
387
difference between Chinese and Western legal systems.

rates discourage the importation into China of authentic goods, leading to
the saturation of the Chinese market with infringing products.
Consequently, foreign licensees are unable to compete in China due to the
presence of large quantities of these infringing products. Preventing full
market access thus limits supply in the face of a rising demand that can only
be satisfied by pirated copies of the product.
Derek Dessler, Comment, China’s Intellectual Property Protection: Prospects for Achieving
International Standards, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 181, 232-33 (1995) (footnotes
omitted).
385. See Bloch, supra note 85, at 214; 2000 NTE REPORT, supra note 155, at 46-47
(describing trading rights).
386. See Bloch, supra note 85, at 215; see also Memorandum of Understanding
Concerning Market Access, Oct. 10, 1992, P.R.C.-U.S., 31 I.L.M. 1274, 1275-76 (laying
the foundation for China to significantly improve the transparency of its trade
regime); ALBERT H.Y. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 85 (1998) (“There is no legal requirement for all guizhang to be
published, and some of it is in fact regarded as internal or not published.”); CORNE,
supra note 320, at 72 (“Many banfa, guiding and guize are never promulgated or issued
to the public and are only intended for the eyes of government officials.”); Sylvia
Ostry, China and the WTO: The Transparency Issue, 3 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1
(1998) (arguing that the lack of transparency will obstruct China’s accession to the
WTO); Pearson, supra note 346, at 170 (“[T]he trading system remained far from
transparent, a problem exacerbated by the still less than-reliable accounting system
and statistical reporting.”).
Professor Zheng argued that, although many Chinese documents are confidential
in the past, they are not confidential today:
When China began to apply to return to GATT in the late 1980s and to enter
into the WTO in the 1990s, to comply with the requirement of these bodies,
all the administrative documents have been made public since the early
1990s. The only problem is that most of the documents are only availabe
[sic] in a Chinese version. This is also one of the reasons why it is almost
useless to get a lawyer who is not a native Chinese speaker. Certain foreign
lawyers presume that their Chinese is good enough, but in fact they still find
difficulty in understanding Chinese legal and administrative documents.
ZHENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA, supra note 123, at viii.
387. Professor Feng explained the difference between Chinese and Western laws:
In common Chinese parlance, laws are a “concrete formulation of the Party’s
policy.” . . . [They] operate within the boundaries of policy directives, under
the guidance of policy principles and supplemented by various policy tools
(such as a Party or government circular or notice). . . .
....
As concrete formulation of the Party’s policy, laws are first of all a
summary of practical administrative and judicial experience. As such, the
text of a law does not necessarily constitute a detailed, comprehensive and
self-containing rule system, justifiable on ideological as well as
jurisprudential grounds, with coherent principles and well-defined concepts.
It is acceptable for a law to be incomplete, incoherent, ideologically
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Step Six: Promote a Local Intellectual Property Industry
So far, the Chinese leaders are reluctant to promote intellectual
property rights because these rights benefit mainly foreigners. For
example, in 1992, foreigners obtained two-thirds of all invention
patents granted even though the Chinese people filed eleven times
388
more applications.
The Chinese leaders, however, may change
their minds if intellectual property protection benefits the domestic
population and contributes to the economic growth of the country.
Thus, the American government and business community need to
encourage and assist the Chinese, in particular its independent
389
sector, to develop a local intellectual property industry.
The

compromising, as well as broadly and vaguely termed pending further
administrative and judicial experience in its implementation.
This also means that it is acceptable that laws are made on an interim or
trial use basis. Laws are supposed to fall behind policies, given the rapid
social and economic changes brought about by the reform. The result is
that statutory provisions effective in one year may be outdated the next when
a new law in another area alters a rule or enlarges a concept. The
applicability and effectiveness of a provision must be examined with a search
of all supplementary documents including administrative rules and judicial
interpretations being implemented in relevant areas. The later, more
specific rules prevail in most cases.
PETER FENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 10-11 (1997).
388. See ALFORD, supra note 23, at 84. As one commentator explained:
Because developed countries create a majority of the patentable inventions
and technology, most of the patents granted in developing countries are
issued to foreigners. The largest proportion of inventions covered by patents
are thus induced, not by the availability of patent protection in the
developing countries, but rather by the domestic patent system of the holder
or in conjunction with patent systems in other developed countries. As a
result, a developing country cannot expect that implementation of a patent
regime will induce foreign innovators to focus their development efforts on
new products and technologies that meet the special needs of the
developing nations.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA, supra note 2, at 20-21 (footnotes
omitted).
389. One commentator explained the need to develop a local intellectual
property industry:
Remember, even India—a country that had a flourishing black market in
pirated media—has seen a decline in counterfeiting as its own film and
software industries have developed. Japan rose to become an economic
superpower through strategic copying of others’ innovations, but Japanese
industry has grown to appreciate the importance of patents and copyrights.
Just ask Sony and Matsushita, which also own movie studios, and Hitachi and
Toshiba, which are among the leading filers for U.S. patents.
Today, all the economic incentives in China dictate that piracy is a
business model that makes sense. The best way to change that is to help
China and its entrepreneurs develop their own intellectual property
industries, protected by intellectual property laws that make sense.
Michael Schrage, In China, Start with Human Rights to Stop the Software Pirates, WASH.
POST, Feb. 10, 1995, at D3; see also Maruyama, supra note 31, at 167 (“China’s IPR
regime will become self-sustaining only when it sees that protecting technology,
films, music, and software advances its own core economic interests.”); id. at 208
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American government and U.S. businesses can also help facilitate
390
legitimate intellectual property exchange.
As the American foreign antitrust policy demonstrated, the
sustainability of a new policy in a less developed country depends on
the emergence of politically powerful domestic constituencies
committed to the new policy and the ability of interested private
parties to mobilize these constituencies to uphold and enforce such a
391
A prosperous local industry and a well-organized
policy.
intellectual property lobby are therefore essential to create the
domestic constituencies that are needed to push for and sustain
continuous intellectual property law reforms and enforcement
efforts. To this end, American businesses should rally the support of

(stating that intellectual property agreements became self-sustaining in Korea and
Taiwan when both countries began developing indigenous innovative technologies);
Glenn Butterton explained the economics behind the need to develop a local
intellectual property industry:
Before IPRs (or the broader institutions of private property) were
theoretically made available to the general population under Deng’s
reforms, most Chinese actors may well have been allied as infringing pirates
or as unwitting consumers of pirated materials. They might, therefore, have
stood in an adverse relation only with a rights holder. In such a situation,
the enforcer’s decision to refrain from an enforcement action would have
benefited all local parties concerned, and the near-term costs of refraining
from enforcement would have been shifted to the non-local, typically foreign
actor, viz., the owner of the property being infringed; the long-term costs
would theoretically have been partly borne locally if declines in revenue due
to piracy ultimately extinguished investment activity in, or distribution in
China of, the product in question. But once Chinese parties obtain
significant IPR stakes, the cost and benefit calculations of consuming and
pirating Chinese parties, as well as those of government enforcers, will begin
to shift with some of the significant costs of non-enforcement being borne
locally by Chinese stakeholders. In this way, when Chinese actors are put in
a position, relative to other available investments, to increase significantly
their net potential gains through either IPR ownership, licensing or
litigation, the economic explanation predicts that they will, in fact, tend to
choose to increase and protect those gains.
Butterton, supra note 223, at 1118 (footnote omitted).
390. See Kolton, supra note 316, at 458-59 (describing the intellectual property
exchange in Xian in August 1995).
391. See SELL, supra note 333, at 216; see also Gary M. Hoffman & George T.
Marcou, Combatting the Pirates of America’s Ideas, COMPUTER LAW., July 1990, at 8, 12
(“The local recording industry in Indonesia, for example, helped significantly in
convincing the Indonesian government to pass an effective copyright law.”).
The difference between the American foreign intellectual property policy and its
antitrust foreign policy clearly demonstrates the sharp distinction between overt
coercion and persuasion. See SELL, supra note 333, at 13. “The adoption of antitrust
policies in developing countries has been based on choice within constraints rather
than coercion.” Id. at 198. In response to the economic crisis in the early 1980s, the
developing countries changed both their policies and their mindsets with respect to
antitrust policies. See id. at 177. Politically powerful domestic constituencies favoring
the new policies had emerged, and the governments in those countries actively and
voluntarily sought information and assistance in drafting laws and training officials to
administer these new policies. See id. at 177-78.

YUPPREPAGED6501USETHISONE.DOC

2000]

FROM PIRATES TO PARTNERS

8/15/2001 11:34 AM

209

local intellectual property holders and help them develop a lobby
392
that aims to protect their own interests.
Apart from setting up branches in China, American businesses can
393
establish joint ventures with local companies. These joint ventures
will not only help create economic incentives for the Chinese to
enforce intellectual property rights, but will also facilitate market
394
access for international trade partners.
In addition, the joint
ventures would protect American enterprises against losses due to
395
intellectual property piracy and would assist them in overcoming
396
These joint ventures would also allow
local protectionism.

392. As commentators have explained:
[U]ltimately, the strongest voices in China are always Chinese, and the most
convincing arguments for development and enforcement of strict IPR
protocols in China have come from those Chinese organizations which are
starting to discover that they have intellectual property worth protecting.
More and more MNCs are finding that one of the best ways to fight Chinese
pirates is to seek out or help create Chinese organizations which share the
same interest.
Donaldson & Weiner, supra note 312, at 417; see Milner, supra note 240, at 239
(arguing that the legislature would likely to adopt a proposal that it does not fully
understand when it can depend on one or more informed domestic groups to signal
it about the proposal); see also Giunta & Shang, supra note 322, at 331 (“[U]nlike
Western countries, developing countries have few strong lobbies of inventors,
authors or companies that would benefit from strict intellectual property laws or the
enforcement thereof.”); Eric M. Griffin, Note, Stop Relying on Uncle Sam!—A Proactive
Approach to Copyright Protection in the People’s Republic of China, 6 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
169, 191 (1998) (“Intellectual property is simply too new a concept within China to
have any strong lobbies of inventors, authors, or companies.”).
393. See generally Walter Sterling Surrey et al., Joint Ventures in China: The First Water
Stop, 21 TEX. INT’L L.J. 221 (1986), for a discussion of joint ventures in China. See also
Pitman B. Potter, Foreign Investment Law in the People’s Republic of China: Dilemmas of
State Control, in CHINA’S LEGAL REFORMS, supra note 355, at 155 (reviewing the
structure and performance of foreign investment law and policy in China).
394. See Cheng, supra note 187, at 2010; see also id. (“The business structure of joint
ventures may even move potential Chinese pirates to the opposite side of the
infringement equation.”).
395. See Keshia B. Haskins, Special 301 in China and Mexico: A Policy Which Fails to
Consider How Politics, Economics and Culture Affect Legal Change Under Civil Law Systems
of Developing Countries, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1125, 1169 (1999)
(“In joint ventures, United States investors work with local partners in foreign
countries who gain economic interests in keeping the intellectual property safe from
loss.” (quoting Frank Long, Joint Ventures: Different Kind of Union Protection, ARIZ. BUS.
GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1997, at 11 [hereinafter Long, Joint Ventures])); Long, Joint
Ventures, supra (explaining how American exporters use joint ventures to protect
their intellectual property). But see Groombridge, Political Economy of Intellectual
Property Rights, supra note 266, at 12 (“All too often it is the authorized manufacturer
who is invited in the infringing activities.”).
396. As one commentator has explained:
Foreign enterprises can reduce local protectionism by forming joint ventures
with their Chinese opponents. The Chinese partner is more likely to have a
better understanding of the nuances of political life in China, be more aware
of impending upheavals, and maintain the proper government contacts to
safeguard joint venture’s investments. Also, a local government is more
willing to take action when a foreign investor has a government-linked
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American investors to bridge their cultural differences, to obtain
397
access to the distribution network of their local partners, and to
take advantage of the personal connections, or guanxi, that are
398
essential to commercial success in China.
Moreover, the joint
ventures would alleviate the unemployment problem that may result
from the closure of pirate factories, a problem that is of major
concern to the local officials in light of the Asian financial crisis and
increased unemployment resulting from the downsizing of state399
operated enterprises.
Because of this unemployment problem,
some commentators suggested co-option of piracy factories as a
400
solution to the piracy problem.
Finally, to help win the acceptance and goodwill of the local
leaders and the Chinese people, American businesses can invest some
of their profits back into the local community in the form of cultural
401
or educational benefits.
These projects would not only demonstrate to the local officials the benefits of adequate intellectual
property protection, but would also allow local officials to benefit
402
from the success of foreign intellectual property businesses. These

partner and the government’s own interest is at stake.
Cheng, supra note 187, at 2010; see Haskins, supra note 395, at 1169 (noting that joint
ventures can protect foreign investors against loss in countries where political risks
are high).
397. See Cheng, supra note 187, at 2010.
398. See Haskins, supra note 395, at 1169; see also Kolton, supra note 316, at 451
(noting that guanxi are an integral aspect of doing business in the United States).
399. See Long, Joint Ventures, supra note 395; Cheetham, supra note 310, at 385
(stating that the local economies are concerned with “the employment, foreign
exchange, and increased industrial development provided by the counterfeiting
factories”).
400. Co-option serves two purposes:
First, it effectively “shuts down” the bogus operation while keeping
manufacturing capacity “employed.” The production of legitimate, quality
goods is achieved and a counterfeit operation has been eliminated with little
incentive to start others. Second, a strategy that employs the local work force
is good public relations, politically expedient and well received by local
governments and can be leveraged for future interests.
Clifford J. Shultz II & William Saporito, Protecting Intellectual Property: Strategies and
Recommendations to Deter Counterfeiting and Brand Piracy in Global Markets, 31 COLUM. J.
WORLD BUS. 18, 23 (1996); see also Griffin, supra note 392, at 188 (stating that cooption through buy-outs or joint ventures may help alleviate the piracy problem).
401. Motorola, for example, has contributed funds to help build primary schools
throughout China. See Doris Estelle Long, China’s IP Reforms Show Little Success: IP
Enforcement Remains Problematic, but Clever Owners Can Beat the Odds, IP WORLDWIDE,
Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 6 [hereinafter Long, China’s IP Reforms] (explaining that local
Chinese officials may be encouraged to protect intellectual property if foreign
intellectual property owners invest some profits back into the local community); see
also R. Michael Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards, Introduction to GLOBAL CONSENSUS,
GLOBAL CONFLICT, supra note 2, at 1, 27 (arguing for the investment of a portion of
the benefits the United States would gain from the elimination of piracy).
402. Long, China’s IP Reforms, supra note 401, at 6.
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projects would also help alleviate the xenophobic sentiments among
the Chinese people and their widespread skepticism toward Western
institutions.
Step Seven: Promote Individual Rights and the Rule of Law in China
Societies that have no respect for individual rights are unlikely to
403
tolerate private expressions or expressive activities.
Without such
toleration, people will have very limited incentives to create
expressions. Indeed, there is “an intimate link” between respecting
individual human rights and respecting a copyright system that values
404
and promotes an individual’s creative achievement. To believe in
intellectual property rights, one must accept, at least, some version of
405
individualism, reward, and commodification.
Thus, the United
States needs to continue its hard work in promoting individual rights
406
and civil liberties in China.
In fact, a well-functioning intellectual property regime will help
advance the United States’s longstanding interests in promoting
407
Consider copyright for
human rights and civil liberties in China.

403. See Alford, How Theory Does—and Does Not—Matter, supra note 265, at 17-18;
Naigen Zhang, Intellectual Property Law in China: Basic Policy and New Developments,
4 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 8 (1997) [hereinafter Zhang, Intellectual Property Law
in China] (attributing the delay of implementing copyright law to China’s concern
about controlling ideology by regulating publications). As Dean Garten explained:
If foreign governments do not seek to protect basic human rights, they are
more likely to ignore or circumvent other basic laws of great commercial
relevance, such as those that protect intellectual property rights, combat
corruption, and mandate the disclosure of critical financial information. If
the arrogance of governments that oppress their people transfers easily to
other areas.
Garten, supra note 48, at 75.
404. See Hamilton, TRIPS Agreement, supra note 249, at 618; see also Barbara Ringer,
Two Hundred Years of American Copyright Law, in ABA, 200 YEARS OF ENGLISH AND
AMERICAN PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW 117, 118 (1977) (stating that strong
copyright systems are a characteristic of free societies).
405. See Hamilton, TRIPS Agreement, supra note 249, at 617.
406. Cf. id. (“Individualism, as captured in the Western intellectual property
system, is the sine qua non for a society to recognize and honor personal liberty.”).
407. Mark Groombridge expressed his skepticism:
In light of th[e] pervasive statism, one should not interpret efforts by the
PRC leadership to protect IPR as evidence of a new-found elevation of the
individual or of individuals’ rights. Rather, just as the entire economic
reform effort is for the leadership a means to increase its power, recent
developments in IPR protection reflect an effort in nation-building. Public
statements about building a “knowledgeable economy” almost always reflect
those statist goals. In the words of a recent joint statement by the governor
of Guangdong Province and the mayors of Beijing and Shanghai, “Only
when it values and promotes a knowledge economy can China put itself in
an invincible position in the next century.”
Groombridge, Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 266, at 12.
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copyright
example.
Being the “engine of free expression,”
“provides an incentive for creative expression on a wide array of
political, social, and aesthetic issues, thus bolstering the discursive
409
foundations for democratic culture and civic association.”
It also
“supports a sector of creative and communicative activity that is
relatively free from reliance on state subsidy, elite patronage, and
410
cultural hierarchy.”
Because of the intertwined relationship

408. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
(stating that the Framers of the Constitution intended copyright to be the “engine of
free expression”).
409. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283,
288 (1996) [hereinafter Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Society]; see also ROBERT
BURNETT, THE GLOBAL JUKEBOX: THE INTERNATIONAL MUSIC INDUSTRY 115-16 (1996)
(noting that large cultural industries using an open system of production and
development may show significant expressive diversity despite ownership
concentration); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: THE LAW AND LORE OF
COPYRIGHT FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 236 (1994) (arguing that
copyright would promote “political as well as cultural diversity”); LYMAN RAY
PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’
RIGHTS 133 (1991) (explaining how copyright encourages the flow of ideas in a
democratic society); Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic
Approach to Copyright Law in Cyperspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 235
(arguing for a democratic approach to copyright law in Cyberspace); Leval, supra
note 282, at 1135 (noting that the underlying objectives of copyright parallel those of
the First Amendment); Netanel, Asserting Copyright’s Democratic Principle, supra note
375, at 271 (“[C]opyright law may make possible a relatively ‘open’ system of cultural
production, characterized by a significant level of innovation and diversity even
under oligopolistic conditions.”); id. at 277 (“[R]equiring authoritarian and
developing countries to implement proprietary copyright regimes modeled on those
of the West will, as a matter of course, engender global democracy.”). But see BEN H.
BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY (6th ed. 2000) (examing the chilling effects of
corporate media ownership); RONALD V. BETTIG, COPYRIGHTING CULTURE: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1996) (examining the power of the
wealthy few to expand their fortunes through the ownership and manipulation of
intellectual property).
410. Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Society, supra note 409, at 288; see
Hamilton, TRIPS Agreement, supra note 249, at 617-18 (arguing that the TRIPS
Agreement has the potential to forge greater democratization in transitional
societies); Netanel, Asserting Copyright’s Democratic Principles, supra note 375, at 267-72
(discussing the importance of an independent sector of authors and publishers to
democratic development); id. at 273 (arguing that copyright may help spark
democratic transition by undermining notions of uncritical obedience to political
and cultural authority). As Professor Netanel explained:
Such a sector may be vital to democratic development in four interrelated
ways. First, the sector’s financial independence from state patronage
enhances its ability to act as a watchdog of the state, to expose corruption
and authoritarian retrenchment and to level criticism of government
officials and their policies. Second, financial independence enables authors
and publishers to produce a greater variety of expression, free from official
notions of proper literature and art. Third, the presence of an indigenous
sector of political and cultural expression creates greater possibilities for
addressing local issues and developing a local democratic culture. As we
have seen, expression that is imported from abroad may help to undermine
authoritarian control. Yet, a sphere of public discourse consisting entirely of
imported expression would be unlikely to support local political and civic
organization and, particularly in more advanced stages of democratic
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between intellectual property and individual rights, one can hardly
promote intellectual property law reforms without strengthening
411
individual rights in the country.
Nevertheless, it is ill-advised to mix up the two issues on a trade
negotiation table. During his 1992 Presidential election campaign,
then-Governor Bill Clinton accused President George Bush of
412
“coddling dictators.”
He vowed to condition the MFN benefits
413
upon improvement in human rights conditions in China. By 1994,
he had accepted defeat and completely reversed his trade policy by
414
delinking human rights from such a policy. The whole incident not
only demonstrates China’s reluctance to accept human rights, or its
internal affairs, as a bargaining chip on a trade negotiation table, but
also shows the lack of long-term support from the American business
415
community over abstract issues like human rights.
Step Eight: Educate the Chinese Officials About Intellectual Property Rights
“For a national intellectual property system to work, there must
first be a judicial system that works, a precondition that is often
416
missing.” Thus, an intellectual property regime would not be fully
operational until the government officials understand what to
enforce, when to enforce, and why they need to enforce. At present,
“many Chinese officials, especially those at the local level, have failed
to understand the urgency of protecting individual [intellectual
417
To many of these officials, intellectual
property] interests.”
property laws were, more or less, unjustly forced upon China by the

development, would only intermittently and haphazardly confront local
officials and state policy. Fourth, and partly overlapping with the third
factor, relatively autonomous, indigenous authors and publishers contribute
to, and make up a significant part of, an independent civil society, a realm of
discourse and association that is widely seen as a vital component of
democratic culture and development.
Id. at 268 (footnote omitted).
411. See Hamilton, TRIPS Agreement, supra note 249, at 614 (“To understand
TRIPS, it is important to embrace an interdisciplinary approach, to widen the
copyright lens to include culture, politics, and human rights.”).
412. MANN, supra note 9, at 274.
413. See id. at 274-91.
414. See id. at 292-314.
415. See id. at 282, 302-03 (stating that the Clinton Administration failed to enlist
long-term support from the American business community for the Administration’s
human rights policy toward China).
416. Sherwood, Why a Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense, supra note
320, at 85.
417. Hu, supra note 69, at 105; see also Tiefenbrun, supra note 35, at 37 (“The
failure to reduce or eradicate piracy of intellectual property in China is also due to
the serious misconceptions of the very notion of ownership by the Chinese people
and by their government leaders.”).
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United States, rather than legitimately introduced by their leaders.
Once international attention is diverted and the pressure from
Chinese leaders dissipates, these officers will likely loosen their
enforcement of these “unjust” laws.
In addition, most Chinese judges lack experience and expertise in
intellectual property cases. The Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution
took away some of the most qualified members of the legal
418
profession, resulting in a majority of lawyers who are too young to
419
serve as judges.
Furthermore, many Chinese judges are retired
420
military officials who have no formal legal education.
In light of China’s inquisitorial judicial system, this lack of
experience and expertise threatens the effectiveness of the judicial
421
process.
Under the inquisitorial system, judges must often gather
422
Judges must also search confusing laws and
facts on their own.
423
regulations to determine which law to apply. Thus, a judge who has
inadequate training or experience be incompetent to perform these
tasks.
Apart from judges, China also suffers from a shortage of lawyers, in
424
Due to this shortage,
particular intellectual property lawyers.
businesses and individuals cannot obtain advice and services from
competent lawyers to protect and effectively enforce their intellectual
425
property rights in lawsuits and administrative proceedings.
Thus,
the shortage of lawyers poses a significant barrier to a well-enforced

418. See William P. Alford, Tasselled Loafers for Barefoot Lawyers: Transformation and
Tension in the World of Chinese Legal Workers [hereinafter Alford, Tasselled Loafers for
Barefoot Lawyers], in CHINA’S LEGAL REFORMS, supra note 355, at 22, 27-28; Kolton,
supra note 316, at 425 (emphasizing the devastating effect of the Cultural Revolution
on the legal profession); see also CHEN, supra note 386, at 30-33 (discussing the impact
of the Cultural Revolution on the Chinese legal system). See generally JUNG CHANG,
WILD SWANS: THREE DAUGHTERS OF CHINA 273-443 (1991), for an insightful personal
account of the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution.
419. See Kolton, supra note 316, at 450.
420. See id.; CHEN, supra note 386, at 37 n.84 (“Since 1957, judges were usually
recruited from demobilised military personnel and the public security organs, and
not from law schools.”).
421. See id.
422. See id.
423. See id.
424. See Yu, Progress, Problems, and Proposals, supra note 153, at 161; see also CHEN,
supra note 386, at 37; Alford, Tasselled Loafers for Barefoot Lawyers, supra note 418, at
30; Berkman, supra note 102, at 29. This shortage may be alleviated once China lifts
the geographic ban on overseas lawyers and opens up the legal profession to foreign
law firms. “So far, branches of overseas law firms have been set up in only eight cities
including Beijing and Shanghai among all the 15 Chinese cities which have
government permission to hold overseas law firms.” China: Geographic Restrictions on
Lawyers to Be Lifted After WTO, CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK, May 4, 1999, available at
1999 WL 17728683.
425. See Yu, Progress, Problems, and Proposals, supra note 153, at 161.
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intellectual property regime. This lack of enforcement greatly
reduces the deterrent effect and economic incentives generated by
the intellectual property regime.
In the early 1990s, the Chinese government began to enact new
426
427
428
laws to promote professionalism in judges, lawyers, procurators,

426. See RONALD C. BROWN, UNDERSTANDING CHINESE COURT AND LEGAL PROCESS:
LAW WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS 101-07 (1997) (discussing the attempt to
professionalize judges through the Judges Law). The Judges Law aims “to ensure
that the People’s Courts independently exercise judicial authority according to law
and that judges perform their functions and duties according to law, to enhance the
quality of judges, and to realize the scientific administration of judges.” JUDGES LAW
OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. 1 (1995), translated in BROWN, supra, at 292,
294 [hereinafter JUDGES LAW].
427. Professor Brown explained how the Law on Lawyers help professionalize
lawyers:
The Lawyer’s Law . . . seeks to further professionalize the lawyers in China by
recognizing their increased autonomy by refining their role from “state
worker” to that of a certified provider of legal services, and, also by
establishing qualifications and standards of conduct, and creating a
disciplinary commission within the All-China Lawyers’ Association (ACLA)
acting to enforce those standards. A lawyer’s professional is supervised by
the . . . ACLA . . . and lawyers can be sanctioned by the ACLA or can have
their licenses suspended or revoked by the Ministry of Justice’s Judicial
Administration Department; lawyers are further regulated by permitting
compensation for malpractice where a lawyer’s error causes loss to clients;
and the law from being used or slandering of competitors. The law also sets
forth regulations on the operation of law firms, the management of attorneys
by their own association, and provisions for state-assisted legal services for
qualifying individuals.
BROWN, supra note 426, at 116 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 115-17 (discussing
the attempt to professionalize lawyers through the Law on Lawyers and through
licensing). Article 1 of the Law on Lawyers states the law’s objectives:
This Law is enacted in order to improve the system governing lawyers, to
ensure that lawyers practise according to law, to standardize acts of lawyers,
to safeguard the lawful rights and interests of parties, to ensure the correct
implementation of law, and to enable lawyers to play a positive role in the
development of the socialist legal system.
LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON LAWYERS art. 1 (1996), translated in
BROWN, supra note 426, at 335, 335. Professor Brown described the development of
lawyers since the reopening of China:
There were very few lawyers in China until the 1979 modernization. In 1980
provisional regulations were issued and in 1986, national exams were
introduced. The number of Chinese lawyers has now grown to about 89,000,
with a goal of having 150,000 lawyers by the year 2000. Presently there are
about 7,000 law firms, with non-government firms numbering about 1,611;
however, this number is expected to expand rapidly under this new law and
the country’s economic reforms.
BROWN, supra note 426, at 115-16 (footnotes omitted); see also Alford, Tasselled Loafers
for Barefoot Lawyers, supra note 418 (examining the transformation of Chinese lawyers
and the implications of such transformation for further development of the Chinese
legal profession and the larger academic debate on law reform and legal profession);
China: Law Profession Attracts More Chinese Applicants, CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK,
Mar. 11, 1998, available at 1998 WL 22707411 (estimating that there will be 250,000
to 300,000 lawyers by 2010).
428. See BROWN, supra note 426, at 107-10 (discussing the attempt to
professionalize procurators through the Public Procurators Law). The Public
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429

The Chinese government also
and law enforcement officers.
sought to promote the rule of law by ensuring judicial independence
430
“in accordance with the law.”
Even though these developments

Procurators Law aims “to ensure that the People’s Procuratorates exercise legal
supervision and independently exercise procuratorial authority according to law and
that public procurators perform their functions and duties according to law, to
enhance the quality of public procurators, and to realize the scientific administration
of public procurators.” PUBLIC PROCURATORS LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
art. 1 (1995), translated in BROWN, supra note 426, at 313, 315.
429. See BROWN, supra note 426, at 110-15 (discussing the attempt to
professionalize law enforcement officers through the People’s Police Law). Article 1
of the People’s Police Law provides:
The present Law is enacted in accordance with the Constitution for the
purpose of safeguarding State security, maintaining public order, protecting
the lawful rights and interests of citizens, strengthening the building of the
contingent of the people’s police, strictly administering the police,
enhancing the quality of the people’s police, ensuring the people’s police’s
exercise of their functions and power according to law, and ensuring the
smooth progress of reform, opening up and the socialist modernization
drive.
PEOPLE’S POLICE LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. 1 (1995), translated in
BROWN, supra note 426, at 303, 305.
430. See XIANFA art. 126 (1982) (“The People’s courts exercise judicial power
independently, in accordance with the provisions of the law, and are not subject to
interference by any administrative organ, public organization or individual.”); CIVIL
PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. 6 (1991), translated in
BROWN, supra note 426, at 174, 177 (“The people’s courts shall try civil cases
independently in accordance with the law, and shall be subject to no interference by
any administrative organ, public organization, or individual.”); JUDGES LAW, supra
note 426, art. 1 (ensuring the People’s courts independently exercise their judicial
authority in accordance with the law), translated in BROWN, supra note 426, at 294; id.
art. 43 (providing that judges can file charges against those who interfere with the
courts and stipulating that those who interfere will be investigated), translated in
BROWN, supra note 426, at 301; ORGANIC LAW OF PEOPLE’S COURTS art. 4 (1983),
translated in BROWN, supra note 426, at 150, 151 (“The People’s courts shall exercise
judicial power independently, in accordance with the provisions of the law, and shall
not be subject to interference by any administrative organ, public organization or
individual.”).
Professor Brown explained the meaning of “in accordance with the law” and the
differences between unfettered judicial independence and judicial independence “in
accordance with the law”:
The meaning of the term “in accordance with the law” must be understood
in historical and political context. Since “Liberation,” there had been a
practice of courts operating as an arm of the state and under the “guidance
of the Party (and the military at various times) to control the illegal activities
of citizens. In 1957, at the time of the Anti-Rightist Movement, advocates of
judicial independence were purged as persons who were undermining party
control. Over the next decade, Party control over adjudication of cases was
institutionalized and in some cases the three judicial institutions (courts,
procuracy, and public security) were integrated or at least their activities
were coordinated under the Political-Legal Committee of the party. During
most of the years of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), law and the courts
were not present in any recognizably “legitimate” form. That period was
brought to an end by the arrest of the “Gang of Four” in 1976 and the
installation of new leadership under Deng Xiaoping in 1978 and the Gang of
Four’s trial in 1980-1981. Thus, in the period of 1949-1979 it was clear that
the court system had a large political element and, was under “close
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were impressive and encouraging, courts are still marred by the
431
limited independence of the judicial branch, the intertwining
432
relationship between the court and the Chinese Communist Party,

guidance” and direction of the Party.
In 1979, the Central Committee of the Party issued a directive that
hereinafter the Party would not directly intervene in day-to-day operations of
the court or in individual cases, but rather would monitor judicial work and
exercise leadership only under general policy guidance. This indirect
influence would come through policy directives, nomination (and in effect,
selection) of appropriate persons for judicial positions, and general
supervision through political-legal committees. Additionally, in practice,
during that period the Party may still have provided some guidance on some
“important or difficult” cases, either through its own initiative, upon request,
or through documents.
In sum, recent history shows the role of law and the courts in Chinese
society (and the role of government and Party in that process) has varied, as
would the meaning also of “in accordance with the law.” However, since
1979, there has been a generally consistent pattern, in the vast majority of
cases, of moving the law and the courts from being an instrument of
government control to that of also being an arbiter of civil, economic, and
administrative disputes.
In addition to the above political facets defining and influencing “judicial
independence,” it must be remembered . . . that in China’s legislative system
of government, the NPC (and through it, the Standing Committee) is the
highest government organ, and the Supreme People’s Court is subordinate
to it on matters of “judicial interpretation.” That is the law; and, therefore,
“in accordance with the law” incorporates that reality.
BROWN, supra note 426, at 127-29 (footnotes omitted).
For discussions of the development of the rule of law in China, see generally
BROWN, supra note 426; CHINA’S LEGAL REFORMS, supra note 355; DOMESTIC LAW
REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA (Pitman B. Potter ed., 1994); THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF
LAW IN CHINA (Karen G. Turner et al. eds., 2000); RONALD C. KEITH, CHINA’S
STRUGGLE FOR THE RULE OF LAW (1994); STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL
REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO (1999); Stanley Lubman, Studying Contemporary Chinese
Law: Limits, Possibilities and Strategy, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 293 (1991).
431. See XIANFA art. 128 (1982) (amended Mar. 29, 1993) (“The Supreme People’s
Court is responsible to the National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee.
Local People’s courts at various levels are responsible to the organs of state power
which created them.”); BROWN, supra note 426, at 35 (arguing that the constitutional
basis of the judicial system in China is not separation of powers, but a “division of
functions and responsibilities” under the guidance of state power organs and the
Chinese Communist Party); see also id. at 125 (“Because of the dual obligations to
state and client, concerns were noted regarding loyalty, confidentiality, and legal
constraints on professional ethics and conduct.”); CORNE, supra note 320, at 141
(“Administrative interpretation is not only the most important mode of legal
interpretation in the PRC, it is in effect an authoritative supplement and accretion to
legislation.”).
432. Professor Brown explained this intertwined relationship:
[T]he governmental congresses and standing committees are comprised of
members primarily selected by Party members through a separate Party
congress mechanism.
Party committees, such as the Political-Legal
Committee, “supervise” the public security (police), procuratorates, and the
courts. Sometimes, the heads of these organs are appointed to the PoliticalLegal Committee. Thus, the supervisory responsibility can become complex
with, for example, the head of the police sitting on the Political-Legal
Committee supervising the procuratorate which is responsible to supervise
the police. Though this general enigma may be made more transparent,
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the judges’
the court’s vulnerability to outside influence,
434
435
susceptibility to bribery and corruption, underfunding, abuse of
436
government officials, and local protectionism.
In addition, these
legal developments failed to keep up with China’s current economic
437
Due to the need for specialized knowledge, the
explosion.

how it actually plays out in practice will vary by locale, depending on “who is
wearing what official hat or hats.”
BROWN, supra note 426, at 8; see also JUDGES LAW, supra note 426, art. 9(4) (stating that
a judge must have fine political quality), translated in BROWN, supra note 426, at 295.
433. See BROWN, supra note 426, at 129-30 (“In a country that appreciates loyalty
and guanxi (connections), pressure on judges to be responsive to political influences
is inherent in the process.”); CORNE, supra note 320, at 253 (indicating that the trial
judge is susceptible to outside pressure and that the judge’s decisions can be
overridden by an adjudication committee with the local people’s court); Berkman,
supra note 102, at 24 (“Courts depend on local governments for resources, and all
personnel, even judges, are beholden to local politicos for their jobs.”). As one
commentator explained:
Chinese judges and court officers do not always enjoy sufficient
independence to avoid the intervention of such interested parties as do local
officials, senior government officials, and influential local businesses. Local
officials derive their power to shape the outcome of a case from the fact that
those officials control the expenditures of the courts as well as the housing
and employment opportunities of the judges’ children. Succumbing to local
pressures, judges may unreasonably deny motions for transfer of forum,
render judgments highly favorable to local parties and refuse to respect
former judgments by other courts.
Cheng, supra note 187, at 1992-93. But see JUDGES LAW, supra note 426, art. 8(3)
(stating that judges shall not be removed, demoted, dismissed, or sanctioned
“without statutory basis and without going through statutory procedures”), translated
in BROWN, supra note 426, at 295.
434. See BROWN, supra note 426, at 130 (stating that Chinese judges do not receive
high compensation and are therefore susceptible to bribery and corruption). In the
last few years, China has made a significant effort to combat corruption. See, e.g.,
China Issues New Codes on Prosecution of Corruption, CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK, Sept.
17, 1999, available at 1999 WL 17731146; Tom Korski, China Premier Pledges Drive
Against Corruption, Economic and Copyright Crimes, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily
(BNA), at D2 (Mar. 5, 1997) (“More than 400 senior Communist officials have been
imprisoned or executed for corruption in the past six months, by official estimate,
while 2,522 state employees have been fired for ‘disciplinary reasons.’ . . . Chinese
prosecutors initiated probes into more than 78,000 corruption cases last year,
according to state agencies.”); Anthony Kuhn, China Executes Ex-Official for Corruption,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2000, at A1 (reporting on the execution of a former vice
chairman of the National People’s Congress who was convicted of taking five million
dollars in bribes). Unfortunately, like the problem with intellectual property rights,
the Chinese government has yet to succeed in this area.
435. See BROWN, supra note 426, at 130; id. at 37 (explaining that judicial
administration may be hampered by inadequate funding of Chinese courts and that
court officials may succumb to political pressure in exchange for funding from
outside sources).
436. See id. at 130; CHEN, supra note 386, at 217 (“Judges who without fear or
favour apply the law to the detriment of local interests may . . . suffer in terms of
their career prospects or their employment benefits. Reduction of funding for the
local court is also a threat that its members have to live with.”).
437. See Alford, Tasselled Loafers for Barefoot Lawyers, supra note 418, at 30 (arguing
that the number of licensed legal workers failed to meet the demand of its fastgrowing economy).
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increasing importance of information products, the globalization
trend, and the proliferation of the Internet and other new
communications technologies, the supply of intellectual property
lawyers is significantly below the demand for legal services.
To help China cope with this shortage, the United States needs to
438
provide assistance programs that help China train its legal workers.
Examples of these programs include regular training programs that
provide the basic understanding of intellectual property rights and
general expertise in the drafting, implementation, and enforcement
of intellectual property laws; advanced seminars that help people
keep pace with the new legal and technological developments in the
country and abroad; and regional, national, and international
conferences where policymakers, government officials, judges, and
lawyers share information regarding their experiences and difficulties
in enforcing intellectual property rights in their region. To minimize
logistical difficulties, these events can be organized with distance
learning and new media technologies. For example, a bilingual
technical assistance website that targets local judges and officials
would provide the needed basic understanding of intellectual
property rights. Likewise, digital videoconferencing equipment
would allow leading intellectual property scholars in the United
States to simultaneously educate people in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin,
and Guangzhou. Nevertheless, due to the limited Internet access
enjoyed by the Chinese people, in particular those in suburban and
rural areas, and the very stringent information control policy of the
439
Chinese government, these distance learning programs would not
be successful unless the Chinese authorities are willing to cooperate
with the foreign organizers.
The United States can also improve the professionalism of the legal
workers in China by encouraging them to create professional

438. WIPO has been particularly active in providing technical assistance and in
training government officials, judges, and the general populace in the less developed
countries. Since its formation, WIPO has “expand[ed] greatly the scope of its
teaching regarding the purpose, implementation, and enforcement of intellectual
property policy in order to help developing countries meet their TRIPS agreement
obligations.” RYAN, supra note 251, at 125. By 1992, 23,000 people had participated
in its training seminars. See id. at 130. To promote the use of new communications
technologies, WIPO has been very active in applying these new technologies to their
programs. The website of the WIPO Worldwide Academy is http://www.wipo.int/
academy/en.htm.
439. See Peter K. Yu, Barriers to Foreign Investment in the Chinese Internet Industry,
GIGALAW.COM, Mar. 2001, at http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2001/yu-2001-03pl.html (discussing content regulations in the Chinese Internet industry); Sheila
Tefft, China Attempts to Have Its Net and Censor It Too, CHRIST. SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 5,
1996, at 1 (stating that China seeks to enjoy the benefits of the Internet without
surrendering its fiercely held control of information).
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associations and to become members of national and transnational
440
In addition, the United States can
epistemic communities.
encourage and assist the Chinese courts, in particular those in small
towns and rural areas, to set up specialized branches to address
441
intellectual property rights and to publish their decisions (in both
English and Chinese) to guide the general public and foreign
442
businesses.
Since 1993, intellectual property trial divisions have
been set up in the High People’s Courts of the cities of Beijing,
Shanghai, and Tianjin, and of the Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangsu, and
443
Hainan Provinces.
China also confers upon the intellectual
property appellate division in the Beijing Municipal Higher People’s
444
Court the exclusive appellate jurisdiction for the entire country.
Reminiscient of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, this centralizing arrangement not only provides greater
judicial expertise in determining intellectual property rights, but also
445
more uniform decisions regarding infringement and remedies. In
light of the Chinese civil law tradition, in which prior cases do not
446
have the force of precedent, uniform decisions are particularly

440. See RYAN, supra note 251, at 15.
441. See Yu, Progress, Problems, and Proposals, supra note 153, at 161; see also
Lagerqvist & Riley, supra note 311, at 32 (stating that judges in the intellectual
property courts are specially trained to hear intellectual property cases, are of
particularly high standard, and have scientific qualifications and foreign language
skills).
442. See ZHENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA, supra note 123,
for a collection of and commentary on important early intellectual property cases in
China.
443. See Zhang, Intellectual Property Law in China, supra note 403, at 15.
444. See Butterton, supra note 223, at 1101.
445. Some commentators argue that the centralizing arrangement made the law
less arbitrary by limiting the discretion of judges:
[M]any laws and regulations are broadly drafted to encompass general
principles and often do not include mechanisms necessary for consistent
interpretation of such principles. Therefore, courts in China often find
themselves armed with some discretion in applying broad principles to
individual cases. The adjudication of such cases in turn may influence other
court decisions, but Chinese legal decisions are not usually reported publicly
and are therefore unavailable for guidance.
DONG ET AL., supra note 359, at 5.
446. Professor Brown disagreed:
The fact seems to be that Chinese court decisions have elements of both
common-law and civil law. When the author raised that point with President
Ren Jianxin and asked which he thought dominated, President Ren’s answer
in reflection was—“Neither, it is Chinese law with Chinese characteristics.”
And so it is; but nevertheless those “Chinese characteristics” seem to carry
with them decisions which have de facto binding and precedential effect.
Lower court judges are keen to follow what the Supreme People’s Court
has indicated is the “absolutely correct” way to interpret the law. Higher
courts have the obvious avenue of enforcing that result through the systems
of appeal and adjudication supervision. Also, in cases using the adjudication
committee, the collegial panel must implement the decision of the
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important.
Step Nine: Educate the Chinese Populace About Intellectual Property Rights
Laws alone are insufficient, no matter how well they are enforced.
These laws must be accompanied by a legal culture that fosters
voluntary compliance. Instead of constantly coercing China to
redraft its laws and introduce new legal institutions, the United States
should promote underlying values that support voluntary
447
448
These values include legitimacy and morality.
To
compliance.
provide legitimacy, the United States must abandon its coercive
policy, which drastically undercuts the legitimacy of intellectual
449
property rights. Such a policy makes the Chinese people suspicious
of the willingness of their government to adhere to and enforce the
450
new legal regime forced upon their country.
To provide morality,
the United States can educate the Chinese populace about the

committee. Whether “administrative in nature” and/or “precedential-infunction,” the evidence supports the court “decisions” are used as authority
and as “precedent.” “Precedent is defined as a “rule of law established for
the first time by a court for a particular type of case and thereafter referred
to in deciding similar cases.” Interestingly, the Supreme People’s Court has
provided: “[A]ll opinions and instructions given by the Supreme People’s
Court on the application of laws shall be followed, but it is not appropriate,
however, to cite them directly.”
BROWN, supra note 426, at 82 (footnotes omitted); see also NANPING LIU, OPINIONS OF
THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT: JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION IN CHINA (1997) (examining
the opinions of the Supreme People’s Court and the role they played within the
Chinese legal system); Nanping Liu, “Legal Precedents” with Chinese Characteristics:
Published Cases in the Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court, 5 J. CHINESE L. 107 (1991)
(arguing that the decisions reported in the Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court
may carry force as precedents).
447. Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological
Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 219, 234 (1997); see CORNE, supra note 320, at
8 (“Law’s effectiveness depends on shared social values. Law is apparently an
autonomous agency which depends on and mirrors particular social and cultural
conditions.”); see also SELL, supra note 333, at 177 (“If targeted countries do not
accept the value orientation preferred by the powerful state, and no politically
influential domestic constituency favors the new policies, one can expect
nonimplementation and robust domestic resistance.”); see id. at 212 (“The fact that
developing countries have not vigorously enforced these new policies suggests that
domestic opposition is still robust.”); Geller, supra note 300, at 203 (noting that a
full-scale copyright law that is bolstered by widespread supporting values would be
more effective than police measures).
448. See Tyler, supra note 447, at 224 (“Morality is concerned with an individual’s
personal feelings about what is right or wrong. Legitimacy involves one’s feelings
that one ought to obey the law.”).
449. Cf. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 43, at 127 (“Legitimacy . . . depends on the
extent to which the [policy] (1) emanates from a fair and accepted procedure, (2) is
applied equally and without invidious discrimination, and (3) does not offend
minimum substantive standards of fairness and equity.”); id. (arguing that the
conception of legitimacy “carries more than faint echoes of the core U.S.
constitutional principles of due process and equal protection of the laws.”).
450. See Tyler, supra note 447, at 224.
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rationales behind intellectual property protection and the wrongful
451
nature of appropriating other’s intellectual property. As Professor
Litman pointed out insightfully:
People do seem to buy into copyright norms, but they don’t
translate those norms into the rules that the copyright statute does;
they find it very hard to believe that there’s really a law out there
that says the stuff the copyright law says. . . . People don’t obey laws
that they don’t believe in. It isn’t necessarily that they behave
lawlessly, or that they’ll steal whatever they can if they think they
can get away with it. Most people try to comply, at least
substantially, with what they believe the law to say. If they don’t
believe the law says what it in fact says, though, they won’t obey it—
not because they are protesting its provisions, but because it
452
doesn’t stick in their heads.

To help promote a sustainable intellectual property regime, the
United States needs to make the Chinese aware of the benefits of
intellectual property rights and the damages inadequate intellectual
453
property protection can inflict upon the growing Chinese economy.

451. See id. at 226 (“[One crucial problem regarding the piracy problem] is the
lack of a public feeling that breaking intellectual property laws is wrong. In the
absence of such a conception, there is little reason for people to follow intellectual
property laws.”); Introduction to PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA,
supra note 140, at 1, 4-5 (“The Chinese obey laws and observe rights if they are
persuaded that it will be in their best interest to do so, just as people everywhere
do.”); Steven Mufson, In Fight for Intellectual Rights in China, Pirates Still Winning,
WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1996, at A29 (“China has a good structure as far as legislation
goes . . . . The main problem is education. People don’t think of intellectual
property as property like other property.” (quoting Bian Zizhen, a patent consultant
with New China Consultants)). For efforts to educate the Chinese populace, see, for
example, China: Sino-US Cooperation to Promote Use of Original Software, CHINA BUS.
INFO. NETWORK, July 10, 1998, available at 1998 WL 13493308 (reporting on the joint
effort by the Chinese Software Alliance and the Business Software Alliance to
promote the use of original software in China); China: Hong Kong Strengthen IPR
Protection Through Education China: Sino-US Cooperation to Promote Use of Original
Software, CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK, May 5, 1998, available at 1998 WL 7561690
(reporting on efforts by the Intellectual Property Department of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region to educate school children on intellectual property
rights). See also Mark Evans, Copyright Violators at Odds with GATT, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Feb. 25, 1994, at 22, available at LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File (“Beijing
has tried to promote its efforts through an aggressive propaganda campaign and
media reports.”).
452. Jessica Litman, Copyright Noncompliance (Or Why We Can’t “Just Say Yes” to
Licensing), 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 237, 238-39 (1997); see Hamilton, TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 249, at 616 (“Intellectual property is nothing more than a
socially-recognized, but imaginary, set of fences and gates. People must believe in it
for it to be effective.”); see also Jessica Litman, Copyright as Myth, 53 U. PITT. L. REV.
235 (1991) (examining the difference between the prevailing public myth of
copyright and existing copyright statute and case law); see also Faison, China Turns
Blind Eye, supra note 8, at D1 (“We take copyright violations very seriously, but when
it comes to copying a disk, most Chinese people don’t see what’s wrong.” (quoting
Xu Guoji, senior official in Shanghai’s Industrial and Commercial Administration)).
453. See Hu, supra note 69, at 106 (“[E]ffective enforcement of copyrights in
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The United States also needs to alert the Chinese to the harmful
effects of using counterfeit products and make them aware that any
long-term costs of copyright infringement would ultimately outweigh
454
the short-term benefits.
Interestingly, “[f]or all its much ballyhooed expressions of
concern, neither the U.S. government nor many of the companies
driving [the American foreign intellectual property] policy . . . have
made any substantial attempt . . . to communicate to the Chinese why
455
better intellectual property protection would be in their interest.”
This lack of efforts may be attributable to two reasons. First, the
American political system tends to reward short-term results, rather
than long-term results. Thus, policymakers are reluctant to focus on
long-term policies such as providing education at the grassroots
456
level. Second, education is a public good. Most companies tend to
free ride on each other’s efforts without incurring any substantial
investment. Indeed, this market failure provides one of the major
457
economic justifications for intellectual property protection.

China requires not only enhanced efforts to combat illegal piracy but also increase
public awareness of the damage that inadequate copyright protection does to the
Chinese economy.”).
454. See Long, China’s IP Reforms, supra note 401.
455. Alford, Making the World Safe for What?, supra note 254, at 142; see Hu, supra
note 69, at 111 (“Active involvement by U.S. companies and lawyers, for example[,]
through special seminars, exchange programs, mock proceedings, and other
assistance to the Chinese media, will expedite the training process.”). One
commentator argued for a more proactive approach by U.S. companies, rather than
relying on the government to act:
Bilateral agreements can create resentment between Chinese citizens and
policy makers. However, U.S. companies can promote their interests within
China without the appearance of imperialism by joining together with
international organizations. The Chinese government may be pressured
more effectively by multinational, industry-based organizations than by
individual companies. Currently the Motion Picture Association of America
(MPAA) and the Recording Industry Association of America have
successfully joined with foreign counterparts to lobby for anti-piracy
programs in individual countries. Other members of the intellectual
property community should follow their lead. International organizations
should act as a unified group in China to educate consumers, retailers, and
governments; monitor perpetrators; provide arbitration centers; initiate
legislation; and pressure local governments. Unified activism can be
effective where governmental pressure is not.
Griffin, supra note 392, at 190.
456. See JOHN M. KEYNES, MONETARY REFORM 88 (1924) (“In the long run we are all
dead.”).
457. Professor Sterk illustrated the public goods problem and the danger of free
riding:
If the author of a creative work cannot prevent copying, any potential copyist
has an incentive to reproduce the creative work so long as the market price
for the work is greater than the marginal cost of reproduction. As a result,
the market price for copies of the work would approach the marginal cost of
reproduction. If copies were indistinguishable in quality from the original,
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Finally, to reduce the skepticism of the Chinese people toward
Western intellectual property rights, the United States can point out
the compatibility between the Chinese culture and Western
458
Consider, for example, the
intellectual property notions.
Confucian tradition of interaction with the past. Under this
tradition, copying is an important living process through which
people acquire understanding to guide their behavior, to improve
themselves through self-cultivation, and to transmit such knowledge
459
to the posterity.
Even though the Chinese civilization emphasizes
this tradition, Chinese poets and literary theorists have disagreed as
460
Indeed, “as Confucius
to the extent of the reproduction.
demonstrated in undertaking to edit the Classics and to comment on
them in the Analects, transmission . . . entailed selection and
adaptation if it was to be meaningful to oneself, one’s
461
contemporaries, and one’s successors.”
Thus, traditional Chinese
culture does not call for verbatim reproduction. Rather, it calls for
transformative use of preexisting works that is tailored to the user’s
needs and conditions. Such use, and the ability to do so, will
demonstrate the user’s comprehension of and devotion to the core of

the market price for the original, too, would approach the marginal cost of
reproduction. At that price, however, the author would realize no financial
return on his investment in creating the work. In this world, only authors
unconcerned with financial return would produce creative works.
Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1204
(1996) (footnotes omitted); see also Landes & Posner, supra note 283, at 326
(discussing the economic rationale justifying copyright protection). See generally
Earl R. Brubaker, Free Ride, Free Revelation, or Golden Rule?, 18 J.L. & ECON. 147 (1975),
for an excellent discussion of the free-riding problem.
458. Compare XIANFA, supra note 430, art. 20 (1982) (amended Mar. 29, 1993)
(“The state promotes the development of the natural and social sciences,
disseminates knowledge of science and technology, and commends and rewards
achievements in scientific research as well as technological innovations and
inventions.”), and id. art. 47 (“The state encourages and assists creative endeavours
conducive to the interests of the people that are made by citizens engaged in
education, science, technology, literature, art and other cultural work.”), with U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
459. See ALFORD, supra note 23, at 28 (“[I]nteraction with the past is one of the
distinctive modes of intellectual and imaginative endeavor in traditional Chinese
culture.” (internal quotations omitted) (quoting ARTISTS AND TRADITIONS: USES OF
THE PAST IN CHINESE CULTURE xi (Christian Murck ed., 1976))). The Chinese
believed that “[t]he essence of human understanding had long since been discerned
by those who had gone before and, in particular, by the sage rulers collectively
referred to as the Ancients who lived in a distant, idealized ‘golden age.’” Id.
Subsequent generations thus have to interact thoroughly with the past in order to
acquire this understanding to guide their behavior, to improve through selfcultivation, and to transmit such knowledge to the posterity. See id. at 25.
460. See ALFORD, supra note 23, at 26-29 (noting that Chinese poets and literary
theorists disagreed on the appropriate use of past works).
461. Id. at 25.
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the Chinese civilization and his or her ability to distinguish the
462
present from the past through original thoughts.
This emphasis of transformative use is similar to what the U.S.
463
Supreme Court pronounced in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. In
Campbell, a music publisher brought a copyright infringement action
against the rap band, 2 Live Crew, for its salacious rap parody of the
464
song “Oh, Pretty Woman.” Emphasizing that transformative works
are important to promote the constitutional goal of copyright, the
Court held that the rap band’s rendition of the song constituted fair
465
use and did not infringe upon the publisher’s copyright.
Step Ten: Be Patient with China During the Transitional Period
The effort to foster serious, widespread, and long-term adherence
to a new regime “entails significant transformations in a people’s
attitudes toward intellectual creation, toward property, toward rights,
toward the vindication of such rights through formal legal action,
466
toward government and so forth.”
The new intellectual property
laws were not enacted in China until the mid-1980s. Even if one
ignores the inertia of the longstanding copying culture, the public’s
general understanding of intellectual property is still vague and
467
weak
It took the United States more than two centuries, five
468
469
copyright acts, five patent statutes, and numerous trademark and
unfair competition laws to get to where it is, not to mention the
English and French works American authors had “borrowed” when
470
the United States was still a less developed country.
Even in this

462. Cf. id. at 29 (pointing out that the Chinese view the use of past works as a
demonstration of one’s understanding of the material).
463. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
464. See id. at 572-73.
465. See id. at 579 (“[T]he goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is
generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at
the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines
of copyright . . . .” (citations and footnotes omitted)).
466. Alford, How Theory Does—and Does Not—Matter, supra note 265, at 21; see
SHERWOOD, supra note 344, at 193-96 (discussing the difficulty of shifting the mindset
of the people in less developed countries with respect to intellectual property rights).
467. See Hu, supra note 69, at 110.
468. Since its adoption in 1790, the Copyright Act has undergone major revisions
in 1831, 1870, 1909, and 1976.
469. In 1790, Congress enacted the first patent statute. Subsequently, the statute
has undergone major revisions in 1793, 1836, 1870, and 1952.
470. See BOYLE, supra note 5, at 3 (noting that the United States used to be the
biggest pirate in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries); Alford, Making
the World Safe for What?, supra note 254, at 146 (stating that the United States has been
“notorious for its singular” and “cavalier attitude toward the intellectual property of
foreigners” during the time when it was a less developed country); Bender &
Sampliner, supra note 286, at 255 (stating that the United States failed to observe
foreign intellectual property rights during its formative period and did not sign any
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information age, where changes occur at an astonishing pace, it is
unreasonable for the United States to expect drastic and immediate
changes in Chinese attitudes toward intellectual property rights or
the sudden emergence of those institutions needed to enforce and
471
nuture those attitudes. Thus, the United States needs to be patient
with China’s development efforts while China is undergoing
transition to a new intellectual property regime.
During this critical transitional period, the United States can help
China make its transition by sacrificing some of its short-term profits
and economic advantage. For example, American manufacturers
and publishers can price their products lower in Chinese markets
472
than in other Western developed countries. Such bargain pricing is
particularly important for educational products, where access to these
products is crucial to the country’s development and for raising the
living standards of its people. Considering that the Chinese can only
afford lower priced products, bargain pricing would also be
economically sound as long as these bargain products do not enter
the United States as grey market goods. In fact, American businesses

international intellectual property agreements until the end of the nineteenth
century).
471. See Alford, How Theory Does—and Does Not—Matter, supra note 265, at 21;
Carole Ganz Brown & Francis W. Rushing, Intellectual Property Rights in 1990s, in
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS, supra note 369, at 1, 14 (“[I]ncreased protection is not
to be expected tomorrow, and the movement will be evolutionary rather than
revolutionary. Strategies to advance protection should take long-range approaches,
say, a five to ten year time frame.”); Brauchli & Kahn, supra note 125, at 1 (“[Building
a functional intellectual property regime is] like building a house. . . . You can have
the house structure all set up, very beautiful. But then, you need electricity and
water pipes. That takes more time.” (quoting Li Cahngxu, head of China United
Intellectual Property Investigation Center)); see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5,
arts. 65-66, 33 I.L.M. at 1222 (providing a five-year transitional period for developing
countries and an 11-year transitional period for the least developed countries).
Interestingly, the colonial British government was more patient than the
contemporary American government. In a letter to his minister in Beijing, Lord
Stanley, the British Foreign Minster, cautioned:
We must not expect the Chinese, either the Government or the people, at
once to see things in the same light as we see them; we must bear in mind
that we have obtained our knowledge by experience extending over many
years, and we must lead and not force the Chinese to the adoption of a
better system. We must reconcile ourselves to waiting for the gradual
development of that system, and content ourselves with reserving for revision
at a future period . . . .
Letter from Lord Stanley to Rutherford Alcock (Aug. 17, 1867) quoted in HSÜ, supra
note 158, at 297.
472. See RYAN, supra note 251, at 80-81; see also Donaldson & Weiner, supra note
312, at 433 (asserting that one approach to stop piracy is to offer the affected people
a legitimate way to earn a living); Don Goves, Warner Bros., MGM Dips into China Vid
Market, DAILY VARIETY, Feb. 21, 1997, at 1, 66 (stating that Warner Bros. and MGM
have entered a licensing deal with a Chinese government-owned conglomerate to
release low-priced video products dubbed in Mandarin).
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can lower their business costs by manufacturing their products in
China, thus taking advantage of the lower labor, production, and
473
distribution costs.
Moreover, counterfeiters are business people who are motivated by
474
profits and who monitor the market for business opportunities. In
mathematical terms, “the total cost of the crime includes the cost of
producing and distributing the fakes and the cost of paying penalties,
weighed against the embarrassment of being caught, the probability
of being convicted, and the severity or inconvenience of any non475
monetary penalties that are likely to be imposed.”
A lower price
and thus a lower profit margin would eventually take away the
476
counterfeiters’ incentives to make pirate goods. The smaller price
difference between legitimate and illicit products would also
discourage the local people from buying counterfeit products,
477
provided the consumers can distinguish between the two.
American manufacturers and publishers can also attract consumers
by providing them with better products or post-sale benefits that are
not available to purchasers of counterfeit goods, such as warranty
service, replacement part guarantees, free upgrades, and contests or
478
giveaways. Like people anywhere, the Chinese want to receive value

473. See RYAN, supra note 251, at 81.
474. See Lagerqvist & Riley, supra note 311, at 17.
475. Id.
476. Nevertheless, “pricing can be an enemy and an ally.” Cheetham, supra note
310, at 395. As one commentator explained:
[I]n the absence of very good control over the distribution of products, a low
price strategy for a select market will simply fuel counterfeiting’s close
cousin, diversion. In some cases, the effects can be so extreme that not only
will the low-priced products be diverted from their intended market but at
the same time, imitations and fakes will rapidly fill the void in the original
market.
Id.
477. A case in point is the reduction of pirated Taiwanese software in Hong Kong
after the Taiwanese software manufacturers lowered the prices of their software.
This example is drawn from the Author’s own experience in Hong Kong.
478. As one commentator recounted:
One joint venture publishing company which publishes popular comics
chose to compete directly against their pirates. Beyond wrapping the
magazine in hard-to-reproduce plastic, the company has continuously
upgraded the quality of the comic’s graphics and paper relative to pirate
editions, and included inexpensive, educational prizes with each issue.
These gambits have worked. Despite being significantly more expensive
than the pirated version, this popular comic book has seen increasing
subscriptions and readership, and the company is planning to expand its
operations.
Donaldson & Weiner, supra note 312, at 432; see also Long, China’s IP Reforms, supra
note 401 (arguing that post-sale benefits would create incentives for the Chinese to
buy legitimate products).
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479

Providing these post-sale benefits
in exchange for their money.
would therefore help convince the Chinese that legally-manufactured
480
goods are worth the higher price.
Step Eleven: Assist China to Reform Its Intellectual Property Laws
Given the very specialized nature of intellectual property laws, the
legal and technical assistance by the United States in drafting,
implementing, and enforcing laws will be very helpful. Indeed, both
481
482
the TRIPs Agreement and the Joint Statement have emphasized
the importance of such assistance. In providing legal assistance, the
United States needs to be careful about the laws and legal ideas they
will bring into China, because these laws and ideas usually “bring
483
their specific motivating values with them.”
For example, the

479. See Long, China’s IP Reforms, supra note 401.
480. See id.
481. The TRIPS Agreement requires developed countries to provide “assistance in
preparation of laws and regulations on the protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights as well as on the prevention of their abuse, and . . .
support regarding the establishment or reinforcement of domestic offices and
agencies relevant to these matters, including the training of personnel.” TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 5, art. 67, 33 I.L.M. at 1222-23.
482. See Joint Statement, supra note 14, at 1683 (“The United States and China
agree that promoting cooperation in the field of law serves the interests and needs of
both countries.”).
483. Geller, supra note 300, at 205; see ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, THE STATE, LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT 34 (1978) (stating that “legal transplants practically never work”); Otto
Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1, 27 (1974)
(“[A]ny attempt to use a pattern of law outside the environment of its origin . . .
requires a knowledge not only of the foreign law, but also of its social, and above all
its political, context.”); Herbert H.P. Ma, The Chinese Concept of the Individual and the
Reception of Foreign Law, 9 J. CHINESE L. 207 (1995) (discussing the cultural barrier to
the reception of Western laws in China); Julie Mertus, Mapping Civil Society
Transplants: A Preliminary Comparison of Eastern Europe and Latin America, 53 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 921 (1999) (arguing that foreign legal experts bring with them their own
cultural, social, and political misconceptions); Netanel, Asserting Copyright’s Democratic
Principles, supra note 375, at 274 (“[A] legal rule or doctrine often operates quite
differently, or carries very different symbolic content, when transplanted from the
source to the host jurisdiction. Even if a rule is transplanted word-for-word, it may
effectively be modified in substance or simply rendered irrelevant in the host
country.”); see also JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS &
FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA 280 (1980) (arguing that the law and development
movement is “an energetic but flawed attempt to provide American legal assistance
and to transfer American legal models, which were themselves flawed”); ALAN
WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 21-30 (2d ed.
1993) (arguing that the laws of one society are borrowed from another society);
Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models,
and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L.
179 (1999) (discussing American legal assistance to the post-Communist societies);
John V. Orth, Exporting the Rule of Law, 24 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 71, 82 (1998)
(“Legal culture is not so readily exportable as scientific culture, in which the medium
is the universal language of mathematics and experiments are reproducible abroad.
Law is inevitably more local.”); Ann Seidman & Robert B. Seidman, Drafting
Legislation for Development: Lessons from a Chinese Project, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1996)
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United States copyright law, in particular the 1976 Copyright Act, is
filled with compromises struck among American interest groups that
484
A verbatim transplant of this
participated in the drafting process.
statute into China would not only be inefficient, but could be indeed
harmful, if China was not facing similar interest group pressure or
did not have similar needs or concerns.
The United States also needs to pay special attention to how it

(discussing the difficulties encountered while assisting China in drafting its
legislation). As Professor Huntington cautioned us in his seminal work, Political
Order in Changing Societies:
In confronting the modernizing countries the United States was
handicapped by its happy history. In its development the United States was
blessed with more than its fair share of economic plenty, social well-being,
and political stability. This pleasant conjuncture of blessings led Americans
to believe in the unity of goodness: to assume that all good things go
together and that the achievement of one desirable social goal aids in the
achievement of others. In American policy toward modernizing countries
the experience was reflected in the belief that political stability would be the
natural and inevitable result of the achievement of first, economic
development and then of social reform. . . .
. . . In some instances programs of economic development may promote
political stability; in other instances they may seriously undermine such
stability . . . the relationship between social reform and political stability
resembled that between economic development and political stability. In
some circumstances reforms may reduce tensions and encourage peaceful
rather than violent change. In other circumstances, however, reform may
well exacerbate tensions, precipitate violence, and be a catalyst of rather
than a substitute for revolution.
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 5-7 (1968).
484. See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 857, 859 (1987); see also Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read,
13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 53 (1994) (“The only way that copyright laws get
passed in this country is for all the lawyers who represent the current stakeholders to
get together. . . . This process has produced laws that are unworkable from the
vantage point of people who were not among the negotiating parties.” (footnote
omitted)); Sterk, supra note 457 (arguing that American copyright protection
expands due to interest group politics and efforts by the nation’s elite to protect the
status quo). As Professor Netanel explained:
Like any complex body of law, copyright represents an uneasy
accommodation of competing interests and theoretical premises. However,
copyright is particularly unstable, largely because of rapid advances in the
technology for creating, reproducing, and communicating authors’ works,
which have in turn dramatically reconfigured, and portend further upheaval
in, the markets for those works. Battles have erupted over issues such as
whether copyright’s duration should be further extended, the extent to
which copyright holders should have exclusive control over creative
reformulations of their works (now including digital manipulation and
sampling), the extent to which traditional limitations and exceptions to
copyright holder rights should carry over into the digital environment, and
whether copyright holders should be able, through shrink wrap licenses and
web site access agreements, to contract out of such limitations and
exceptions. These and other deepening fault lines have in turn engendered
widespread debate over what are and should be copyright’s primary
objectives.
Netanel, Asserting Copyright’s Democratic Principles, supra note 375, at 225-26.
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structures its assistance efforts. The United States’s assistance efforts
to the former Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe have
demonstrated that assistance may either “bridge the gap or serve to
widen it,” depending on how the aid is structured and transferred
485
and on the relationship between the donor and donee countries.
Indeed, assistance can be competitive and may dominate power
486
An assistance effort that humiliates the receiver clearly
relations.
contravenes the goal and spirit behind the constructive strategic
487
partnership model.
When assisting China in revising its intellectual property laws, the
United States should focus on those problems that continue to
hamper the existing intellectual property regime in China. These
488
problems include the difficulties in monitoring a large territory, in
489
490
collecting evidence of infringement, and in collecting judgments,
491
492
widespread corruption, abuse by government officials, different

485. JAINE R. WEDEL, COLLISION AND COLLUSION: THE STRANGE CASE OF WESTERN
AID TO EASTERN EUROPE 1989-1998, at 6 (1998); id. at 7 (“In some instances, unwitting
donors sustained and even reinforced those legacies through their sheer
misunderstanding of them.”).
486. See Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 11; see also Nicholas D.
Kristof, Asians Worry That U.S. Aid Is a New Colonialism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1998, at
A4 (reporting on the concerns of the Asian countries that the American assistance
efforts may create a new form of colonialism).
487. See DE BARY, supra note 302, at 9 (“[D]iplomacy . . . requires tact; it cannot
succeed if the other party is discountenanced and left humiliated.”).
488. See Lagerqvist & Riley, supra note 311, at 16 (“The [piracy] problem is partly
logistical, as it is difficult to monitor a territory as large as China effectively enough to
keep on top of the counterfeiters and to act swiftly against every act or potential act
of infringement or counterfeiting.”).
489. See id. at 28 (“Because injunction orders for the preservation of evidence are
generally unavailable in China except in the form of ‘sealing up’ company assets—
which amounts to shutting down the company—there is little to stop infringers from
simply taking away the evidence of infringement.”); see also Cheng, supra note 187, at
1969 (“Continued widespread piracy resulted largely from the fact that pirates were
able to destroy crucial evidence because Chinese authorities delayed in responding
to allegations of piracy by infringing stores, factories, and distribution centers.”). But
see Trademark Protection in China: Procedure and Strategy, Pat. Trademark & Copyright
L. Daily (BNA), at D2 (Feb. 18, 1998) (arguing that a conservation measure
proceeding, which is similar to a preliminary injunction, is available to seize the
allegedly infringing goods after the plaintiff lodges the complaint).
490. See Mary L. Riley, Enforcement in a Nutshell, in PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra note 140, at 73; Berkman, supra note 102, at 25
(“There is a widespread belief that court orders can be ignored with impunity since
the authority of judges to impose penalties on recalcitrant parties is questionable. . . .
Courts and successful litigants also face significant resistance when seeking to
enforce a judgment outside the jurisdiction in which it was rendered.”); Kolton,
supra note 316, at 448 (explaining the difficulty of collecting judgements in China
even after damages have been awarded by the People’s Courts).
491. See CORNE, supra note 320, at 285 (“Enforcement patterns reflect whether or
not one can attract the patronage of the ‘right official’ for the personalized ‘quick
fix’ rather than codified substantive or procedural norms.”); Kolton, supra note 316,
at 449 (“Many Chinese infringers are protected by Chinese officials and,
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493

the
values placed on intellectual property infringement,
494
local
indistinguishability between public and private entities,
495
496
protectionism, and the decentralization of government.

consequently, are beyond the Intellectual Property Courts’ ability to prosecute. . . .
The Chinese Trade Minister has confided that at least one [compact disc] factory is
‘untouchable’ because of its owner’s ties with the Chinese military . . . .”);
Tiefenbrun, supra note 35, at 68 (“People in [China] are accustomed to function
according to a corrupt system of favors which may still be prevalent in the court
system.”).
492. See Tiefenbrun, supra note 35, at 9 (“[In China,] the government,
government institutions, and many individuals allegedly engage in pirating.
Government violations of domestic and international intellectual property law make
it all the more difficult to discourage this illegal practice by corporations and
individuals.”).
493. See Linus Chua, China Steps up Enforcement Piracy Laws, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4,
1994, at D3 (reporting on a fine of $91 levied against a Chinese company
counterfeiting Disney’s Mickey Mouse trademark); Matt Forney, Microsoft Furious over
China’s Trademark Ruling, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Feb. 4, 1994 (reporting on a fine of
$260 imposed on a Shenzhen University research institute for counterfeiting more
than 650,000 Microsoft trademark holograms); see also 2000 NTE REPORT, supra note
155, at 50 (indicating concerns over the “reluctance or inability on the part of
enforcement officials to impose deterrent level penalties”); Butterton, supra note
223, at 1104 (stating that fines were not broadly applied or sufficiently substantial to
serve as deterrents); Lagerqvist & Riley, supra note 311, at 16 (stating that damages
awards are so low that there is no deterrent effect). Nevertheless, the awards have
been increasing. See, e.g., $1.5m Bill for Beijing Pirate, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1996, at 4
(reporting on an award of 13 million yuan to a local software manufacturer); CD
Pirate Gets Jail Term and $7m Fine Over Counterfeits, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 8,
1996, at 4 (reporting on an award of 6.67 million yuan to the record industry).
494. See PEARSON, supra note 345, at 40 (noting the difficulty in distinguishing in
post-Mao China between what is within the Party-state and what falls outside of it);
William Alford, Underestimating a Complex China, CHI. TRIB., May 24, 1994, at 23
(stating that many of the businesses that the American media describe as
independent from state control are actually owned in large part by the Chinese
government or the Communist Party).
495. See CORNE, supra note 320, at 240 (“Government bureaux are still linked to
production facilities and foreign trading corporations. When licenses or permits are
needed, . . . the administrative organ with jurisdiction to handle the matter will only
grant the license or permit to the extent that it does not threaten a domestic
interest . . . .”); Berkman, supra note 102, at 17 (“While Beijing’s directives generally
are implemented without question, protection of intellectual property rights may be
one area where Beijing’s support is not alone sufficient.”); Li, supra note 314, at 401
(commenting that the consent and cooperation of local governments are often
needed to implement a national plan); Lucian Pye, China: Erratic State, Frustrated
Society, FOREIGN AFF., Fall 1990, at 58, 58 (“[China] is a civilization pretending to be a
state.”); Gerald Segal, The Muddle Kingdom? China’s Changing Shape, FOREIGN AFF.,
May/June 1994, at 43, 58 (“[F]oreigners who want to trade with China are best
advised to think in terms of provinces or localities. It is [the local authorities] who
can guarantee the transparency of global trading regulations or resolve disputes over
intellectual property.”); Kolton, supra note 316, at 448 (“[Piracy p]roblems arise from
flaws in the Chinese legal system, which allows for local protectionism both in the
adjudication process and the enforcement process.”); id. at 448-49 (“[P]articipation
by local Chinese authorities generally is needed to enforce People’s Court orders,
which they might be unwilling to offer if doing so would be detrimental to their
authority, especially if the judgment comes from a jurisdiction outside the scope of
such officers’ authority.”); see also CHINA DECONSTRUCTS: POLITICS, TRADE, AND
REGIONALISM (David S.G. Goodman & Gerald Segal eds., 1994) [hereinafter CHINA
DECONSTRUCTS] (examining the regional political and economic disparities in
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Local protectionism has been a long-standing problem whose
497
origin can be traced back to the Qing dynasty or even further to the
498
previous dynasties. Even though there have been substantial efforts
to centralize power in the Chinese Communist Party in the 1950s and

China); DONG, ET AL., supra note 359, at 196 (“In China, local governments are highly
protective of their own interests. A well-known expression in China sums up the
protectionist attitudes of local governments: ‘The central government has policies
but the local governments have policy-proof devices.’”); EDWARD FRIEDMAN, NATIONAL
IDENTITY AND DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS IN SOCIALIST CHINA (1995) (arguing that two
distinct regional identities exist in China). By contrast, one commentator argued
that China always used local protectionism as an excuse for not complying with its
intellectual property agreements:
It is laughable to hear excuses from Beijing that they can’t control the 50
pirate CD factories. If they were turning out thousands of copies of the BBC
documentary on the Tiananmen Square protest—rather than bootleg copies
of “The Lion King”—the factory managers would be sharing a cell with other
dissidents in a heartbeat.
James Shinn, The China Crunch; Three Crises Loom in the Next 30 Days, WASH. POST, Feb.
18, 1996, at C1.
496. See Hu, supra note 69, at 106 (“[E]conomic decentralization originally
intended as an incentive for local development has caused the central government to
lose control over local administrators; many of them strive for economic growth at
the price of leaving legitimate copyright interests unprotected.”); see also XIANFA art.
101 (1982) (amended Mar. 29, 1993) (granting local people’s congresses the power
to elect and dismiss officials); Stanley B. Lubman, Does Beijing Signify Anything, with
Power Flowing to Provinces, Cities?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1995, at M2 (discussing the
problem of a decentralized Chinese government). One commentator explained the
lack of centralized leadership:
Ideally, authorities are supposed to share power according to a system of
dual rule (shuangchang lingdao). Problems that arise are supposed to be
resolved by the unifying authority of the CCP at the same level, which
normally has an office and a deputy secretary in charge of the area in
question, and which has jurisdiction over it. In reality, however, there is no
dual rule. There is rule by either tiao tiao or kuai kuai authorities depending
on their relative power and the issue at hand.
CORNE, supra note 320, at 87 (footnote omitted).
497. For example, regionalism was one of the main causes for the failure of the
Self-Strengthening Movement conducted by the Qing government in the latter half
of the nineteenth century:
The provincial promoters of Self-strengthening rivaled rather than
cooperated with each other and regarded their achievements as the
foundation of personal power. Their sense of regionalism and their
eagerness for self-preservation persisted so strongly that during the French
war of 1884 the Peiyang and Nanyang fleets refused to go to the rescue of
the Fukien fleet under enemy attack, and during the Japanese war of 1894-95
the Nanyang fleet maintained “neutrality” while the Peiyang fleet alone
fought the Japanese navy. The results of both wars were, of course,
disastrous.
HSÜ, supra note 158, at 288.
498. See CORNE, supra note 320, at 124 (“China is a country which encompasses
regions at vastly different stages of economic development, every province, city and
county having its own peculiar features and problems.”); MILTON MUELLER & ZIXIANG
TAN, CHINA IN THE INFORMATION AGE: TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE DILEMMAS OF
REFORM 10 (1997) (emphasizing the historical instability among central and regional
governments in China); Berkman, supra note 102, at 17 (“Imperial China was
infamous for its hydra-headed bureaucracy and the inability of the Imperial Court to
control the authority of local elites.”).
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499

1960s, recent economic reforms have led to greater autonomy of
500
Even worse, many of these
regional and local governments.
governments are “owners of the vast bulk of enterprises in China
which are likely to be violators of [intellectual property] regulations,
and thus have a direct economic interest in the income accruing
501
from such violations.”
Thus, the continuing economic
modernization process and the decentralization movement will
further exacerbate the existing law enforcement problem. Indeed,
the decentralization movement may even make bilateral intellectual
property negotiation more difficult, because what was agreed in
Beijing may not necessarily be enforceable in Guangzhou.
Step Twelve: Develop a New and Harmonized International Intellectual
Property Regime
In light of the need for global cooperation, the significant
differences between China and the West, and China’s leadership in
Asia and growing world power status, a new intellectual property
regime that takes political, social, economic, and cultural differences
502
into consideration is greatly needed.
One should, however, not

499. See Dali L. Yang, Reform and the Restructuring of Central-Local Relations, in CHINA
DECONSTRUCTS, supra note 495, at 62-74.
500. See sources cited supra note 345.
501. See Andrew G. Walder, Harmonization: Myth and Ceremony? A Comment,
13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 163, 165 (1994); see also Hu, supra note 69, at 106 (“[M]any
local government entities either use pirated materials or have financial interests in
the illegal production of copyrighted products. Such entanglement of financial
interest by local officials make copyright enforcement even more difficult and
intriguing.” (footnote omitted)).
502. See ENDESHAW, supra note 286, at 47 (arguing that less developed countries
may be able to modernize if “they manage to grasp the internal dynamic that
operates in each of them and devise appropriate economic and technological
polices, without neglecting social and political aspects”); id. at 98-142 (outlining a
proposal for an intellectual property system in non-industrial countries); Carlos M.
Correa, Harmonization of Intellectual Property Rights in Latin America: Is There Still Room
for Differentiation?, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 109, 129 (1997) (“Differentiation . . .
looks desirable in that it permits countries in the Latin tradition to retain a system
that responds to their own cultural perceptions of creation and protects the moral
and economic rights of all interested parties.”); Claudio R. Frischtak, Harmonization
Versus Differentiation in Intellectual Property Rights Regime, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 320, at 89 (arguing that countries should
tailor their intellectual property system by taking into account their economic needs,
productive and research capabilities, and institutional and budgetary constraints);
Oddi, International Patent System, supra note 244, at 866-74 (outlining a proposal for a
patent system in less developed countries); Sherwood, Why a Uniform Intellectual
Property System Makes Sense, supra note 320, at 68 (“The first characteristic of the
uniform system being proposed is that the specific intellectual property systems
being proposed is that the specific intellectual property systems of individual
countries need not be identical.”); David Silverstein, Intellectual Property Rights,
Trading Patterns and Practices, Wealth Distribution, Development and Standards of Living:
A North-South Perspective on Patent Law Harmonization, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
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confuse this regime with a universalized Western intellectual property
regime. In fact, the American government “sometimes confuses its
503
natural policy preferences with ‘international norms’” and ignores
the interests of other countries, particularly less developed
504
Although the U.S. government “claims that stronger
countries.
intellectual property protection will benefit developing countries, this
relationship has yet to be demonstrated in either economic theory or
505
empirical proof.”
Likewise, the presumption that a universalized
506
regime would maximize global welfare is equally questionable. Also
doubtful is the “assum[ption] that the current level of intellectual

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 4, at 156 (“[A] truly successful IP system must be
culturally-specific and responsive to the different economic and social realities of
each country.”); id. at 171 (“[I]t cannot be taken for granted that a Western IP
system will be either beneficial to or successful in other countries with different
cultures.”); see also PHILIP LEITH, HARMONISATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
EUROPE: A CASE STUDY OF PATENT PROCEDURE (1998) (discussing efforts to harmonize
patent law throughout the European Union).
Professor Huntington cautioned that full harmonization may threaten the United
States, the West, and the rest of the world:
Some Americans have promoted multiculturalism at home; some have
promoted universalism abroad; and some have done both. Multiculturalism
at home threatens the United States and the West; universalism abroad
threatens the West and the world. Both deny the uniqueness of Western
culture. The global monoculturalists want to take the world like America.
The domestic multiculturalists want to make America like the world. A
multicultural American is impossible because a non-Western America is not
American. A multicultural world is unavoidable because global empire is
impossible. The preservation of the United States and the West requires the
renewal of Western identity. The security of the world requires acceptance
of global multiculturality.
HUNTINGTON, CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS, supra note 250, at 318; see also Keohane, supra
note 204, at 141-71 (exploring why self-interested actors in world politics should seek
to establish international regimes through mutual agreement). See generally
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 199, for an excellent collection of essays
discussing international regimes.
503. Lampton, supra note 188, at 133; see also ENDESHAW, supra note 286, at 80
(“[T]he US drive for stronger protection of IP is more in the direction of devising a
new legal regime that answers to its needs than to accommodate within the present
conventions upcoming global trends in technology creation and use.”).
504. See Burrell, supra note 250, at 198 (arguing that the Western approach toward
China “fails to respect other voices and other traditions and instead posits the moral
superiority of a value system which is far more recent than the tradition it seeks to
condemn”).
505. SELL, supra note 333, at 221; see also Frischtak, supra note 502, at 90 (“There is
little in economic theory to support convergence of IPR systems on a cross-country
basis, particularly if convergence means an increase in the level of protection in
developing and industrializing countries.”). But see Richard T. Rapp & Richard P.
Rozek, Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries, 24 J.
WORLD TRADE 75 (1990) (asserting that the level of economic development is closely
correlated to the existing level of intellectual property protection).
506. See Correa, supra note 502, at 126; Frischtak, supra note 502, at 103-05 (urging
countries to develop their intellectual property rights regime according to their own
needs); see also Keohane, supra note 204, at 152 (arguing that an international regime
may not yield overall welfare benefits and that actors outside the regime may suffer).
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property strikes the right balance between incentives to future
production, the free flow of information and the preservation of the
507
public domain in the interest of potential future creators.” Indeed,
many Americans disagree on the proper balance between intellectual
property protection and the access to information “needed to spur
further innovation and ensure the citizenry’s full participation in our
508
democratic polity.” The Americans also disagree on the expediency
509
and constitutionality of American database protection legislation.
Adherents of the realist theory of international relations will find
even more unconvincing the argument that the Western intellectual
property regime represents universal values. As many scholars
pointed out, the Western intellectual property regime becomes
universal because it is backed by great economic and military might,
rather than because of its “appeal to common sense or . . . innate
510
conceptual force.” Indeed, it was not until the eighteenth century

507. BOYLE, supra note 5, at 124; see J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers:
Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 11, 24
(1997) [hereinafter Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers] (arguing that
policymakers in many developed countries take the existing levels of innovative
strength for granted and mistakenly promote protectionism); see also F.A. HAYEK, THE
FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (W.W. Bartley III ed., 1988) (“While
property is initially a product of custom, and jurisdiction and legislation have merely
developed it in the course of millennia, there is then no reason to suppose that the
particular forms it has assumed in the contemporary world are final.”).
508. Alford, How Theory Does—and Does Not—Matter, supra note 265, at 22; see
Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright, Computer Software and the New Protectionism, 28 JURIMETRICS
J. 33 (1987) (arguing that policymakers and the judiciary should not automatically
apply the existing copyright paradigm to computer software); John Perry Barlow, The
Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Rethinking Patents & Copyrights in the Digital Age
(Everything You Know About Intellectual Property Is Wrong), WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84
(arguing against the need for copyright in digital media).
509. For discussions of the expediency and constitutionality of American database
protection legislation, see generally Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database
Protection: The Role of Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in
Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535 (2000); Marci A. Hamilton, A Response to
Professor Benkler, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 629 (2000); Malla Pollack, The Right to Know?;
Delimiting Database Protection at the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property
Clause, and the First Amendment, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 47 (1999); J.H. Reichman
& Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent Developments and Their
Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793 (1999); J.H. Reichman &
Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997);
Peter K. Yu, Evolving Legal Protection for Database, GIGALAW.COM, Dec. 2000, at
http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/yu-2000-12-pl.html.
510. Alford, How Theory Does—and Does Not—Matter, supra note 265, at 17; see
ENDESHAW, supra note 286, at 93 (“[W]hether or not [intellectual property] was
consciously designed to serve economic policies in any of the [industrialized
countries], it has always evolved in response to economic and political necessity.”); see
also ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES:
AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 247 (1998) (“The range of Western
beliefs that define intellectual and cultural property laws . . . are not universal values
that express the full range of human possibility, but particular, interested fictions
emergent from a history of colonialism that has disempowered many of the world’s
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that the contemporary notion of authorship was developed. Unlike
contemporary writers, “[m]edieval church writers actively
disapproved of the elements of originality and creativeness which we
think of as essential component of authorship. ‘They valued extant
old books more highly than any recent elucubrations and they put the
512
work of the scribe and the copyist above that of the authors.’” Even though
writers in later periods changed their attitudes toward originality and
513
they did not espouse modern attitudes toward
creativeness,
514
plagiarism.
Rather, like the Chinese people, they regarded
imitation as the sincerest form of flattery or a necessary component
515
For example, in The Defence of Poesy, Sir
of the creative process.
Philip Sidney maintained that poetry “is an art of imitation . . . [and]
516
counterfeiting.”
Likewise, “Shakespeare engaged regularly in
activity that we would call plagiarism but that Elizabethan playwrights
517
saw as perfectly harmless, perhaps even complimentary.”

peoples.”). Indeed, Western culture and ideology are sometimes attractive because
they are backed by hard economic and military power. As Professor Huntington
explained:
[Culture and ideology] becomes attractive when they are seen as rooted in
material success and influence. . . . Increases in hard economic and military
power produce enhanced self-confidence, arrogance, and belief in the
superiority of one’s own culture or soft power compared to those of other
peoples and greatly increase its attractiveness to other peoples. Decreases in
economic and military power lead to self-doubt, crises of identity, and efforts
to find in other cultures the keys to economic, military, and political success.
HUNTINGTON, CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS, supra note 250, at 92.
511. See MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993);
Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the
Emergence of the ‘Author,’ 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDS. 425 (1984).
512. BOYLE, supra note 5, at 53 (quoting ERNST P. GOLDSCHMIDT, MEDIEVAL TEXTS
AND THEIR FIRST APPEARANCE IN PRINT 112 (1943)).
513. See id. at 54-58 (discussing the development of modern concepts of plagiarism
and copyright).
514. See id. at 54 (commenting that modern notions of plagiarism were slow to
develop).
515. See id.; see also Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 11 (noting that
the Chinese considered copying as a form of respect related to ancestor worship).
516. SIR PHILIP SIDNEY, THE DEFENSE OF POESY (1595), reprinted in THE NORTON
ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE 479, 483 (M.H. Abrams ed., 6th ed. 1993)
(footnote omitted); see also ROSE, supra note 511, at 13 (discussing Sir Philip Sidney’s
The Defense of Poesy).
517. BOYLE, supra note 5, at 230 n.12; RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A
MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 382 & n.3 (1988) (“Shakespeare was by modern standards
a plagiarist, but by the standards of his time not. . . . A competing playwright, Robert
Greene, called Shakespeare ‘an upstart Crow, beautified with our feathers.’”); see also
ALEXANDER LINDEY, PLAGIARISM AND ORIGINALITY 72 (1952) (“Borrowing flourished in
sixteenth-century England. It was often flagrant enough to constitute plagiarism.
The Elizabethans did not bother to devise plots, incidents and characters; they lifted
them from their predecessors and from each other.”). It was often flagrant enough
to constitute plagiarism.”).
As Professor Boyle pointed out, Shakespeare’s
“plagiarism” is the main reason why critics doubted the authorship of what we
generally attribute to Shakespeare. BOYLE, supra note 5, at 230 n.12; see also JOHN
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Furthermore, a Western intellectual property regime may
contradict the economic policies of the less developed countries.
Consider copyright for example. Copyright is an economic incentive
regime that grants authors the exclusive rights to control and profit
from the use of their intellectual creations while permitting uses that
foster the creation and dissemination of intellectual works for the
518
Due to different social, political, and economic
public welfare.
needs, different countries have to make different value judgments as
to what would best promote the creation and dissemination of
intellectual works in their own countries. Some governments have
not developed to an economic level that makes Western intellectual
519
property protection a cost-effective and sound government policy.
Similarly, by promoting a uniform incentive scheme, a
universalized regime ignores the fact that different countries need
different incentive schemes. Consider for example the duration of a
patent. Economists have shown that the “length of protection for a
given product should be inversely related to the length of elasticity of
demand and the social rate of discount, and positively related to R&D
520
returns.”
Because markets in different countries differ in their

MICELL, WHO WROTE SHAKESPEARE? (1999) (examining questions concerning the
authorship of Shakespeare’s plays and sonnets); James Boyle, The Search for an Author:
Shakespeare and the Framers, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 625 (1988) (examining the similarities
between textual indeterminancy and the notion of romantic authorship).
518. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984)
(“‘The immediate effect of [United States] copyright law is to secure a fair return for
an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate
artistic creativity for the general public good.’” (quoting Twentieth Century Music
Corp., 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975))); Peter K. Yu, Note, Fictional Persona Test: Copyright
Preemption in Human Audiovisual Characters, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 355, 382-85, 398-400
(1998) (discussing the economic incentives created by U.S. copyright laws). For
excellent economic analyses of copyright law, see generally Richard P. Adelstein &
Steven I. Peretz, The Competition of Technologies in Markets for Ideas: Copyright and Fair
Use in Evolutionary Perspective, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 209 (1985); Landes & Posner,
supra note 283, at 325.
519. See RYAN, supra note 251, at 75; see also Conferences: Intellectual Property Lawyers
Lament Supreme Court Federalism, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA), at D3
(Nov. 22, 1999) (reporting that a Ukranian government minister told Judge Randall
Rader that honoring U.S. intellectual property rights on products used in Ukraine
would cost half of the country’s gross national product).
520. As Claudio Frischtak explained:
Nordhaus assumes a competitive world, with inventors producing small
process innovations; the objective is to maximize the net welfare to society,
provided the innovator’s returns are sufficient to ensure that the innovation
becomes available to society. The intuition behind Nordhaus’s results is that
the length of protection should be longer, the more insensitive demand is to
price changes or the harder it is to innovate, so that it would take longer for
the innovator to reap the necessary returns; similarly the longer terms of
protection are optimal if society can “wait” to appropriate the gains from the
invention (the social rate of discount is low).
Frischtak, supra note 502, at 97 (citing WILLIAM NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH AND
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levels of income and preferences, it is likely that different countries
would have different elasticities, discount rates, and research and
521
development productivities. Thus, strict equality in the duration of
522
patents would not be justified.
Finally, intellectual property protection involves a fundamental
523
debate about economic development strategy.
Such protection,
therefore may threaten the established relationships of business and
524
government. It may also put the ruling elites in the less developed
525
countries in a very difficult, if not precarious, position.
For
example, in 1987 Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond’s
administration was ousted in a no-confidence vote after it attempted
526
to strengthen the country’s copyright laws.
Fearing similar
repercussions, the South Korean government was very sensitive to the
political threats posed by college students who were concerned about

WELFARE (1969)).
521. See id.
522. See id.
523. See THUROW, supra note 362, at 128 (asserting that countries with different
levels of economic development desire, need, and should have different intellectual
property systems); Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers, supra note 507, at 25
(“[A]dherence to the TRIPS Agreement requires [the less developed] countries to
reconcile their own economic development goals with its international intellectual
property norms.”); see also MacLaughlin et al., supra note 329, at 89 (examining
whether intellectual property protection is of net benefit to the less developed
countries); Oddi, International Patent System, supra note 244, at 865 (arguing that the
Paris Convention incurs significant costs to the less developed countries); J.H.
Reichman, Beyond the Historical Lines of Demarcation: Competition Law, Intellectual
Property Rights, and International Trade After the GATT’s Uruguay Round, 20 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 75, 81 (1993) (“[P]olicymkaers concerned to promote investment in
important new technologies often overstate the supposed benefits of specific
intellectual property regimes while ignoring the negative economic functions of
these regimes in relation to the complementary operations of competition law
generally.”).
524. See RYAN, supra note 251, at 144.
525. See SELL, supra note 333, at 215; id. (“If they succumb to U.S. pressure, they
are subject to criticisms of selling out sovereignty to foreign interests.”); Burrell,
supra note 250, at 207 (“Clearly no Chinese leader could be seen bowing to pressure
from the United States without being in danger of undermining his own position, a
difficult which goes some way towards explaining much of the brinkmanship which
has characterised the negotiations between China and the United States on the
issue.”); see also MILNER, supra note 295, at 33 (“[T]he structure of domestic
preferences holds a key to understanding international cooperation.”); id. at 246-47
(arguing that international cooperation is the continuation of domestic politics by
other means); Ronald Rogowski, Institutions as Constraints on Strategic Choice, in
STRATEGIC CHOICE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 9, at 115 (arguing that
domestic political institutions affect the formation of foreign policy and the
strategies actors choose); Renato Ruggiero, Whither the Trade System Next?, in URUGUAY
ROUND AND BEYOND, supra note 228, at 123, 139 (arguing that the post-Cold War
international system “is blurring the distinction between foreign and domestic
policies”).
526. See SELL, supra note 333, at 192.
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increased textbook prices resulting from efforts to curtail piracy.
In sum, due to the variations in the level of wealth, economic
structure, technological capability, political system, and cultural
tradition, different states have different goals, interests, and political
528
pressures.
China and the United States therefore should join
together to develop a new international intellectual property regime,
529
rather than to universalize the existing Western regime.
In
particular, this new regime must recognize the difficulties in
“reconciling legal values, institutions, and forms generated in the
West with the legacy of China’s past and the constraints imposed by
530
its present circumstances.”
Harmonization is not an easy process. It is even more difficult,
considering the significant political, economic, social, and cultural
531
Nevertheless, a
differences between China and the West.

527. See RYAN, supra note 251, at 75.
528. See SELL, supra note 333, at 191, 201; see also Giunta & Shang, supra note 322,
at 333 (“Fundamental differences in concepts of ownership and legal regimes
provide at least some explanation as to why it has been so difficult to draft a
multilateral intellectual property agreement. A favorable agreement for one country
could be unfavorable for another country.”).
529. See THUROW, supra note 362, at 256 (“[An international intellectual property
system] is not something that can be built by any one country and then imposed on
the rest of the world. It will have to be built by the world for the world.”).
530. ALFORD, supra note 23, at 2.
531. To understand the difficulty of the harmonization process, it is illustrative to
look at the difficulty the European Community faced in its attempt to harmonize the
trademark laws of its members:
Although trademarks are an important form of intellectual property, they do
not have the same bearing on science and technology as patents and
copyright, but two aspects of the European Community’s experience in this
field are relevant and worth a brief mention. The first is that although the
economic pressure to “globalize” the use of trademarks is strong and has
benefited some firms trading in Europe, such as the Mars Corporation, there
is still a cultural and linguistic resistance to the process. Thus, there is not
quite the degree of support for a pan-European trademark system that the
community authorities had expected. The second is that while the EC is
nevertheless going ahead with its proposals for a community trademark, it is
hamstrung by a purely political dispute over where the trademark office
should be located. This is a salutary reminder that the concerns of
intellectual property experts are in the last event always subordinate to the
political process and that legislation on intellectual property is ultimately
determined by political considerations.
Bryan Harris, The European Community, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 320, at 158, 160.
At an international intellectual property conference organized by the National
Research Council, an observer from the Arab Society for the Protection of Industrial
Property noted great difficulty in harmonizing intellectual property laws of a lessdeveloped country with those of the United States:
[H]armonization among the United States, Japan, and the EC seemed the
most feasible, not because there are fewer disagreements or differences in
their IPR systems, but because they collectively possess nearly all of the
technological capacity in the world and have a natural, common interest in
establishing strong protection for their assets. By the same logic, . . . it
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harmonized regime would be in the interest of both countries. Given
the fact that a majority of the American economy is knowledge-based
and technology-driven, the importance of a harmonized regime to
the United States is apparent. Although the Chinese economy has
not reached the stage where information will become a major sector,
a harmonized regime is also crucial to China. Such a regime will
allow China to trade effectively with other Western countries. It will
also generate the substantial capital needed for the modernization
process and will allow China to take advantage of the new
globalization trends and e-commerce opportunities. In fact, while
532
China is undergoing modernization, the harmonization process will
provide China with a full grasp of the Western intellectual property
regime. This grasp will help Chinese leaders understand the
principles behind Western economic systems and anticipate the
problems that may occur during this critical transitional period. It
will also allow the leaders to assess the strengths and weaknesses of a
market economy and to design an economic development strategy
that matches China’s present conditions. As Chairman Mao once
wrote, “If you want to know the taste of a pear, you must change the
533
pear by eating it yourself.”
In constructing the new regime, the legal specialists of the two
countries need to pay special attention to the weakness of the existing
Western intellectual property regime. The Western intellectual
property regime tends to “value the raw materials for the production
534
It disproportionately favors the
of intellectual property at zero.”
developed countries’ contributions to world science and culture
while ignoring the interests of the less developed countries that
535
supply the raw materials.
Even worse, these raw materials may
include cultural heritage, which is rare, unique, irreplaceable, and
536
invaluable. The Chinese civilization has over 4000 years of history

should not be surprising that there is little incentive for the rest of the world
to embrace this level of protection, since the majority of the world operates
under completely different circumstances.
Discussion, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 320,
at 183, 185.
532. See generally OVERHOLT, supra note 181, for an overview of China’s
modernization efforts in the post-Mao era.
533. Tse-tung Mao, On Practice, in 1 SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 300 (1965),
quoted in NATHAN, supra note 231, at 1.
534. BOYLE, supra note 5, at 126.
535. See Bellagio Declaration, reprinted in BOYLE, supra note 5, at 192, 195.
536. See Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict of May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property] (declaring that each cultural group contributes
invaluable cultural heritage to the world).
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and is made up of the majority Han Chinese and a great variety of
537
minority cultures, bringing with them rich tradition, indigenous art,
538
and native medical knowledge.
The loss of these cultures and
cultural knowledge is not only a loss to the Chinese civilization, but to
539
all humanity.
To protect against this bias against indigenous cultural materials,
540
the Bellagio Declaration called our attention to the scientific and
artistic contributions of minority cultures and the lack of
541
representation from these cultures. As the Declaration stated:
Contemporary intellectual property law is constructed around the
notion of the author, the individual, solitary and original
creator . . . . Those who do not fit this model—custodians of tribal
culture and medical knowledge, collectives practicing traditional
artistic and music forms, or peasant cultivators of valuable seed
varieties, for example—are denied intellectual property
542
protection.

The Western intellectual property regime has resulted in a massive
outflow of traditional knowledge, folklore, genetic material, and
543
native medical knowledge and has threatened the very existence of
544
indigenous cultures. By scrutinizing the structural and ideological

537. “The largest of the fifty-six minority groups are the Zhuangs (15.4 million),
Hui or Chinese Muslims (8.6 million), Uygur (7.2 million), Yi (6.5 milion), Tibetans
(4.5 million), Miao (7.3 million), Manchus (9.8 milllion), Mongols (4.8 million).
Bouyei (2.1 million), and Koreans (1.9 million).” JAMES C.F. WANG, CONTEMPORARY
CHINESE POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION 176 (6th ed. 1999).
538. See generally VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 249, for a collection of
essays examining the protection of indigenous knowledge.
539. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, supra note 536,
at 240 (stating that cultural artifacts are the “cultural heritage of all mankind”);
Thomas Bishop, France and the Need for Cultural Exception, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
187, 187 (1997) (“Each country, although it needs to be open to the cultures of
other lands, has a right—even a duty—to protect and develop its own culture. This
disappearance of one country’s culture cannot be made up by another’s gain; the
result would be an irretrievable loss for all humanity.”); Sarah Harding, Justifying
Repatriation of Native American Cultural Property, 73 IND. L.J. 723, 769 (1997) (arguing
that cultural property connects different cultures and promotes a common heritage);
J.H. Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CAL. L. REV. 339, 349 (1989)
(arguing that cultural property promotes “participation in a common human
enterprise”).
540. See Bellagio Declaration, reprinted in BOYLE, supra note 5, at 192-95.
541. See id. at 193.
542. Id. at 195.
543. See id. at 193.
544. See id. at 196. One commentator described this threat as follows:
The very cultural heritage that gives indigenous peoples their identity, now
far more than in the past, is under real or potential assault from those who
would gather it up, strip away its honored meanings, convert it to a product,
and sell it. Each time that happens the cultural heritage itself dies a little,
and with it its people.
Thomas Greaves, Tribal Rights, in VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 249, at 25,

YUPPREPAGED6501USETHISONE.DOC

242

8/15/2001 11:34 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:131

assumptions built within the Western intellectual property regime,
the policymakers in the two countries would be able to pay special
545
By doing so,
attention to the interests of nonauthorial producers.
the policymakers would also be able to acknowledge the importance
of protecting folkloric works, works of cultural heritage, and
546
biological and ecological know-how of traditional peoples.
CONCLUSION
After a decade of heightened tension between China and the
United States, the two countries have finally decided to build a more
stable and healthy relationship with each other. The Joint Statement
issued after the 1997 U.S.-China Summit not only presents a new
model upon which the two countries can build their diplomatic
relations, but also provides a conceptual framework under which
policymakers can develop a new bilateral intellectual property policy.
This Article argues that the 1997 U.S.-China Summit and the
constructive strategic partnership model pronounced in the Joint
Statement may spell an end to the decade-long coercive American
intellectual property policy toward China, which is inconsistent with
the goal or definition of the partnership model. The twelve-step
action plan based on the new constructive strategic partnership
model developed in this article will help policymakers formulate a
new bilateral policy. Targeting the shortcomings of the existing
ineffective American foreign intellectual property policy, this action
plan strives to cultivate a more stable and harmonious relationship
between the two countries, to foster better mutual understanding of
each other, and to promote a self-sustainable intellectual property

25.
545. See Bellagio Declaration, reprinted in BOYLE, supra note 5, at 194 (advocating
the protection of the interests of the nonauthorial producers); see also Burrell, supra
note 250, at 224 (“It is only when the principle of equitable treatment has been
accepted that other cultures and other voices will be treated with the respect and
concern to which they are entitled.”); Greaves, supra note 544, at 26 (“Western
Intellectual property protections not only fail to protect indigenous knowledge; they
protect its appropriation by others.”).
546. See Bellagio Declaration, reprinted in BOYLE, supra note 5, at 194. Most
recently, some countries and policymakers have emphasized the need for a “cultural
exception” in international agreements. See, e.g., Council Directive 89/552 on
Television Without Frontiers, art. 4, 1989 O.J. (L 298) 26 (requiring that 50% of
audiovisual products broadcast over European television to be of European origin);
North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, Annex 2106,
32 I.L.M. 289, 702 (providing the cultural industries exemption); William Drozdiak,
With Deadline Looming Before Trade Talks, U.S., France Trade Blame, WASH. POST, Oct. 16,
1993, at A14 (reporting that the French Cultural Minister argued that culture could
not be included in any global trade deal lest it leads to “the mental colonization of
Europe and the progressive destruction of its imagination”).
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regime in China.
The action plan does not intend to offer an exhaustive list of
actions that are available to the United States in reconciling its
foreign intellectual property policy. Apparently, with the continuous
growth and modernization of the Chinese economy and the
increasing globalization of information technologies and products,
creating such a list would be impossible. Thus, the action plan
merely aspires to present a conceptual framework under which
American policymakers can reformulate its current wrongheaded
policy. The test of the plan is not whether it can eradicate completely
the piracy problem in the near future, but whether it offers a
meaningful direction in which such a problem can be eradicated.
Within the last two decades, China has become one of the fastest
growing economies in the world. Although there are still differences
between China and the United States, cooperation with China has
apparently become more beneficial to the U.S. interests than
confronting China. The 1997 U.S.-China Summit has provided a
great opportunity for both countries to mend their bilateral
relationship. Whether the constructive strategic partnership will
become a success or just another empty label will depend on the will
and the vision of the leaders of both countries and the support of
their constituents, including the very powerful American business
sector.

